Uzbekistan: INP Representatives Highlight Radiation

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001161 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, EXBS FOR JEFF HARTSHORN, DOE FOR LAUREL COTTON AND ANNE KOHNEN AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/06 TAGS: PBTS KNNP PREL PGOV UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: INP Representatives Highlight Radiation Detection Problems CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, State, Pol-Econ; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (SBU) On June 30, Post handed over some 290,000 USD in equipment-including a handheld radiation monitor, a Yantar-1U detection system, and video monitoring sets-donated by the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense program to representatives from Uzbekistan's Institute of Nuclear Physics. (Note: This equipment consists of spare parts necessary for the maintenance of the network of 27 radiation portal monitors on Uzbekistan's borders. End note.) ¶2. (C) In a conversation with Poloff, the INP representatives highlighted several problems with the network. First, problems with computers and communications equipment at least six points of entry have resulted in breakdowns that prevent INP in Tashkent from finding out immediately if there has been a detection of radioactive materials at the border. Instead, INP representatives might only find out about such detections during routine maintenance visits every three months to each point of entry (POE). Customs officers' lack of appropriate technical expertise necessary to repair this sophisticated equipment, as well as the lack of appropriate supplies, at some points of entry can result in ineffective repairs. Irregular power supply to some of these locations-particularly to Gagarin point of entry (Jizzak Province) as well as Yallama (Tashkent Province) and Ak-altin (Syrdarya Province)-presents an additional problem. INP representatives suggested the installation of solar panels at some points of entry as a possible remedy to the power supply issue. ¶3. (SBU) The INP representatives also indicated that they travel each year to Aspect in Moscow for recertification training on handheld radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs). (Comment: The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program as well as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency have provided a number of RIIDs to the Government of Uzbekistan over the past two years. U.S.-sponsored RIID training may thus not be necessary if INP shares this expertise with sufficient numbers of Uzbek personnel on the borders. End comment.) They welcomed Department of Energy visitors to observe conditions at points of entry firsthand, recommending the border crossing points at Shovot (in Khorezm Province) and Alat (Bukhara Province) in particular. (Note: The Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) denied Post's request for a Department of Energy team to visit sites in the Ferghana Valley in May, and also prohibited INP from visiting these sites. The GOU may be more receptive to visiting Shovot and Alat. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) Comment: The Institute of Nuclear Physics would probably welcome assistance-perhaps under the auspices of the Department of Energy in conjunction with the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Program-that helps to address power supply issues at Uzbekistan's borders or in training Customs personnel in how to address problems with the sophisticated equipment associated with the radiation portal monitors. NORLAND