ESTONIA'S POST-IRAQ AGENDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000034 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS NATO IZ EN SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S POST-IRAQ AGENDA CLASSIFIED BY: CDA KAREN DECKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D) REF: (A) TALLIN 0027 (B) Ahn-Adkins email 01/27/09 (C) Adkins-Ahn email 01/28/09 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 22, the Government of Estonia (GOE) concluded formally Estonia's participation in coalition operations in Iraq, after lengthy negotiations between GOE and Government of Iraq (GOI) on the status of Estonian forces failed to produce results. In the days following this decision, we have discussed with the Estonian Ministry of Defense (MOD) ways Estonia can continue to contribute in Iraq, but initial feedback indicates that while the GOE supports USG objectives in Iraq, legislative hurdles and low public support for Estonia's role in Iraq will hamper its efforts in the near term. The most obvious fix -- simply to increase Estonia's ongoing contribution to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) -- disappointingly requires Parliamentary action, as the Estonian Parliament sets numerical limits on overseas deployments. The MOD will be better prepared to comment on additional Estonian contributions to NTM-I after Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo's February 6-8 visit to Baghdad. In the meantime, Estonia's priority is to find new opportunities where it can partner Estonian troops together with U.S. troops on the ground, with Afghanistan being the likeliest possibility. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On January 28, Pol/Econ Chief and ARMA met with Riho Rongelep, MOD's Director of Operations and point man on Iraq negotiations, to discuss the way forward following the GOE's decision to conclude its participation in coalition operations in Iraq (Reftel A). Rongelep stated that the failure to resolve the issue of the legal status of Estonian troops in Iraq was not for lack of political will, but stringent legal restrictions on the part of both the GOE and the GOI. According to Rongelep, Dr. Fadel (advisor to al-Maliki) noted that given the current situation in Iraq, CoM Resolution 439 and CoR 50 would have to be readdressed in order to provide Estonia with a legally binding agreement that would satisfy the Estonian parliamentary mandate. Given the low number of Estonian troops in Iraq, this would not be feasible, according to the Iraqis. Rongelep added that GOE legal experts believed that without a change to Iraqi domestic law, the (draft) letter from al-Maliki to NATO Secretary General J. De Hoop Scheffer outlining the formal legal basis for the operations of NATO soldiers in Iraq would not be sufficient protection for Estonian troops as it would likely not be deemed legally binding in an Iraqi court. While no agreement was ultimately possible, Rongelep characterized his conversations with Dr.Fadel and Iraqi Minister of Defense Abdul Al-Quador Kassa as 'frank' and demonstrating a clear interest on the part of the GOI to continue bilateral cooperation with Estonia. ¶3. (C) Looking to the future, Estonia is committed to continuing bilateral cooperation with Iraq. Any proposed increase in the Estonian contribution to NTM-I, however, would require new legislation and approvals both by the Cabinet and then the Parliament, a process that could take at least two months. Noting that NATO would hold an NTM-I force generation conference in May/June (which might change the nature of NTM-I requirements),Rongelep reported that the MOD is considering whether to await the results of the NATO forcegen process before deploying additional support to NTM-I. (NOTE FOR EMB BAGHDAD: Rongelep stressed the importance of LTG Helmick and Ambassador Crocker conveying to DefMin Aaviksoo a strong message on the need to increase support for NTM-I.) ¶4. (C) While the GOE wants to remain engaged in Iraq, concern lingers about the lack of Estonian public support for Estonia's presence in Iraq (not specifically NTM-I). MOD advisors, including Rongelep, hope Aaviksoo's February 6-8 visit to Baghdad will provide an opportunity to give more positive visibility to Estonia's role there (Ref C), and to correct public perceptions about Estonia's role in Iraq. Rongelep cautioned us that public perceptions must change before the mandate could be revised, and noted that better public diplomacy will help future operations as well. ¶4. (C) In the meantime, the MOD is considering several ways Estonia can continue bi-lateral cooperation with Iraq. Apparently no specific ideas were discussed between the GOE and GOI during Rongelep's last visit, but Rongelep mentioned possibly inviting Iraqi students to attend the TALLINN 00000034 002 OF 002 Baltic Defense College (this would require agreement by Latvia and Lithuania as well) and inviting GOI officials to train at the Estonian Diplomatic Academy. Rongelep stated that Estonia is considering sending an Mine Counter- Measures (MCM) ship to support TF150 in the Persian Gulf where the U.S. and Estonian navies could work together to train Iraqi naval officers. Rongelep was quick to point out that these ideas are only at the 'thinking stage' and that concrete decisions depend on the outcome of DefMin Aaviksoo's meetings in Baghdad. The MOD is also considering how Estonian troops can continue to engage side by side with U.S. troops. According to Rongelep, one option under consideration is sending a platoon to Afghanistan to work with U.S. troops. (NOTE: This would be the same platoon that was trained and ready to deploy to Iraq in December 2008 and has been on stand-by since then. END NOTE.) Rongelep made it clear that this platoon would be in addition to the company currently embedded with UK forces in Helmand. Rongelep also mentioned that Estonian troops will be ready to participate in an OMLT in 2011, but no specific location is being considered at this time. (NOTE: After numerous discussions with the MOD, it is our understanding that the Estonians would not be able to sustain an independent OMLT by 2011, but may be able to contribute to a joint operation. END NOTE). ¶5. (C) Rongelep also discussed with us plans for Aaviksoo's February 6-8 visit to Baghdad. Aaviksoo will be accompanied by four members of the Estonian press and Brigadier General Valeri Saar. While in Iraq, he will meet with Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul Al-Quador Kassa to discuss further defense-related co-operation between the two countries. Aaviksoo will participate in a "mission conclusion" ceremony with Coalition Forces on February 8 at Camp Victory in either Al-Faw Palace or at the Baghdad International Airport. The GOE would welcome attendance by Ambassador Crocker or a high-level U.S. representative, MNF-I Commander General Odierno or his representative, appropriate GOI officials, the Estonian delegation, U.S. Embassy Baghdad staff and a few representative Estonian soldiers to take down the Estonian flag. Rongelep commented that similar ceremonies were done for other nations upon completion of their Iraq missions. DECKER