Uzbekistan: U/S Burns Meets FM Norov

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/17
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KIRF UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: U/S Burns Meets FM Norov

REF: STATE

CLASSIFIED BY: Holly Lindquist Thomas, Second Secretary, State,
Pol-Econ; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns led an inter-agency
delegation to Tashkent on July 12-13 that included NSC Senior
Director for Russia and Central Asia Michael McFaul, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East and South Asia David
Sedney. Burns used the occasion of a July 12 meeting with Uzbek
Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov to propose the establishment of a
bilateral commission to regularize and structure bilateral
relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan. Burns told Norov that
the Administration sought a pragmatic and constructive relationship
that could foster cooperation on security, trade, counter narcotics
and the stabilization of Afghanistan, as well as sensitive issues
such as civil society and human rights.




2. (C) (Summary cont'd) Norov did not directly respond to the
proposal for a commission, but he saw possibilities for
cooperation. Norov maintained that sensitive human rights and
civil society issues were internal matters, and he offered no sign
of movement on an on-going negotiation over an exchange of letters
that would formalize joint understandings on religious freedom.
Burns noted that the United States would not seek to impose its
values on others; we would not lecture. But human rights and
democracy issues were and would remain important to Americans, to
our Congress, and to the President. We would need to find a way to
manage and discuss these issues as we rebuilt our relationship.
Norov expressed familiar skepticism about the government of
President Karzai, but he emphasized that Uzbekistan shared our
interest in security and stability there. He also conveyed deep
suspicion of Russian behavior in the region, including perceived
efforts to divide Central Asia. Burns and Senior Director McFaul
emphasized that the U.S. would seek stable, sovereign partners in
the region; President Obama was not interested in great games or
competition. End Summary.



Bilateral Relations




3. (C) Norov expressed the usual lament about the
deterioration of relations with the U.S. in the post-2005 period,
which he ascribed to the "ideological" U.S. policy of that time,
which sacrificed security cooperation and a base in Uzbekistan to
appease human rights interests. The Uzbek government was watching
the new Administration with great interest and hoped that
pragmatism would prevail in its approach. Burns pointed out that
President Obama's speeches reflect a new approach to foreign
policy. The U.S. was interested in practical dialogue in areas of
mutual interest - even with states, like Uzbekistan and Russia,
where we would continue to disagree on important issues. Burns
proposed establishing a U.S. -Uzbek bilateral commission that would
meet on a regular basis to begin a structured dialogue on issues of
common concern, including security, economic issues, political
questions and the human dimension, including civil society and
human rights.



Human Rights




4. (C) During a lengthy and frank exchange, Burns made clear
that while the Obama Administration would not seek regime change
or force American values on other countries, we believed that human
rights and the development of open and protected civil societies
were essential characteristics of good governance and of valued
partners. Part of rebuilding relations with the United States
would be finding a way to discuss and manage these issues. Burns
pointed to the case of jailed opposition leader and former Uzbek
businessman Sanjar Umarov, suggesting that the GOU find a way to

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release him on humanitarian grounds. Norov said that only the
Uzbek Senate could grant amnesty to prisoners, continuing with a
familiar comparison of incarceration rates around the world
(pointing out that the U.S. incarcerates far more of its citizens
per capita than Uzbekistan) and noting that Uzbekistan does not try
to interfere in the U.S. criminal justice system. Burns raised the
issue of ICRC prison access, to which Norov replied that Uzbekistan
was the only country in the region that allowed the ICRC into its
prisons at all, a point which he said underscored the double
standard that exists whereby Uzbekistan is held to a different
standard from its neighbors. He said that Uzbekistan also wanted a
strong civil society, but in a multi-ethnic country such as
Uzbekistan, there were rights as well as responsibilities that
called for certain limitations on behavior that could be socially
destabilizing.



Religious Freedom




5. (C) Raising the proposed exchange of letters on religious
freedom, Burns said that he had hoped this would be resolved by the
time of his visit and urged the GOU to bring this process to
conclusion. Norov did not speak directly to the negotiations over
the exchange, but said he understood the issue was a legacy of the
previous administration. He pointed out that there were sixteen
different religious faiths that practiced freely in Uzbekistan and
said that limitations on proselytism were necessary not because of
Christian denominations in the country, but to control "Wahhabist"
Islamists who he noted were very active immediately following
independence. He also noted the irony of Uzbekistan's situation in
light of a recent proposal on the part of French President Sarkozy
to ban the wearing of veils in public.



Afghanistan




6. (C) Norov expressed skepticism about the course of events
in Afghanistan, the impossibility of a purely military solution to
the problems, and the weakness of President Karzai. He said that
Afghanistan needed a strong, charismatic leader drawn from among
its Pashtun population who could enforce a writ beyond the limits
of Kabul. Norov added a pitch for President Karimov's 6 plus 3
dialogue (among neighboring states, the UN, NATO and Russia, but
without Afghanistan). Burns said that the U.S. was cognizant of
the fact that the problems of Afghanistan could not be solved by
military means alone. The new strategy places a heavy emphasis on
development and on cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbors. He
noted U.S. support for an ADB-financed extension of the railroad
from Hairaton to Mazar-e Sharif, which Norov said the Uzbek side
strongly supports as a means of opening links to ports in Pakistan
and Iran and thereby lessening the ability of Russia to control
Uzbekistan and Central Asia.



Russia




7. (C) Burns briefed Norov on the outcomes of the July 6-8
Moscow Summit, noting important progress on arms control and on the
transit of lethal material through Russia to Afghanistan. He said
that the U.S. and Russia did not agree on all issues, such as
Georgia and Missile Defense, but that relations were improving.
Burns emphasized that the U.S. was not interested in a competition
with Russia in Central Asia, which he said was a relic of the past
century. Norov noted that the Russians were very unhappy with the
Manas agreement, despite public statements. He said that
Uzbekistan would attempt to block the rumored Russian use of a base

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in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, which would require overflights of Uzbek
territory. Uzbekistan also opposed the creation of the Rapid
Reaction Force under the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). He said that Russia under Putin and Medvedev was pursuing
an aggressive, chauvinistic policy in the territory of the ex-USSR
and that Uzbekistan would resist this policy in every way possible.
The CSTO Rapid Reaction Force, Uzbekistan fears, is merely a
pretext for intervention in domestic conflicts such as that in
Georgia, in which Uzbekistan will not partake.



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