AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: UZBEKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001451 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/19 TAGS: PGOV PREL UZ AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: UZBEKISTAN REF: STATE 85136 CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) We have urged the Uzbeks to play a constructive role as the Afghan elections unfold. Ambassador discussed reftel points with Deputy FM Karamatov on Aug. 17, and CENTCOM Commanding General Petraeus delivered the message in his meetings with President Karimov, the Uzbek Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the National Security Council Secretary on Aug. 18. ¶2. (C) Post's responses are keyed to reftel questions: A) Analysis of Uzbekistan's likely strategic interests in the Afghan election: Uzbekistan has a long-standing interest in Afghanistan and has been following developments there very closely. Although there are ethnic and historical ties between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, Tashkent's primary interest has been and remains the stability of Northern Afghanistan and the security of its own southern border, as well as the Afghan-Tajik border. The GOU fears both a return of the Taliban to power in Kabul and the currently more real possibility that extremists will move from the border areas with Pakistan into Central Asia. Northern Afghanistan represents a crucial buffer zone for Uzbekistan in the case of either contingency. President Karimov made this point in his August 18 meeting with Gen. Petraeus, urging the U.S. to pay special attention to the development of the North. Karimov and FM Norov told Petraeus that Uzbekistan does not meddle in Afghanistan and has absolutely no connection or dealings with Gen. Dostum, saying that he is an unreliable figure who has become largely "irrelevant" in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Uzbek leadership has no confidence in Afghan President Karzai and Karimov and others have repeatedly maintained that Afghanistan needs a stronger, more charismatic leader who can effectively wield power from the center. In his conversation with Petraeus, Karimov said he was convinced that Karzai will win re-election on either the first or second round and that this will be a "U.S. problem," as Karzai will be incapable of implementing any of the key goals of U.S. strategy. Tashkent is resigned to an extension of the status quo in Afghanistan and thus attaches little importance to the August 20 elections. B) Assessment of whether Uzbekistan would be likely to urge restraint and play a positive role, publicly or privately: Despite their utter lack of confidence in Karzai, the Uzbeks are convinced of his eventual victory and seek stability above any other goal. As such, we judge that they would be unlikely to take steps to further aggravate the situation should there be unrest in the wake of the elections. Uzbek influence is relatively limited to Northern Afghanistan and to remaining connections from the time when the Northern Alliance held power there. The GOU would likely respond to unrest in a non-public manner, but if there were large-scale violence, could take a more public posture in urging restraint. C) Advice on how we could best encourage Uzbekistan to play such a role: In the event of unrest, we should be prepared to consult with the Uzbeks on the situation and approach them with requests to urge restraint and to quietly intercede with those individuals with whom they still have influence in Afghanistan. Assurances to the effect that we will help to make sure any violence does not spill over Afghanistan's borders would also help to allay fears in Tashkent and elicit cooperation. NORLAND