Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TALLINN34
2009-02-02 12:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tallinn
Cable title:  

ESTONIA'S POST-IRAQ AGENDA

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR MOPS NATO IZ EN 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1017
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000034 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS NATO IZ EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S POST-IRAQ AGENDA

CLASSIFIED BY: CDA KAREN DECKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)

REF: (A) TALLIN 0027
(B) Ahn-Adkins email 01/27/09
(C) Adkins-Ahn email 01/28/09

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000034

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS NATO IZ EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S POST-IRAQ AGENDA

CLASSIFIED BY: CDA KAREN DECKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D)

REF: (A) TALLIN 0027
(B) Ahn-Adkins email 01/27/09
(C) Adkins-Ahn email 01/28/09


1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 22, the Government of Estonia
(GOE) concluded formally Estonia's participation in
coalition operations in Iraq, after lengthy negotiations
between GOE and Government of Iraq (GOI) on the status of
Estonian forces failed to produce results. In the days
following this decision, we have discussed with the
Estonian Ministry of Defense (MOD) ways Estonia can
continue to contribute in Iraq, but initial feedback
indicates that while the GOE supports USG objectives in
Iraq, legislative hurdles and low public support for
Estonia's role in Iraq will hamper its efforts in the near
term. The most obvious fix -- simply to increase Estonia's
ongoing contribution to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq
(NTM-I) -- disappointingly requires Parliamentary action,
as the Estonian Parliament sets numerical limits on
overseas deployments. The MOD will be better prepared to
comment on additional Estonian contributions to NTM-I after
Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo's February 6-8
visit to Baghdad. In the meantime, Estonia's priority is
to find new opportunities where it can partner Estonian
troops together with U.S. troops on the ground, with
Afghanistan being the likeliest possibility. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On January 28, Pol/Econ Chief and ARMA met with Riho
Rongelep, MOD's Director of Operations and point man on
Iraq negotiations, to discuss the way forward following the
GOE's decision to conclude its participation in coalition
operations in Iraq (Reftel A). Rongelep stated that the
failure to resolve the issue of the legal status of
Estonian troops in Iraq was not for lack of political will,
but stringent legal restrictions on the part of both the
GOE and the GOI. According to Rongelep, Dr. Fadel (advisor
to al-Maliki) noted that given the current situation in
Iraq, CoM Resolution 439 and CoR 50 would have to be
readdressed in order to provide Estonia with a legally
binding agreement that would satisfy the Estonian
parliamentary mandate. Given the low number of Estonian
troops in Iraq, this would not be feasible, according to
the Iraqis. Rongelep added that GOE legal experts believed
that without a change to Iraqi domestic law, the (draft)
letter from al-Maliki to NATO Secretary General J. De Hoop
Scheffer outlining the formal legal basis for the
operations of NATO soldiers in Iraq would not be sufficient
protection for Estonian troops as it would likely not be
deemed legally binding in an Iraqi court. While no

agreement was ultimately possible, Rongelep characterized
his conversations with Dr.Fadel and Iraqi Minister of
Defense Abdul Al-Quador Kassa as 'frank' and demonstrating
a clear interest on the part of the GOI to continue
bilateral cooperation with Estonia.


3. (C) Looking to the future, Estonia is committed to
continuing bilateral cooperation with Iraq. Any proposed
increase in the Estonian contribution to NTM-I, however,
would require new legislation and approvals both by the
Cabinet and then the Parliament, a process that could take
at least two months. Noting that NATO would hold an NTM-I
force generation conference in May/June (which might change
the nature of NTM-I requirements),Rongelep reported that
the MOD is considering whether to await the results of the
NATO forcegen process before deploying additional support
to NTM-I. (NOTE FOR EMB BAGHDAD: Rongelep stressed the
importance of LTG Helmick and Ambassador Crocker conveying
to DefMin Aaviksoo a strong message on the need to increase
support for NTM-I.)


4. (C) While the GOE wants to remain engaged in Iraq,
concern lingers about the lack of Estonian public support
for Estonia's presence in Iraq (not specifically NTM-I).
MOD advisors, including Rongelep, hope Aaviksoo's February
6-8 visit to Baghdad will provide an opportunity to give
more positive visibility to Estonia's role there (Ref C),
and to correct public perceptions about Estonia's role in
Iraq. Rongelep cautioned us that public perceptions must
change before the mandate could be revised, and noted that
better public diplomacy will help future operations as
well.


4. (C) In the meantime, the MOD is considering several ways
Estonia can continue bi-lateral cooperation with Iraq.
Apparently no specific ideas were discussed between the GOE
and GOI during Rongelep's last visit, but Rongelep
mentioned possibly inviting Iraqi students to attend the

TALLINN 00000034 002 OF 002


Baltic Defense College (this would require agreement by
Latvia and Lithuania as well) and inviting GOI officials to
train at the Estonian Diplomatic Academy. Rongelep stated
that Estonia is considering sending an Mine Counter-
Measures (MCM) ship to support TF150 in the Persian Gulf
where the U.S. and Estonian navies could work together to
train Iraqi naval officers. Rongelep was quick to point
out that these ideas are only at the 'thinking stage' and
that concrete decisions depend on the outcome of DefMin
Aaviksoo's meetings in Baghdad. The MOD is also
considering how Estonian troops can continue to engage side
by side with U.S. troops. According to Rongelep, one
option under consideration is sending a platoon to
Afghanistan to work with U.S. troops. (NOTE: This would be
the same platoon that was trained and ready to deploy to
Iraq in December 2008 and has been on stand-by since then.
END NOTE.) Rongelep made it clear that this platoon would
be in addition to the company currently embedded with UK
forces in Helmand. Rongelep also mentioned that Estonian
troops will be ready to participate in an OMLT in 2011, but
no specific location is being considered at this time.
(NOTE: After numerous discussions with the MOD, it is our
understanding that the Estonians would not be able to
sustain an independent OMLT by 2011, but may be able to
contribute to a joint operation. END NOTE).


5. (C) Rongelep also discussed with us plans for Aaviksoo's
February 6-8 visit to Baghdad. Aaviksoo will be
accompanied by four members of the Estonian press and
Brigadier General Valeri Saar. While in Iraq, he will meet
with Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul Al-Quador Kassa to
discuss further defense-related co-operation between the
two countries. Aaviksoo will participate in a "mission
conclusion" ceremony with Coalition Forces on February 8 at
Camp Victory in either Al-Faw Palace or at the Baghdad
International Airport. The GOE would welcome attendance by
Ambassador Crocker or a high-level U.S. representative,
MNF-I Commander General Odierno or his representative,
appropriate GOI officials, the Estonian delegation, U.S.
Embassy Baghdad staff and a few representative Estonian
soldiers to take down the Estonian flag. Rongelep
commented that similar ceremonies were done for other
nations upon completion of their Iraq missions.

DECKER

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