U.S.-Baltic Annual CFE Consultations: Support for CFE, U.S.

S E C R E T TALLINN 000293 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/25 TAGS: PARM PREL NATO KCFE EN SUBJECT: U.S.-Baltic Annual CFE Consultations: Support for CFE, U.S. Lead with Russia REF: STATE 92528 CLASSIFIED BY: Karen Decker, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The three Baltic states used this year's annual CFE consultations in Tallinn to express regret that U.S.-Russia discussions on CFE were not progressing due to Russia's repetition of old ideas, but insisted the U.S. continue to lead on CFE in order to maintain a unified NATO approach. They reaffirmed the readiness of their governments to join the Adapted CFE Treaty when that became possible. They urged that the new Administration stick to positions in the NATO-agreed Parallel Actions Package and hoped that we would not change fundamentally our approach on CFE, either by ceding too much to the Russians or relegating European conventional forces - and CFE itself - to the second tier. ¶2. (S/NF) The Balts also took the opportunity to underscore the importance of continued USG engagement on practical European security issues - such as NATO defense planning and exercises - as well as CFE. The U.S. team's outline of Russia's ongoing military reorganization provided the basis for a wide-ranging discussion of conventional military challenges. MOD briefers from Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia insisted that training and resources for territorial defense and expeditionary missions are mutually supportive, but also stressed that NATO must take the Balts' Article 5 concerns seriously if we expect them to be able to sustain support for expeditionary missions. All highlighted that U.S./EUCOM practical involvement with exercise and visits was a huge plus. They were explicit in stating that it was essential for the U.S. conventional and nuclear presence in Europe to remain undiminished. End summary. Support for CFE and U.S. as Lead with Russia ¶3. (C) Estonian MFA Director General for Security Policy and International Organizations Margus Kolga opened the meeting with a general tour d'horizon on CFE-related topics. He reaffirmed Estonia's continued willingness to accede to the Adapted CFE Treaty when the conditions were right. Latvian MFA Director of Security Policy Kaspars Ozolins announced that there had been discussions among the three Baltic States on how they could increase their security through CFE implementation. Lithuanian MFA Director of Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Gediminas Varvuolis encouraged the U.S. to make all efforts to "bring Russia back to the table." U.S. Head of Delegation Rich Davis reaffirmed that the U.S. welcomed the Balts' willingness to accede to Adapted CFE and recalled that it was one of the elements of the parallel actions package. Davis said that in Washington there was active consideration at senior levels of the way ahead on CFE. Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller had recently met twice with Russian MFA Disarmament Director Anatoly Antonov, but eliciting Russian flexibility on the "toughest issues" was proving difficult. Russian Force Restructuring: Update ¶4. (S/NF) The U.S. side provided an update, as per usual practice, on the security situation in the Baltic region to include the status of the Russian military's reorganization. Following up on previous Baltic interest in the situation in Georgia, the U.S. offered a snapshot: Russian forces were still located in South Ossetia and Abkhazia but had been pulled out of the rest of Georgia, generally on schedule when EU monitors were in place. Russia had declared these forces in its Vienna Document data as of 1 January 2009 under the identity of the units from which they had been formed at their peacetime locations at Maykop and Vladikavkaz in the North Caucasus Military District. Russian border guards had been placed on South Ossetian and Abkhazian borders. ¶5. (S/NF) Concerning Russian forces more generally, the U.S. explained that the largest restructuring of Russian ground forces in at least two decades or more was ongoing. Most inactive formations and units were being eliminated, and divisions were being restructured into one, two, or three brigades in order to create smaller, more agile units that would be able more quickly to respond to regional conflicts and contingencies. Overall, there will be fewer tank battalions and motorized rifle battalions in the Area of Application than heretofore. The large-scale reorganization would take time to digest and it is likely that Russia would be somewhat less ready to react to a contingency like Georgia now than it was this time last year. Nevertheless, Russia would be able to respond promptly to any contingency related to South Ossetia or Abkhazia. ¶6. (S/NF) More broadly, the restructuring also signaled a decision by Russia to focus on a small number of ready forces, rather than maintaining its ability to generate a large, heavy force quickly. Under its previous organization, Russia had aimed to be able to mobilize a large, heavy force in a matter of weeks; now the timeframe for generating that type of large, defensive force would be perhaps as much as six months or more. The Russian premise appeared to be that there would not be a major land war in Europe that engaged, for example, Russia and NATO, whereas there might be a need for Russian forces to act to meet smaller contingencies, and here Russia wanted to be more capable. ¶7. (S/NF) The Zapad (West) 2009 military exercise expected in late September was notified as involving a total of 12,529 personnel (6,820 from Belarus, 5,680 from Russia and 29 from Kazakhstan) in a simulation of attacks on both the Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus that would be repelled by the combined forces. This combined exercise, Zapad 2009, will be the largest exercise conducted in the region in many years and is just below the Vienna Document threshold (13,000 personnel) for observation. Varvuolis (Lithuania) expressed concern about the large scale exercise on the Lithuanian border. He stressed that the GOL is "not alarmed" but suggested the exercise was the largest since the Cold War, and represented the prospect of activity near the of the Baltic states. This year's exercise will be even bigger that last year's Zapad exercise. He inferred that, as such, these exercises had a "show of force" element. U.S. and Baltic teams both expressed regret that Russia had used up the last available Vienna Document inspection quota for this year, thus limiting opportunities for OSCE partners to observe the Zapad exercise, although Belarus had notified this exercise and invited neighboring states (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine) to observe. Estonian LTC Toomas Peda noted that the opportunity to observe this exercise was not totally lost -- both Latvia and Lithuania were planning to conduct two evaluations on a bilateral basis with Russia within the coming week. (Lithuania announced at the 21 September meeting of NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee that it has conducted bilateral evaluation visits of a Belarusian interceptor aviation base (at which Russian aircraft and personnel were present) and of the Russian Naval Infantry Brigade in the Kaliningrad Oblast, on 16 and 17 September, respectively. Russia Ceases Bilateral Activities with Baltic States ¶8. (C) Kolga noted that Russia had discontinued bilateral verification visits with Estonia because it did not see any "military merit" in them. Ozolinz (Latvia) noted that Russia was not interested in additional bilateral agreements with Latvia. In contrast, Latvia noted that its bilateral agreement with Belarus was working well. The Lithuanian rep agreed that Lithuania's bilateral agreement with Belarus also was working well, but Russia had ceased to permit any bilateral Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Kaliningrad region. Since "suspending" CFE, Russia had indicated that it did not feel it needed to continue its bilateral verification activities with Lithuania. Post-Oberammergau and Berlin ¶9. (C) All three Baltic delegations believed there had not been much change in the Russian position following the Berlin conference on conventional arms control in Europe. They noted the "unusual" interest of non-aligned countries (e.g., Austria, Ireland, Switzerland) in the event. The Estonian rep noted that although recent meetings, like Berlin, were a positive step, they were not very successful in paving the way for anything new. Kolga said the Balts continued to support NATO's position, but they wanted to see more concrete developments from the Russian side; Russia needed to compromise, too, and should not keep insisting on maximalist positions. He also noted that they were unaware of the modalities regarding the smaller group meeting (June 9) prior to the Berlin seminar. The Estonian rep asked for clarification regarding provisional versus temporary application of CFE. Latvia (Diana Krieva) noted that at this year's Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) the Russian rep in Vienna mentioned a next possible conference in November. ¶10. (C) The U.S. head of del provided an update on U.S.-Russia discussions on CFE over the last few months. We welcomed the Russian aide-memoire, more for its procedural value than substance. We received a list of questions, which Russian Arms Control Delegate to the OSCE Ambassador Ulyanov had distributed at the last plenary of the spring Joint Consultative Group (JCG) session, regarding provisional application of CFE. The U.S. rep pointed out that provisional application was not possible for the U.S. and many other Allies also) until internal ratification procedures were completed. He explained that the small group meeting on June 9 in Berlin was not what the U.S. delegation had proposed at an earlier High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting. The German hosts had different plans which resulted in the larger meeting that took place between Allies and Russia on the 9th. For our part, we did not find this meeting particularly useful; it exposed many delegations to Russian rhetoric, but there was no meaningful discussion. As far as any next conference (suggested by Russia in the NATO-Russia context),he thought the Alliance had some internal work to do first. The U.S. rep provided a readout of the September 3 meeting between Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Russian Disarmament Director Antonov per reftel. What Does Russia Get for its 2nd Year "Anniversary"? ¶11. (C) The U.S. rep said that one of the questions Allies needed to consider was how to handle the annual CFE data exchange in December, two years into the Russian suspension of implementation. The Baltic delegations noted that NATO would need to consider its public message for the 2nd year that marked Russia's "suspension" of CFE. The Estonian rep noted that putting pressure on Russia publicly did not necessarily bring a positive response. The Latvian rep pointed out that what to do in December regarding the annual CFE data exchange put more pressure on the Allies than on Russia. The U.S. stressed the importance of NATO solidarity and said this was a conversation for discussion within the Alliance. Temporary/trial versus Provisional Application ¶12. (C) The Lithuanian del asked what would be the Russian obligation under temporary application and how that differed from provisional application. The U.S. rep first clarified that during the September 3 meeting Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller had presented general ideas -- not a formal proposal -- to Antonov to determine whether there was Russian interest. The ideas were, in the context of overall agreement on the parallel actions package, to establish a timeline for ratification of Adapted CFE by NATO Allies, and to initiate a period of trial implementation of Adapted CFE by Russia and others for that same timeframe. If Adapted CFE was to be ratified by all NATO Allies, Russia would need to be implementing CFE in some form. Provisional application, which Russia had focused on, is "a legal concept" that the U.S. could not pursue until it had ratified the Adapted treaty. Temporary (trial) application, as an idea, would focus on the operational aspects of the treaty, e.g. data and inspections. Latvia wondered since trial application was not a legal concept would it require ratification by Congress. The U.S. rep explained that the idea was to show some movement that could provide "an ice breaker" for progress on some of the tougher issues. However, he emphasized, the Russian side did not show interest in pursuing such an option and noted that any agreement on trial application would be in the context of agreement on the entire parallel actions package. What about the Istanbul Commitments? ¶13. (C) Both Lithuanian and Estonian dels expressed concern that the phrase "Istanbul commitments" had fallen from the vocabulary. The U.S. rep noted that the September 3 meeting touched on Georgia and Moldova, but the discussion did not reveal anything new. He reaffirmed that host nation consent must be part of the discussion on CFE. The U.S. (Laurendeau) said that in the parallel actions package itself, the U.S. and NATO Allies had taken a decision to focus on achieving results, rather than reiterating the phrase "Istanbul Commitments." Georgia and Moldova were subject lines in the parallel actions package. Russia had accepted that. The question was what could be agreed as a way forward. It was notable that Antonov routinely referred to Moldova as "the issue on which we are closest to a solution." On Georgia, the U.S. hoped to take Russia up on its suggestion, in the aide-memoire, that it was ready to consider transparency measures. She emphasized that Georgia and Moldova are part of the parallel actions package and explained that whether or not we use the phrase "Istanbul commitments" we are focused on the same results. Frustration with Russian Non-Movement ¶14. (C) Latvia noted that provisional application and the flank argument were old issues we had heard from Russia before. Now, she surmised, it seemed Russia was still "sitting on old items" and "testing what response" we would give them. How long would we pursue this path? Did we see a need for a new European security treaty, or some new form of arms control agreement? Lithuania was in favor of joining the discussion on CFE, but at the moment it needed to see some movement from the Russian side on the parallel actions package. ¶15. (C) The U.S. clarified that a European security treaty and CFE were separate items. It was not clear how Russia saw their relationship. Russia's dissatisfaction with CFE was not well defined until 2007, though we had a preview at the 2006 CFE Review Conference. The initial idea for a new European security treaty seemed more of a speech writer's concept than something fully fleshed out, and the Russians are still giving it shape. Russian authorities have said that they do not see their European security treaty idea as a replacement for CFE, but as an additional document. That said, it was not clear at this point how interested Russia is in keeping CFE, or whether Russia would be willing to compromise to keep it. Baltic Defense Planning: Updates ¶16. (S/NF) The Baltic delegations provided an update on recent defense planning in their countries. The theme was clear: the economic crisis is having a significant impact on the overall budgets of each of the Balts, with Latvia and Lithuania expecting further cuts to defense spending in an effort to make funds available for other ministries. Despite these near-term setbacks, each nation remains committed to smartly appropriating resources to develop complementary homeland defense and NATO expeditionary operations capabilities. In this regard, tangible evidence of US-led prudent planning, through boots-on-the ground exercises will best assuage domestic and parliamentary concerns over the viability of Article 5. ¶17. (S/NF) Kristjan Prikk, MOD Director for International Cooperation briefed on Estonian planning. Although resources for defense planning were limited and would constitute a smaller percentage of GDP than in previous years (possibly less than 2%), priorities would not change. The Estonians were committed to conducting the core mission of the NATO Alliance. The U.S. (Kehl) noted that the U.S. (and NATO) remained committed to the prudent planning it was conducing with the Baltic region. ¶18. (S/NF) Martynas Zapolskis, MOD Deputy Head of the Policy Formation Division briefed on Lithuanian activities. He outlined three main pillars for Lithuanian defense. The first pillar is having well-equipped home forces to provide territorial defense. The Lithuanian military is undergoing a restructuring of its forces, while also conducting contingency planning. He said that Lithuania's participation in the NATO Response Force will help it to develop military skills in areas which are currently lacking. The second pillar is collective defense, which requires both capabilities and also political will. In order to sustain effective collective defense Zapolskis said the GOL needs the allies to commit to collective defense as well as to develop its own capabilities in relation to NATO's ongoing work on an updated strategic concept. He explained that the new strategic concept should include practical measures that demonstrate the credibility of collective defense. Zapolskis elaborated that Article 5 should be more than a response to crisis and could serve as an early warning system to deter and prevent crisis. He said that Lithuania supports NATO visibility in member states such as air police missions, NATO infrastructure and military exercises. He noted that these activities help to consolidate public and political support for the alliance. The third pillar is the ability to act with Allied forces. Zapolskis cited a recent fruitful exercise with EUCOM, Baltic Host. The exercise's scenario focused on facilitating a U.S. deployment to the Baltics. He stressed that the "plans can turn out worthless, but the planning process was always priceless" in terms of demonstrating host-nation support to various initiatives. ¶19. (S/NF) Diana Krieva of the MFA's Arms Control Division briefed the group on Latvian planning. Latvia, probably the worst hit economically, had little to report on its defense planning, as the previous briefers had already covered most of the topics she planned to raise. She underscored the importance of bilateral training with the U.S. and noted that the Latvian Defense Ministry and Armed Forces are currently undergoing restructuring. Latvia's involvement with Afghanistan provides added-value for soldiers since these are the same soldiers that would respond to other, new threats. Severe budget cuts had caused the Latvians to adopt the new slogan of "best value for the moment." Latvia will not hit its target of spending 2% of GDP on defense this year and predicts it likely will not hit that target in the next few years. ¶20. (U) Delegation Lists: -- U.S.: State VCI/CCA Director Richard Davis, head of delegation; Jennifer Laurendeau, State EUR/RPM; Toniann Wright, State VCI/CCA; James Starkey, State; Jessica Kehl, Director, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Southeast Europe and Regional Affairs; CDR Brett Mietus, Joint Staff J-5; LTC Doug Peterson, Joint Chiefs of Staff USOSCE; LTC Robert Williams, Office of Defense Cooperation, Embassy Tallinn; Michelle Hoyt, Embassy Vilnius; Johnathan Hilton, Embassy Tallinn; and Kelly Busby, Embassy Riga. -- Estonia (host): Margus Kolga, Director General Security Policy and International Organizations Department, MFA; Paul Teesalu, Director Security Policy Division, MFA; Kristjan Prikk, Director International Cooperation Department, MOD; Kai-Helin Kaldas, Adviser, International Cooperation Department, MOD; LTC Toomas Peda, Head of Arms Control and Verification Branch, Department of Analysis and Planning, HQ of the Estonian Defense Forces. -- Latvia: Kaspars Ozolins, Director of Security Policy Department, MFA; Sintija Visnevska, Director of Defense Policy Department, MOD; Raimonds Oskalns, Head of Arms Control Division, MFA; Diana Krieva, 2nd Secretary of Arms Control Divison, MFA. -- Lithuania: Gediminas Varvuolis, Director of Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Department, MFA; Martynas Zapolskis, Deputy Head of the Policy Formation Division, MOD; Donatas Vainalavicius, 2nd Secretary Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Department, MFA. ¶21. (U) This cable was drafted by VCI/CCA: TWright and also cleared by OSD: JKehl, JS: BMietus and WINPAC: JStarkey. DECKER