Manas May Raise Base Issue for Uzbekistan-and for U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000141 STATE FOR SCA/CEN CENTCOM FOR POLAD TRANSCOM FOR POLAD AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-02-04 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR UZ SUBJECT: Manas May Raise Base Issue for Uzbekistan-and for U.S. CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Norland, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The announcement in Moscow by Kyrgyz President Bakiyev that his government would close Manas air base has piqued interest in Tashkent, with the Uzbek MFA convoking the Ambassador today to inquire further. Although the Uzbeks said nothing to indicate that they wish to explore the possibility of reopening a base in Uzbekistan, some in the GOU may view the problems surrounding Manas as an opportunity to re-establish a partnership with the United States that could once again include use of a base in Uzbekistan. This is complex question, given the history of U.S.-Uzbek relations over the last four years, the role of Russia in the region, and the prevailing skepticism within the GOU on the direction of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is an issue that merits consideration under current circumstances. End Summary. MFA Convokes Ambassador -------------- ¶2. (C) On a day that also had a NATO delegation in town to finalize the transit agreement with Uzbekistan, MFA convoked the Ambassador to discuss the situation surrounding Manas air base. MFA Americas Director Mamajanov queried the Ambassador about the circumstances surrounding Manas, asking whether or not the Kyrgyz government had given the U.S. side formal notification that they plan to terminate our use of the base, what the terms of the agreement with Kyrgyzstan are and whether or not there had been forewarning that this decision was imminent. The Ambassador demurred on the details surrounding U.S. use of the base, telling Mamajanov that Manas is obviously very important to the U.S. and that we will assess how to move forward on this issue. ¶3. (C) The GOU has long maintained that Kyrgyzstan is an unreliable partner and is no doubt enjoying some degree of quiet satisfaction. Nevertheless, they have always maintained that they support our efforts in Afghanistan and consider the question of Manas to be strictly bilateral. Mamadjanov repeated these points. However, the quickness with which they convoked the Ambassador could be an ;indication that some in the GOU see an opportunity in the current situation to secure closer security cooperation with the U.S. and derive some degree of economic benefit as well. This inevitably begs the question of whether or not use of a base in Uzbekistan is feasible or desirable. Is Another Base in Uzbekistan a Viable Option? -------------- - ¶4. (C) Given the experience with the base at Karshi-Khanabad (K2) that was closed when bilateral relations deteriorated following the events at Andijon in May 2005, basing questions are an elephant in the room. In the context of Afghan transit, we have frequently been asked if the U.S. intends to reopen a base in Uzbekistan and have consistently said that our discussions with the GOU have focused on commercial transit exclusively. We do not know if the Uzbek leadership would support U.S. use of a base here again, but the fact that the MFA so quickly convoked the Ambassador could be an indication that there is room to explore this issue. Problems form the Uzbek Perspective -------------- ¶5. (C) U.S. use of a base in Uzbekistan (e.g. for troop transfers or other overt military activities) is fraught with peril for the GOU. First and foremost for the Uzbeks is the position of Russia, which has been openly hostile to perceived encroachment in its "near abroad" and would no doubt react negatively were the Uzbeks to negotiate base access with the U.S. However, President Karimov has been more willing than other Central Asian leaders to thwart Russian pressure in the pursuit of Uzbekistan's interests and is generally suspicious of Russian intentions in the region. Secondly, the Uzbeks are not convinced that the U.S. and NATO have a strategy to win in Afghanistan, are skeptical Qreased troop levels will resolve the problems there and may be concerned about being too closely allied with U.S. efforts should tQan one day return to power in KQinally, there is the experience of K2, where the Uzbeks feel that they took big risks for the U.S. for which they were not adequately compensated, either through local procurement and contracting, or in direct compensation. Problems from the US Perspective -------------- ¶6. (C) Uzbekistan is a non-democratic state with a bad human rights record, despite some modest improvements over the last year. Any overtures to the GOU on our part could quickly be portrayed as another twist on the well-worn plot of "the U.S. coddling dictators to pursue its security interests." This is a legitimate concern and a question that would need to be carefully managed. Nevertheless, security cooperation does not have to come at the exclusion of engagement on human rights and the success of our troops in Afghanistan must be our primary concern in these circumstances. Whether or not we use an Uzbek base is unlikely to have an effect either on how long Karimov remains in power or the pace of reform in Uzbekistan. Comment: Something to Consider, but Carefully -------------- ¶7. (C) With the exception of Kazakhstan (whose border and relationship with Russia make any such discussion extremely improbable),Uzbekistan is the most well-developed state in Central Asia. It has a developed infrastructure and a government bureaucracy that, although corrupt, is able to carry out necessary functions in a mostly coordinated fashion. History and culture mean that all of Central Asia has deep and complex ties to Russia and Uzbekistan is no exception. Nevertheless, it has been willing to act against Russian pressure on a number of issues and by virtue of its more stable economic situation, is potentially less vulnerable to such pressure than either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. We do not know how the GOU would react were we to raise the question of base usage, nor do we know that the Uzbeks will raise this issue. The basing issue is sensitive and needs to be handled carefully. Nevertheless, we believe that current circumstances warrant discussion on whether or not this is something we should quietly sound out. The upcoming (February 17) visit of General Petraeus will inevitably fuel press speculation on this issue. NORLAND To view the entire SMART message, go to URL http://repository.state.sgov.gov/_layouts/OSS SearchResults.aspx?k=messageid:1121774e-158d- 45a0-adfc-63fbb0d653c5