Uzbekistan: Under Secretary Burns' July 13 Meeting with

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 001271 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/22 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM RS AF UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Under Secretary Burns' July 13 Meeting with Uzbek President Karimov REF: TASHKENT 903 CLASSIFIED BY: Holly Lindquist Thomas, Pol/Econ Officer, State, Pol-Econ; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a wide-ranging meeting that lasted over three hours, President Karimov affirmed to Under Secretary Burns his desire to turn the page on U.S.-Uzbek relations and work together to restore trust based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Citing Afghanistan as Uzbekistan's greatest security concern, Karimov looked to the U.S. - rather than Russia - to bring stability to that country. Karimov dwelled obsessively on Russian "imperial ambitions" in Central Asia and warned the U.S. not to "make deals with Russia behind our backs." The Uzbek President welcomed President Obama's determination not to impose U.S. values on other countries and indicated he was willing to cooperate on certain issues involving reform and human rights. Provided the U.S. did not put political prisoner Sanjar Umarov up on a political pedestal were he released, Karimov even suggested he would be willing to "urge" the Uzbek Senate to amnesty Umarov. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Under Secretary Bill Burns was accompanied by Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Michael McFaul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney and Ambassador Norland. President Karimov was joined by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov and National Security Council Secretary Murat Ataev. Karimov spoke in Russian with occasional translation into English to emphasize a point. Karimov appeared healthy though as the meeting wore on his skin appeared a little mottled. He spoke fluidly and at great length, occasionally drifting down a particular tangent but usually returning to his main theme. Karimov clearly enjoyed the opportunity to expound his views before the most senior American civilian delegation to visit Tashkent in nearly four years. Afghanistan -------------- ¶3. (C) Karimov alternated between heavy emphasis on the situation in Afghanistan and relations with Russia - as well as the interplay between the two. But he began his lengthy monologue with a review of the "trust deficit" that developed in relations with the U.S. after 9/11. He reminded us that Uzbekistan had taken decisive steps to support the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and launch the "domino strategy" that toppled the Taliban. As he has done before, he made the point that the U.S. did not show sufficient appreciation for Uzbek support. Rather than dwelling on this, however, Karimov emphasized the Soviet role in launching thirty years of warfare in Afghanistan, saying the Central Committee of the Communist Party sought to make Afghanistan the "sixteenth republic" of the USSR. Karimov criticized the "War on Terror" for alienating potential allies in the Muslim world, but he kept returning to the question of whether Russia was in fact a worthy partner and really shared our interest in a stable Afghanistan. On the contrary, Karimov claimed, Russia did not want Uzbekistan or Central Asia to have access to the ports and markets of Iran and South Asia which peace in Afghanistan would grant. Nor did Russia want U.S. investment capital to come to Afghanistan, which would also be a result of peace. ¶4. (C) Karimov observed that Afghanistan was President Obama's top foreign policy priority. He repeated his analysis (reftel) that any Contact Group should not include India, the Gulf States, Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, but rather should be strictly limited to Afghanistan's six immediate neighbors. Pakistan should be part of the Contact Group, but it should not be the "object" of the Group's discussions as it was too big and too complicated. In TASHKENT 00001271 002 OF 005 effect, Karimov laid out the "six plus three" formula that he first expounded at the Bucharest Summit in March 2008, featuring the six neighbors plus the U.S., Russia and NATO. A slightly new twist was his acknowledgment that the Afghan government was a key player ("of course, the central government is the central government"). But this concession to our concerns about GOA involvement in any 6 plus 3 formula was offset by his analysis that the central government would be no stronger after the upcoming elections (which the "feckless" Karzai would win) than it was before. Karimov urged us not to put all our eggs in one basket, but rather to somehow treat the Afghan government as "neutral" and try to establish consensus among the warring parties. The longer foreign forces remained in Afghanistan, he warned, "the more likely you will be seen as occupiers." He praised the decision to pull U.S. forces out of Iraq and encouraged us to do the same in Afghanistan. ¶5. (C) "The way out of Afghanistan," Karimov advised, was to focus on developing the more peaceful northern part of the country. He had discussed this idea with visiting Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, but did not think the Spanish had enough clout to make a difference in Baghdis province. Rather, the U.S. should "replace" the Germans in Balkh province (sic),develop the rail link between Hairaton and Mazar-e-sharif, and focus on economic development over military operations. This would prevent Iran from achieving its goal of dominating Mazar-e-sharif, he said. Karimov appeared pleased by U/S Burns' statement that the U.S. would support Asian Development Bank financing of the Hairaton to Mazar railway. Russia -------------- ¶6. (C) Karimov considered the April 3 U.S.-Uzbek agreement on commercial transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan as an important, logical step following talks with CENTCOM commander Gen. Petraeus and TRANSCOM commander Gen. McNabb. He was more cautious regarding the agreement signed between the U.S. and Russia last week on lethal transit. While he agreed that what Russia was offering was no doubt an important transit option, he emphasized Russia's desire merely to appear helpful and warned us not to trust the Russians. When all was distilled, the Russian contribution would turn out to be far less than appeared to be the case. He himself had only reluctantly partnered with Russia in 2005, after the Andijon events and the ensuing "information war" launched by the West "forced" him to turn to Moscow and Beijing for support. ¶7. (C) Karimov strongly denounced Russian goals in the former USSR. He accused Russia of creating the Collective Security Treaty Organization to serve as the "anti-NATO," and said the proposed CSTO rapid reaction force had only three goals: to enable Russia to dominate the former Soviet space, to provide multi-national cover for Russian forces to attack problem countries like Georgia or Ukraine, and to station Russian forces permanently in Central Asia. He expressed concern about Russia's approach to Kyrgyzstan on establishing a new military base in Osh, saying this was a primarily ethnic Uzbek community only 40 kilometers from Andijon. As he did reftel, Karimov accused the Russians of planning suicide bombings from Kyrgyz territory, saying that the May 27 attack in Andijon was a "signal" to Uzbekistan: "if you don't join the CSTO rapid reaction force, there will be more such attacks." Nevertheless, Karimov reiterated his determination that Uzbekistan would not sign on to the rapid reaction force. Describing blunt exchanges with Russian Prime Minister Putin, President Medvedev and Foreign Minister Lavrov, Karimov said he accused Russia of seeking to reestablish a zone of "privileged interest." Why, he said he asked them, does Russia treat Finland as an independent country but TASHKENT 00001271 003 OF 005 not Uzbekistan? Russia's biggest problem remained its "imperial ambitions," he charged, along with racist "chauvinism" exhibited toward ethnic minorities. ¶8. (C) However Karimov took umbrage at press reports suggesting that the U.S. had said it had "no differences" with Russia on Central Asia. "On what basis do you say this," he asked suspiciously. He warned the U.S. not to "make deals behind our backs." U/S Burns and McFaul pointed to President Obama's statements in Moscow strongly refuting the idea of any zone of privileged influence. "That is why we are here today," Burns said. Karimov accepted that mistranslation may have led to misunderstanding on his part of the U.S. position. ¶9. (C) Karimov accused Russia of trying to buy off the Kyrgyz in order to kick the U.S. out of the airbase at Manas, saying he knew "for a fact" that it was Putin's idea (the Kyrgyz prime minister was Putin's "agent," Karimov claimed). While the Kyrgyz might go along with the U.S. for a while, the Russians would continue upping the ante. He encouraged us not to engage in a bidding war, "even though this is against my interests." He said Medvedev would attend the July 28 CSTO meeting in Kyrgyzstan, if for no other reason than to celebrate President Bakiev's birthday. Karimov suggested the Russian goal in pressing the U.S. on Manas had been to trade Russian acceptance of a base at Manas for U.S. willingness to give up plans for missile defense involving the Czech Republic and Poland. "The Russians will try again" on Manas, he predicted. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan's "wheeling and dealing," Karimov considered Turkmenistan, although neutral, "ready enough for a positive approach" on support for Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. ¶10. (C) The only guarantee of Russian "common sense," Karimov said, was a continued low price of oil. Karimov caricatured Putin as earlier being besotted by 150 dollar per barrel oil, and expressed satisfaction at the economic difficulties now facing Russia as a result of the global economic crisis. Likewise, he trivialized Medvedev's claim to be speaking for the Commonwealth of Independent States countries at the G-8 gathering in London this past spring. Especially after what happened in Georgia, Karimov said, Russia would have a hard time ever again speaking for the CIS (which existed "in name only"). Relations with U.S. -------------- ¶11. (C) Under Secretary Burns said he was very glad to have visited Tashkent. Everything President Karimov had said reinforced two points. First, the need for a realistic long-term strategy in Central Asia and Afghanistan, based on existing realities. Second, the importance of rebuilding trust. U.S. and Uzbek national interests intersected in many respects, he said. President Obama had made clear the U.S. aimed to listen to others and operate on the basis of mutual respect. Burns said he had listened carefully and had great respect for what Karimov said. Much had changed in the seventeen years since his last visit, and he respected Uzbekistan's economic achievements. While it was easy to talk of a fresh start in U.S.-Uzbek relations, it was harder to actually do this. The U.S. wanted to work together with Uzbekistan to make this a reality. TASHKENT 00001271 004 OF 005 ¶12. (C) On Afghanistan, Burns said, it was true that there were more questions than answers, just as it was true that there was no purely military solution. Uzbekistan had contributed much and could do yet more. We looked forward to working in detail on the ideas Karimov had outlined. We also wanted to do more on bilateral relations, especially in the economic sphere. The progress with General Motors was a good example of practical results stemming from such cooperation. We hoped that Ex-Im Bank might be able to provide some support for the sale of aircraft manufactured using American parts at the Tapoich plant in Tashkent. ¶13. (C) President Obama had no intention of imposing U.S. values on other societies, Burns said, nor would we be delivering lectures. We wanted to work pragmatically together on the basis of practical, mutual interests. We had to bear in mind that human rights issues will remain a priority for the U.S. Administration and Congress. We would seek to work together step-by-step on humanitarian issues, and Ambassador Norland would be following up on several items that had been raised in the previous day's meeting with FM Norov. As Karimov himself had suggested, Burns said, in the end "we will have to judge each other by our actions and not just by our words." ¶14. (C) McFaul emphasized President Obama's pragmatic approach, and observed that the U.S. and Uzbekistan had a number of common interests. The U.S. would approach Russia pragmatically, rejecting any notion of spheres of influence. McFaul noted that he had personally witnessed President Obama telling Putin that spheres were a nineteenth, not a twenty-first century idea. He had also heard Obama, in April in London, reject the idea proposed by Medvedev that the U.S. approach Central Asia "via" Moscow. The U.S. had negotiated directly with Kygyzstan to restore access to Manas, rather than take up an offer of Russian "help." We would not approach Central Asia through Moscow, but we would seek to pursue concrete interests that we might have in common with Russia - and this would be the U.S. approach toward Uzbekistan as well. ¶15. (C) Karimov called the U.S. the most important country in the world, saying that recovery of the U.S. economy was essential to global economic stability. He downplayed China's economic importance, saying it relied too much on exports (to the U.S.),and reiterated his assessment (reftel) that the "sustainable" U.S. economy would rebound. He called for more U.S. investment in Uzbekistan, and pointed out that much of the financing for GM's new powertrain plant in Tashkent came from Uzbekistan itself. Uzbekistan needed American "know-how." (In another swipe at the Russians, Karimov said he told Medvedev that Russian investments were too heavily concentrated in the gas sector - "doesn't anything else interest you?" he reportedly asked the Russian president.) Sanjar Umarov -------------- ¶16. (C) Karimov emphasized his desire to re-start U.S.-Uzbek relations "from a clean slate," as was currently unfolding, and said he did not wish to recall that period when "due to bad decisions we stopped understanding one another." He congratulated President Obama on his successful outreach to the Muslim world. Uzbekistan did not reject human rights, he added, but neither was it trying to impose democracy "too quickly" as this would be counter-productive. He recognized that some in Congress would hang on to "old stereotypes" but bristled at the idea of Congressmen "dictating" to Uzbekistan how it should behave. Karimov said he TASHKENT 00001271 005 OF 005 saw a potential contradiction between President Obama's words and U.S. efforts to raise human rights cases such as that of Sanjar Umarov. Likewise, the public acclaim surrounding the "woman of courage" award to Mutabar Tadjibaeva, with Secretary Clinton and Mrs. Obama in attendance, appeared to represent unwarranted interference. In an intriguing suggestion that he might consider releasing Umarov, Karimov asked rhetorically what guarantee there was that Umarov would not be "made a hero, too?" He emphasized that it was counter-productive to pressure him on this, but raised the possibility that if there were a guarantee that there would be "no demonstrations" and he would not be made a hero, "I would not refuse that." Since the Senate decided on amnesties, it would be a matter of the President forwarding a "proposal" to the Senate - but, Karimov smiled, "I think they respect me enough to accept this." ¶17. (C) Karimov thanked Burns and McFaul for their open and frank remarks. "You understand that the twenty-first century is not the nineteenth century." Still, deeds counted more than words, and concrete actions would serve as the best proof of sincerity. He proposed we pursue cooperation on this basis. Uzbekistan's national interests were his only concern and "unlike some of my neighbors, we deliver what we promise." Making the unusual gesture of walking U/S Burns to the car, Karimov said he was pleased with the meeting and asked Burns to reemphasize to President Obama that Uzbekistan genuinely wanted a fresh start in relations. On human rights issues, Karimov repeated his hint that we could work together on Sanjar Umarov, and agreed to U/S Burns' suggestion that the GOU work with Ambassador Norland to follow up specific items that had been raised the previous day with FM Norov: religious freedom, child labor, Umarov and ICRC prison access. ¶18. (U) U/S Burns cleared this cable. 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