Uzbekistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of General Petraeus

S E C R E T TASHKENT 001447 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/14 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of General Petraeus CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) For General Petraeus from Ambassador Norland ¶1. (S) Summary: Your second visit to Uzbekistan comes at a pivotal moment in the U.S.-Uzbek relationship and will build upon the July 12-13 visit of Under Secretary of State Bill Burns during which we proposed to the Uzbeks the establishment of a structured bilateral dialogue. The Uzbek leadership is following events in Afghanistan very closely and there will be keen interest in the upcoming elections. Your discussions will be an opportunity to underscore to a still-skeptical President Karimov the extent of our commitment to Afghanistan and allay his lingering fears that the U.S. and NATO will not see this mission through to its end, a segue to seeking his views on lethal transit through Uzbekistan and direct (non-lethal) cargo flights to Afghanistan (both of which he has heretofore strongly opposed). You will also likely hear Karimov expound at length on Russian duplicity and his efforts to steer an independent course, factors that are conducive to our efforts to develop a more constructive relationship with Uzbekistan. End Summary. Recent Political Developments -------------- ¶2. (C) Under Secretary of State Bill Burns visited Tashkent on July 12-13 and met with President Karimov and Foreign Minister Norov. Burns was the highest level USG civilian visitor to Uzbekistan in four years and delivered a message that the U.S. wants to build a constructive relationship with Uzbekistan that enables us to address sensitive issues such as human rights effectively. He proposed setting up regular political consultations at the level of Assistant Secretary or above on four general groups of issues: 1) Political; 2) Security; 3) Human Rights and Democracy; 4) Economic and Development. We are now waiting for the Uzbek reaction to these proposals, but all signals are that the GOU welcomes the opportunity to rebuild relations. ¶3. (C) On the issues of human rights and democracy that continue to be problems in the relationship, the GOU may have been hoping that the Administration's "pragmatism" meant that these issues are now off the table. U/S Burns made very clear that they are not off the table and remain very important principles in U.S. foreign policy. Karimov gave positive signals on a prominent human rights case and the International Committee of the Red Cross has since been able to renew its prison monitoring program here. Likewise, there appears to be a realization on the part of the GOU that it must cooperate with UNICEF and the International Labor Organization to address the issue of child labor in Uzbekistan. However, other recent arrests and imprisonments of human rights activists offer little assurance that we will see comprehensive improvements soon. On the issue of religious freedom, despite positive statements, we have yet to get a response from the GOU on our draft language to resolve this issue. The GOU had been waiting for signals from the new Administration on its approach and, despite a clear signal from Burns, is still taking an incremental and cautious approach in its relations with the U.S. Our challenge is to keep forward progress on these issues that is sufficient to relieve the periodic pressure from some quarters to take a harder line on Uzbekistan. Guantanamo Detainees -------------- ¶4. (S) The Government of Uzbekistan is increasingly aware that Guantanamo detainees are being returned to neighboring countries, including Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, at the same time as they know Uzbek detainees are being resettled in places like Ireland and Switzerland. They strongly desire the Uzbek detainees back and have expressed their dissatisfaction. Washington agencies have thus far been reluctant to consider returning Uzbek nationals to Uzbekistan given the poor human rights record here. You should be prepared for the possibility of this issue being raised in your discussions with the GOU. Uzbekistan and Russia -------------- ¶5. (C) Even when relations with the West were at their worst, Uzbekistan never fully aligned with Russia in the way that Moscow hoped and has limited its engagement with Russian-dominated organization such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC). The Uzbeks seem to be in another period of strategic reassessment in light of Russia's announcement of intent to build a military base in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, which is located adjacent to the Ferghana Valley-Uzbekistan's breadbasket and most troublesome and vulnerable region. The Uzbeks are linked to Russia by history, culture and economics but remain suspicious of Russia's intent. We have been careful never to lend credence to the "Great Game" interpretations of politics in Central Asia. The Uzbeks, however, believe that they are in the middle of this chess board and must calculate their moves accordingly. Although we should discount facile conjecture that the Uzbeks are "leaning" one way or another, we do believe that the present moment provides an opportunity for the GOU to pursue greater engagement with the U.S. across a range of issues, beginning with Afghanistan. In several recent meetings, Karimov has expressed his visceral distrust of Russia. Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) Uzbek officials across the board have been very skeptical of our engagement in Afghanistan. Drawing on the Soviet experience, they frequently point out that there is no military solution to the problem and are loathe to become too closely associated with the military effort partially for fear of retribution should a vengeful Taliban one day return to power in Kabul. At the same time, however, the threat of instability in the region and the movement of extremist groups northward is a major concern here, a fact underscored by the May attacks in Andijon province on a border and police post that left at least one officer dead. The Uzbeks therefore want and need us to succeed in Afghanistan. Your meetings here will be an opportunity to update them on the progress of our strategy and drive home the point that the U.S and NATO will see this mission through. ¶7. (C) The upcoming Afghan elections will also be major point of interest here. Karimov and others have made no secret of their disdain for Karzai, whom they believe was "Washington's man," and frequently point to the need for a "Pashtun strongman" who can rein in regional governors and warlords. Your discussions will be an opportunity to reinforce the message that the U.S. is neutral on the elections, but is doing everything possible to ensure that they are conducted in a fair, transparent and secure fashion. You should urge the Uzbeks to engage closely with whomever emerges as the next Afghan president. Other Key Operational Objectives and Points -------------- ¶8. (S) Lethal Transit - Since the announcement of the agreement with Russia following the Moscow Summit, the Uzbeks have been following this issue closely and likely expect it to be raised. We judge Tashkent may not acquiesce now to a U.S. request to expand transit to include lethal materiel or flights, but our gradually escalating dialogue could set the stage for a possible shift in Uzbek attitudes down the line, should we decide we really need to pursue this option. As the Uzbeks already believe they are indispensable to NDN because of their rail network, raising lethal transit would only marginally influence their thinking on this score. On balance, however, putting the issue of lethal transit on the table with the Uzbeks even while there are uncertain prospect of actual early implementation advances our interests; both in terms of developing more options for resupply of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and in taking our dialogue with the Uzbeks to a new, possibly more productive level across the board. ¶9. (C) Northern Distribution Network - NDN is the concept that has provided us the opening to broaden our relationship with Uzbekistan. NDN rail shipments are moving successfully through Uzbekistan, however there were some delays in June and July during which several trains were not released within the 30-day window stipulated in the transit agreement (exchange of letters). Since Major General Dowd's June visit, during which he emphasized the importance of timely release of logistics trains, delays have been largely resolved and trains have begun to move again in accordance with the transit agreement. We must continue to make clear to the GOU that, in order to gain the confidence necessary to accelerate local purchase and increase volumes on NDN, they must ensure trains are released according to agreement-specified timelines and preferably even sooner. Our logisticians tell us that they can ship even more through NDN if the Uzbeks can make the process more efficient. The GOU, from President Karimov down to the lowest level, wants NDN through Uzbekistan to succeed. In particular, they are keen to work with the US on efforts to extend the rail line from Hairaton to Mazar-e Sharif and are highly appreciative of our support in the Asian Development Bank on that issue. Karimov has yet to relent on the prohibition on flying cargo directly from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan; this is a chance to underscore the opportunity cost of this policy for Uzbekistan. ¶10. (C) Local Purchase - DLA came to Tashkent in January to assess the prospects for local purchase of construction materials, prepared foods, beverages and fresh fruits and vegetables in support of NDN. The GOU pulled out all the stops to accommodate DLA, which is an indication of the importance the Uzbeks attach to this issue. GOU officials, including Foreign Minister Norov, have said to us that the lack of economic benefit and local purchase was a major factor influencing the 2005 decision to close the base at Karshi-Khanabad (K2). We believe this is an essential element to solidify cooperation on NDN and you should use the opportunity to reiterate our commitment to local purchase. During Major General Dowd's recent visit in late June, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Trade and Investment (MFERIT) arranged for him to visit the Tashkent Paint Factory, Uzbekistan's only steel mill, the largest cement factory in the Former Soviet Union outside of Navoi, as well as the multi-modal transit hub at Navoi Airport and adjacent Free Industrial Economic Zone (FIEZ). From these site visits, MG Dowd suggested to GOU officials that local purchase efforts might soon include construction materials, particularly Uzbek-produced cement and some steel wire and rebar products. Product samples from General Dowd's visit are on their way to USCENTCOM POCs for quality assessment. Purchases from the Defense Department prime contractor for foodstuffs (Supreme Foodservices) are now limited to bottled water from the Nestle plant in Namangan. However, a Supreme Foodservices representative who visited in early August is hopeful that Supreme may soon add locally produced pasta as well as UHT boxed milk and juice to existing water purchases. Sizable local purchase opportunities remain with high quality Uzbek Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FF&V) and textiles. Since Uzbekistan still denies direct flight to Afghanistan, Uzbek FF&V might be trucked a short distance to Chimkent, Kazakhstan for air delivery to Kabul. Uzbekistan's growing textiles industry is also capable of producing quality uniform items to order for Afghanistan's police and military forces although concerns about child labor practices in the cotton industry may preclude such cooperation. Local purchase is an important effort capable of building goodwill and expanding government-to-government relations. Local purchase expectations already exist inside the GOU, as was demonstrated when First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov told visiting USTRANSCOM Commander General McNabb in April 2009 that the GOU expects more effort in local purchase and went so far as to set an annual procurement goal of 100 million USD. We need to develop a simple, accessible mechanism to define U.S. military requirements and bring them to the attention of potential local suppliers, as well as to "plug" interested vendors into the DOD contracting process. ¶11. (C) Termez Transit - Since January 2008, the GOU has allowed U.S. Troops to use the German air bridge at Termez Air Base for transit of NATO/ISAF personnel into Afghanistan. After it became evident that the clearance process for this transit was overly complex and unreliable, in June 2009, Uzbekistan simplified the clearance process for U.S. use of Termez by adding the U.S. to the list of approved nations and waiving the requirement to submit dipnotes for each case. This will facilitate U.S. use of the Uzbek-Afghan Air Bridge. ¶12. (C) Mil to Mil Cooperation - In August 2007 the MOD began to re-engage CENTCOM with dialogue about getting past our "diplomatic pause" and working towards improving our security cooperation relationship. Even with visa and dip note difficulties in June 2008, FY 2008 was the most prolific military-to military engagement year since FY 2005. The FY 2009 cooperation plan more than doubled from FY 2008. Uzbekistan and CENTCOM are well on their way to completing the majority of the 33 small scale military-to-military events on our FY 2009 plan. Unfortunately we have had significant delays and in some cases cancellations of events because the MOD-selected attendees were never granted Uzbek exit visas. In fact, our event supporting MOD's top-stated priority of Modeling and Simulation has been scheduled and postponed two times this year for that reason. Addressing this issue at presidential-level meetings would probably be the most effective way to help MOD get this obstacle removed since no one below that level, to include MFA, seems to have the power to generate these clearances. On a very positive note, we met informally with the Border Guards this past month, which we have otherwise not been able to do for more than a year. Our relationship with the Border Guards is warming up quickly and should continue to do so as we will be doing boat training with them from 7 Sep to 2 Oct in Termez. The Border Service is very excited about any training or equipment we can help out with along their shared border with Afghanistan. Your Meetings -------------- ¶13. (C) You will have three meetings with GOU officials in Tashkent. First you will have a combined meeting with Defense Minister Kobil Berdiev, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Investment and Trade Elyor Ganiev and National Security Council Secretary Murod Ataev. Focus of this meeting should be streamlining the Northern Distribution Network, military-to-military cooperation and local purchase. Next you will have a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Norov. You should discuss streamlining the Northern Distribution Network within the context of Uzbekistan's contribution to efforts in Afghanistan. The MOD will host you for lunch at Dome Restaurant in the Intercontinental Hotel. After lunch you will travel to the Embassy for a photo opportunity and gift presentation with the Marine Security Guard Detachment and a modified Country Team Brief. Your last official meeting of the day is with President Karimov. We have arranged a dinner buffet at Ambassador Norland's residence to take place after your meeting with the President. This will provide you an opportunity to chat with Ruslan Mirzaev the Commander of the Border Service, with whom we are eager to cultivate a relationship. You will also have the opportunity to meet other ministers, important to the mil-to-mil relationship, whom you did not have the chance to meet during the day. Many players critical to the Northern Distribution Network will also be present. ¶14. (U) We look forward to welcoming you and Mrs. Petraeus to Tashkent. NORLAND