Uzbekistan: Under Secretary Burns' July 13 Meeting with

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SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Under Secretary Burns' July 13 Meeting with
Uzbek President Karimov

REF: TASHKENT 903

CLASSIFIED BY: Holly Lindquist Thomas, Pol/Econ Officer, State,
Pol-Econ; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary. In a wide-ranging meeting that lasted over
three hours, President Karimov affirmed to Under Secretary Burns
his desire to turn the page on U.S.-Uzbek relations and work
together to restore trust based on mutual interests and mutual
respect. Citing Afghanistan as Uzbekistan's greatest security
concern, Karimov looked to the U.S. - rather than Russia - to bring
stability to that country. Karimov dwelled obsessively on Russian
"imperial ambitions" in Central Asia and warned the U.S. not to
"make deals with Russia behind our backs." The Uzbek President
welcomed President Obama's determination not to impose U.S. values
on other countries and indicated he was willing to cooperate on
certain issues involving reform and human rights. Provided the
U.S. did not put political prisoner Sanjar Umarov up on a political
pedestal were he released, Karimov even suggested he would be
willing to "urge" the Uzbek Senate to amnesty Umarov. End
Summary.




2. (C) Under Secretary Bill Burns was accompanied by Special
Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Russia and
Eurasia Michael McFaul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David
Sedney and Ambassador Norland. President Karimov was joined by
Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov and National Security Council
Secretary Murat Ataev. Karimov spoke in Russian with occasional
translation into English to emphasize a point. Karimov appeared
healthy though as the meeting wore on his skin appeared a little
mottled. He spoke fluidly and at great length, occasionally
drifting down a particular tangent but usually returning to his
main theme. Karimov clearly enjoyed the opportunity to expound his
views before the most senior American civilian delegation to visit
Tashkent in nearly four years.



Afghanistan

--------------




3. (C) Karimov alternated between heavy emphasis on the
situation in Afghanistan and relations with Russia - as well as the
interplay between the two. But he began his lengthy monologue with
a review of the "trust deficit" that developed in relations with
the U.S. after 9/11. He reminded us that Uzbekistan had taken
decisive steps to support the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and
launch the "domino strategy" that toppled the Taliban. As he has
done before, he made the point that the U.S. did not show
sufficient appreciation for Uzbek support. Rather than dwelling on
this, however, Karimov emphasized the Soviet role in launching
thirty years of warfare in Afghanistan, saying the Central
Committee of the Communist Party sought to make Afghanistan the
"sixteenth republic" of the USSR. Karimov criticized the "War on
Terror" for alienating potential allies in the Muslim world, but he
kept returning to the question of whether Russia was in fact a
worthy partner and really shared our interest in a stable
Afghanistan. On the contrary, Karimov claimed, Russia did not want
Uzbekistan or Central Asia to have access to the ports and markets
of Iran and South Asia which peace in Afghanistan would grant. Nor
did Russia want U.S. investment capital to come to Afghanistan,
which would also be a result of peace.




4. (C) Karimov observed that Afghanistan was President
Obama's top foreign policy priority. He repeated his analysis
(reftel) that any Contact Group should not include India, the Gulf
States, Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, but rather should be strictly
limited to Afghanistan's six immediate neighbors. Pakistan should
be part of the Contact Group, but it should not be the "object" of
the Group's discussions as it was too big and too complicated. In

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effect, Karimov laid out the "six plus three" formula that he first
expounded at the Bucharest Summit in March 2008, featuring the six
neighbors plus the U.S., Russia and NATO. A slightly new twist was
his acknowledgment that the Afghan government was a key player ("of
course, the central government is the central government"). But
this concession to our concerns about GOA involvement in any 6 plus
3 formula was offset by his analysis that the central government
would be no stronger after the upcoming elections (which the
"feckless" Karzai would win) than it was before. Karimov urged us
not to put all our eggs in one basket, but rather to somehow treat
the Afghan government as "neutral" and try to establish consensus
among the warring parties. The longer foreign forces remained in
Afghanistan, he warned, "the more likely you will be seen as
occupiers." He praised the decision to pull U.S. forces out of
Iraq and encouraged us to do the same in Afghanistan.




5. (C) "The way out of Afghanistan," Karimov advised, was to
focus on developing the more peaceful northern part of the country.
He had discussed this idea with visiting Spanish Foreign Minister
Moratinos, but did not think the Spanish had enough clout to make a
difference in Baghdis province. Rather, the U.S. should "replace"
the Germans in Balkh province (sic),develop the rail link between
Hairaton and Mazar-e-sharif, and focus on economic development over
military operations. This would prevent Iran from achieving its
goal of dominating Mazar-e-sharif, he said. Karimov appeared
pleased by U/S Burns' statement that the U.S. would support Asian
Development Bank financing of the Hairaton to Mazar railway.



Russia

--------------




6. (C) Karimov considered the April 3 U.S.-Uzbek agreement
on commercial transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan as an
important, logical step following talks with CENTCOM commander Gen.
Petraeus and TRANSCOM commander Gen. McNabb. He was more cautious
regarding the agreement signed between the U.S. and Russia last
week on lethal transit. While he agreed that what Russia was
offering was no doubt an important transit option, he emphasized
Russia's desire merely to appear helpful and warned us not to trust
the Russians. When all was distilled, the Russian contribution
would turn out to be far less than appeared to be the case. He
himself had only reluctantly partnered with Russia in 2005, after
the Andijon events and the ensuing "information war" launched by
the West "forced" him to turn to Moscow and Beijing for support.




7. (C) Karimov strongly denounced Russian goals in the former
USSR. He accused Russia of creating the Collective Security Treaty
Organization to serve as the "anti-NATO," and said the proposed
CSTO rapid reaction force had only three goals: to enable Russia to
dominate the former Soviet space, to provide multi-national cover
for Russian forces to attack problem countries like Georgia or
Ukraine, and to station Russian forces permanently in Central Asia.
He expressed concern about Russia's approach to Kyrgyzstan on
establishing a new military base in Osh, saying this was a
primarily ethnic Uzbek community only 40 kilometers from Andijon.
As he did reftel, Karimov accused the Russians of planning suicide
bombings from Kyrgyz territory, saying that the May 27 attack in
Andijon was a "signal" to Uzbekistan: "if you don't join the CSTO
rapid reaction force, there will be more such attacks."
Nevertheless, Karimov reiterated his determination that Uzbekistan
would not sign on to the rapid reaction force. Describing blunt
exchanges with Russian Prime Minister Putin, President Medvedev and
Foreign Minister Lavrov, Karimov said he accused Russia of seeking
to reestablish a zone of "privileged interest." Why, he said he
asked them, does Russia treat Finland as an independent country but

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not Uzbekistan? Russia's biggest problem remained its "imperial
ambitions," he charged, along with racist "chauvinism" exhibited
toward ethnic minorities.




8. (C) However Karimov took umbrage at press reports
suggesting that the U.S. had said it had "no differences" with
Russia on Central Asia. "On what basis do you say this," he asked
suspiciously. He warned the U.S. not to "make deals behind our
backs." U/S Burns and McFaul pointed to President Obama's
statements in Moscow strongly refuting the idea of any zone of
privileged influence. "That is why we are here today," Burns said.
Karimov accepted that mistranslation may have led to
misunderstanding on his part of the U.S. position.




9. (C) Karimov accused Russia of trying to buy off the Kyrgyz
in order to kick the U.S. out of the airbase at Manas, saying he
knew "for a fact" that it was Putin's idea (the Kyrgyz prime
minister was Putin's "agent," Karimov claimed). While the Kyrgyz
might go along with the U.S. for a while, the Russians would
continue upping the ante. He encouraged us not to engage in a
bidding war, "even though this is against my interests." He said
Medvedev would attend the July 28 CSTO meeting in Kyrgyzstan, if
for no other reason than to celebrate President Bakiev's birthday.
Karimov suggested the Russian goal in pressing the U.S. on Manas
had been to trade Russian acceptance of a base at Manas for U.S.
willingness to give up plans for missile defense involving the
Czech Republic and Poland. "The Russians will try again" on Manas,
he predicted. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan's "wheeling and dealing,"
Karimov considered Turkmenistan, although neutral, "ready enough
for a positive approach" on support for Coalition efforts in
Afghanistan.




10. (C) The only guarantee of Russian "common sense," Karimov
said, was a continued low price of oil. Karimov caricatured Putin
as earlier being besotted by 150 dollar per barrel oil, and
expressed satisfaction at the economic difficulties now facing
Russia as a result of the global economic crisis. Likewise, he
trivialized Medvedev's claim to be speaking for the Commonwealth of
Independent States countries at the G-8 gathering in London this
past spring. Especially after what happened in Georgia, Karimov
said, Russia would have a hard time ever again speaking for the CIS
(which existed "in name only").



Relations with U.S.

--------------




11. (C) Under Secretary Burns said he was very glad to have
visited Tashkent. Everything President Karimov had said reinforced
two points. First, the need for a realistic long-term strategy in
Central Asia and Afghanistan, based on existing realities. Second,
the importance of rebuilding trust. U.S. and Uzbek national
interests intersected in many respects, he said. President Obama
had made clear the U.S. aimed to listen to others and operate on
the basis of mutual respect. Burns said he had listened carefully
and had great respect for what Karimov said. Much had changed in
the seventeen years since his last visit, and he respected
Uzbekistan's economic achievements. While it was easy to talk of a
fresh start in U.S.-Uzbek relations, it was harder to actually do
this. The U.S. wanted to work together with Uzbekistan to make
this a reality.

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12. (C) On Afghanistan, Burns said, it was true that there were
more questions than answers, just as it was true that there was no
purely military solution. Uzbekistan had contributed much and
could do yet more. We looked forward to working in detail on the
ideas Karimov had outlined. We also wanted to do more on bilateral
relations, especially in the economic sphere. The progress with
General Motors was a good example of practical results stemming
from such cooperation. We hoped that Ex-Im Bank might be able to
provide some support for the sale of aircraft manufactured using
American parts at the Tapoich plant in Tashkent.




13. (C) President Obama had no intention of imposing U.S. values
on other societies, Burns said, nor would we be delivering
lectures. We wanted to work pragmatically together on the basis of
practical, mutual interests. We had to bear in mind that human
rights issues will remain a priority for the U.S. Administration
and Congress. We would seek to work together step-by-step on
humanitarian issues, and Ambassador Norland would be following up
on several items that had been raised in the previous day's meeting
with FM Norov. As Karimov himself had suggested, Burns said, in
the end "we will have to judge each other by our actions and not
just by our words."




14. (C) McFaul emphasized President Obama's pragmatic approach,
and observed that the U.S. and Uzbekistan had a number of common
interests. The U.S. would approach Russia pragmatically,
rejecting any notion of spheres of influence. McFaul noted that he
had personally witnessed President Obama telling Putin that spheres
were a nineteenth, not a twenty-first century idea. He had also
heard Obama, in April in London, reject the idea proposed by
Medvedev that the U.S. approach Central Asia "via" Moscow. The
U.S. had negotiated directly with Kygyzstan to restore access to
Manas, rather than take up an offer of Russian "help." We would
not approach Central Asia through Moscow, but we would seek to
pursue concrete interests that we might have in common with Russia
- and this would be the U.S. approach toward Uzbekistan as well.




15. (C) Karimov called the U.S. the most important country in the
world, saying that recovery of the U.S. economy was essential to
global economic stability. He downplayed China's economic
importance, saying it relied too much on exports (to the U.S.),and
reiterated his assessment (reftel) that the "sustainable" U.S.
economy would rebound. He called for more U.S. investment in
Uzbekistan, and pointed out that much of the financing for GM's new
powertrain plant in Tashkent came from Uzbekistan itself.
Uzbekistan needed American "know-how." (In another swipe at the
Russians, Karimov said he told Medvedev that Russian investments
were too heavily concentrated in the gas sector - "doesn't anything
else interest you?" he reportedly asked the Russian president.)



Sanjar Umarov

--------------




16. (C) Karimov emphasized his desire to re-start U.S.-Uzbek
relations "from a clean slate," as was currently unfolding, and
said he did not wish to recall that period when "due to bad
decisions we stopped understanding one another." He congratulated
President Obama on his successful outreach to the Muslim world.
Uzbekistan did not reject human rights, he added, but neither was
it trying to impose democracy "too quickly" as this would be
counter-productive. He recognized that some in Congress would hang
on to "old stereotypes" but bristled at the idea of Congressmen
"dictating" to Uzbekistan how it should behave. Karimov said he

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saw a potential contradiction between President Obama's words and
U.S. efforts to raise human rights cases such as that of Sanjar
Umarov. Likewise, the public acclaim surrounding the "woman of
courage" award to Mutabar Tadjibaeva, with Secretary Clinton and
Mrs. Obama in attendance, appeared to represent unwarranted
interference. In an intriguing suggestion that he might consider
releasing Umarov, Karimov asked rhetorically what guarantee there
was that Umarov would not be "made a hero, too?" He emphasized
that it was counter-productive to pressure him on this, but raised
the possibility that if there were a guarantee that there would be
"no demonstrations" and he would not be made a hero, "I would not
refuse that." Since the Senate decided on amnesties, it would be a
matter of the President forwarding a "proposal" to the Senate -
but, Karimov smiled, "I think they respect me enough to accept
this."




17. (C) Karimov thanked Burns and McFaul for their open and frank
remarks. "You understand that the twenty-first century is not the
nineteenth century." Still, deeds counted more than words, and
concrete actions would serve as the best proof of sincerity. He
proposed we pursue cooperation on this basis. Uzbekistan's
national interests were his only concern and "unlike some of my
neighbors, we deliver what we promise." Making the unusual
gesture of walking U/S Burns to the car, Karimov said he was
pleased with the meeting and asked Burns to reemphasize to
President Obama that Uzbekistan genuinely wanted a fresh start in
relations. On human rights issues, Karimov repeated his hint that
we could work together on Sanjar Umarov, and agreed to U/S Burns'
suggestion that the GOU work with Ambassador Norland to follow up
specific items that had been raised the previous day with FM Norov:
religious freedom, child labor, Umarov and ICRC prison access.




18. (U) U/S Burns cleared this cable.



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