Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TAIPEI939
2009-08-06 02:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
THE KMT-CCP CROSS-STRAIT FORUM UNDER CHAIRMAN MA
VZCZCXRO5895 PP RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #0939/01 2180224 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 060224Z AUG 09 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2053 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 9320 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0234 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0765 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 3168 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 0314 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0753 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 2622 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 7115 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000939
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW CH
SUBJECT: THE KMT-CCP CROSS-STRAIT FORUM UNDER CHAIRMAN MA
REF: A. TAIPEI 0896
B. TAIPEI 0650
C. TAIPEI 0433
Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000939
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW CH
SUBJECT: THE KMT-CCP CROSS-STRAIT FORUM UNDER CHAIRMAN MA
REF: A. TAIPEI 0896
B. TAIPEI 0650
C. TAIPEI 0433
Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary. President Ma Ying-jeou, who was uncontested
in the July 26 election for Chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT),
is likely to continue the KMT-CCP Cross-Strait Forum. The
event, which held its fifth meeting July 11-12 in Changsha,
Hunan, on educational, cultural, and social issues, has
emerged as an important, unofficial channel between Taipei
and Beijing. Even some Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
members have shown interest in the Forum and other
cross-Strait exchanges, prompting DPP leaders to tighten
regulations governing travel to the mainland and, ultimately,
expel two former DPP officials who attended the Changsha
session (refs A, B). KMT contacts advise that the
cross-Strait relationship is not yet mature enough for a
meeting of "equals" between Ma and PRC President/CCP General
Secretary Hu Jintao. As a result, future KMT delegations
likely will be led by an honorary Chairman and the Secretary
General. End Summary.
From Opposition to Government Channel
--------------
2. (C) The July 11-12 Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and
Cultural Forum (colloquially known as the KMT-CCP Forum) held
in Changsha, Hunan, was the fifth since the event was
launched in 2006. Established during DPP President Chen
Shui-bian's second term, the Forum was originally envisioned
as a way to maintain cross-Strait dialogue despite Chen's
pro-independence stance, according to KMT Deputy Secretary
General Chang Jung-kung. Now that the KMT holds the
Presidency and 80 of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan,
he said, the party works with the various government
ministries in developing and negotiating agenda items with
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The KMT maintains a say
in the agenda, but increasingly defers to government
positions, said Chang. He emphasized that the Forum is only
intended to raise issues at a general level. Negotiating
agreements remains the purview of the official channel
between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).
Changsha Recommendations, Taiwan Soft Power
--------------
3. (C) KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung led the 270-member
delegation, including party members, academics, government
officials and two DPP members, from Taiwan to Changsha July
11-12. (Note: According to DPP contacts, another DPP member
was invited and went to Changsha, but did not participate in
the forum. End note.) CPPCC Chair Jia Qinglin led the CCP
delegation. More than five hundred participants, in all,
attended the forum, which issued six joint recommendations:
strengthen cross-Strait cultural exchanges, encourage joint
compilation of a Chinese-language dictionary, deepen
cooperation of cross-Strait cultural industries and promote
cross-Strait cultural exchanges and cooperation, establish a
cross-Strait cooperative mechanism on culture and education,
reinforce exchanges between media companies across the
Strait, and support cooperation with Taiwan enterprises in
the environmental field.
4. (C) Tsai Cheng-wen, president of the KMT-affiliated
thinktank National Policy Foundation (NPF),told AIT Econoff
that educational exchange was a principal topic of discussion
during the Changsha session and that both sides agreed on the
importance of facilitating student and teacher exchanges.
Tsai also noted that Taiwan's Council for Cultural Affairs is
preparing for a "culture summit" to be held in China in
September. Tsai recommended that Taiwan actively pursue a
wide range of exchanges, particularly educational, as part of
a "soft power" strategy to exert long-term influence on the
mainland. (Note: The NPF is involved in planning and research
for the KMT-CCP Cross-Strait Forum.) President Ma himself
has spoken of using Taiwan's soft power, through social,
cultural, and educational exchanges, to demonstrate to the
TAIPEI 00000939 002 OF 002
mainland that democracy is compatible with Chinese culture
(ref C).
The Cross-Strait Forum's Expanding Membership?
-------------- -
5. (C) KMT Secretary General Wu Den-yih pointed out to us
recently that the name of the forum has always been the
Cross-Strait Forum, not the KMT-CCP Forum so often reported
in the media. While the leaders of the two delegations are
from the KMT and CCP, the delegation's membership is far more
inclusive, said Wu. DSYG Chang acknowledged that some
government officials as well as DPP members participated in
the July 11-12 forum, but did not use their titles.
According to DPP contacts, former DPP legislator Hsu Jung-shu
and former Council of Agriculture head Fan Chen-tzung were
the first DPP members ever to attend a KMT-CCP Forum. The
outrage their participation sparked within the opposition
party ultimately prompted the DPP to expel them in an effort
to deter growing interest among senior members in traveling
to China in a non-personal capacity (refs A, B). DPP
officials maintain that invitations by both the KMT and CCP
to participate in the forum are efforts to create internal
divisions within the party. (Note: Per ref A, DPP Chair Tsai
Ing-wen explained to AIT that the party will not block visits
to the mainland by its members as long as they are related to
their substantive work. She argued the attendance at the
recent KMT-CCP forum had no purpose at all and hinted there
were personal business considerations involved.)
Who Will Lead?
--------------
6. (C) Although Taiwan's delegation has traditionally been
led by the KMT Chairman, KMT contacts across the board
dismissed speculation that Ma, who was elected KMT Chairman
on July 26, would attend future sessions of the Forum. KMT
SYG Wu Den-yih told the ADIR July 30 that Ma would likely
appoint an Honorary Chairman as well as the Secretary General
to co-lead future delegations. The cross-Strait relationship
was not mature enough yet to have a Ma-Hu meeting, said Wu.
Ma is the president and the Taiwan people would expect him to
be acknowledged as such; this is the basic condition for
accepting a Ma-Hu meeting, Wu insisted.
Cross-Strait Approach Remains Cautious
--------------
7. (C) Despite opposition criticism that the Ma
administration is moving too fast and that economic
over-reliance on China gives Beijing the ability to pressure
Taiwan, SYG Wu underscored the KMT administration's cautious
approach toward the pace of cross-Strait improvements. If
Taiwan moves too fast, said Wu, then the stability of the
relationship is affected. Opening is easy; pulling back is
hard. The KMT does not want to go too fast. One example of
this cautious approach is in the area of finances. Chinese
investment in Taiwan is being limited, precisely because
Taiwan is aware of the imbalance in resources. Wu noted that
this imbalance in land and economic resources affects the
entire relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. Unlike
North and South Korea, or East and West Germany, the
differences in land mass and resources between Taiwan and
China are so large that it is difficult for China to see that
it must deal with Taiwan on an equal basis. This is the real
difficulty, claimed Wu, in the cross-Strait relationship.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) In some ways, Ma's move to run as Chairman
demonstrates his desire to ensure a clear and consistent
message across the Strait. As Chair, he can not only
directly manage this important unofficial channel between
Taipei and Beijing, but also, by denying the possibility of a
Ma-Hu meeting, he can address domestic demands that he
demonstrate his protection of Taiwan's sovereign interests
while he moves forward with his cross-Strait agenda.
WANG
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW CH
SUBJECT: THE KMT-CCP CROSS-STRAIT FORUM UNDER CHAIRMAN MA
REF: A. TAIPEI 0896
B. TAIPEI 0650
C. TAIPEI 0433
Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary. President Ma Ying-jeou, who was uncontested
in the July 26 election for Chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT),
is likely to continue the KMT-CCP Cross-Strait Forum. The
event, which held its fifth meeting July 11-12 in Changsha,
Hunan, on educational, cultural, and social issues, has
emerged as an important, unofficial channel between Taipei
and Beijing. Even some Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
members have shown interest in the Forum and other
cross-Strait exchanges, prompting DPP leaders to tighten
regulations governing travel to the mainland and, ultimately,
expel two former DPP officials who attended the Changsha
session (refs A, B). KMT contacts advise that the
cross-Strait relationship is not yet mature enough for a
meeting of "equals" between Ma and PRC President/CCP General
Secretary Hu Jintao. As a result, future KMT delegations
likely will be led by an honorary Chairman and the Secretary
General. End Summary.
From Opposition to Government Channel
--------------
2. (C) The July 11-12 Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and
Cultural Forum (colloquially known as the KMT-CCP Forum) held
in Changsha, Hunan, was the fifth since the event was
launched in 2006. Established during DPP President Chen
Shui-bian's second term, the Forum was originally envisioned
as a way to maintain cross-Strait dialogue despite Chen's
pro-independence stance, according to KMT Deputy Secretary
General Chang Jung-kung. Now that the KMT holds the
Presidency and 80 of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan,
he said, the party works with the various government
ministries in developing and negotiating agenda items with
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The KMT maintains a say
in the agenda, but increasingly defers to government
positions, said Chang. He emphasized that the Forum is only
intended to raise issues at a general level. Negotiating
agreements remains the purview of the official channel
between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).
Changsha Recommendations, Taiwan Soft Power
--------------
3. (C) KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung led the 270-member
delegation, including party members, academics, government
officials and two DPP members, from Taiwan to Changsha July
11-12. (Note: According to DPP contacts, another DPP member
was invited and went to Changsha, but did not participate in
the forum. End note.) CPPCC Chair Jia Qinglin led the CCP
delegation. More than five hundred participants, in all,
attended the forum, which issued six joint recommendations:
strengthen cross-Strait cultural exchanges, encourage joint
compilation of a Chinese-language dictionary, deepen
cooperation of cross-Strait cultural industries and promote
cross-Strait cultural exchanges and cooperation, establish a
cross-Strait cooperative mechanism on culture and education,
reinforce exchanges between media companies across the
Strait, and support cooperation with Taiwan enterprises in
the environmental field.
4. (C) Tsai Cheng-wen, president of the KMT-affiliated
thinktank National Policy Foundation (NPF),told AIT Econoff
that educational exchange was a principal topic of discussion
during the Changsha session and that both sides agreed on the
importance of facilitating student and teacher exchanges.
Tsai also noted that Taiwan's Council for Cultural Affairs is
preparing for a "culture summit" to be held in China in
September. Tsai recommended that Taiwan actively pursue a
wide range of exchanges, particularly educational, as part of
a "soft power" strategy to exert long-term influence on the
mainland. (Note: The NPF is involved in planning and research
for the KMT-CCP Cross-Strait Forum.) President Ma himself
has spoken of using Taiwan's soft power, through social,
cultural, and educational exchanges, to demonstrate to the
TAIPEI 00000939 002 OF 002
mainland that democracy is compatible with Chinese culture
(ref C).
The Cross-Strait Forum's Expanding Membership?
-------------- -
5. (C) KMT Secretary General Wu Den-yih pointed out to us
recently that the name of the forum has always been the
Cross-Strait Forum, not the KMT-CCP Forum so often reported
in the media. While the leaders of the two delegations are
from the KMT and CCP, the delegation's membership is far more
inclusive, said Wu. DSYG Chang acknowledged that some
government officials as well as DPP members participated in
the July 11-12 forum, but did not use their titles.
According to DPP contacts, former DPP legislator Hsu Jung-shu
and former Council of Agriculture head Fan Chen-tzung were
the first DPP members ever to attend a KMT-CCP Forum. The
outrage their participation sparked within the opposition
party ultimately prompted the DPP to expel them in an effort
to deter growing interest among senior members in traveling
to China in a non-personal capacity (refs A, B). DPP
officials maintain that invitations by both the KMT and CCP
to participate in the forum are efforts to create internal
divisions within the party. (Note: Per ref A, DPP Chair Tsai
Ing-wen explained to AIT that the party will not block visits
to the mainland by its members as long as they are related to
their substantive work. She argued the attendance at the
recent KMT-CCP forum had no purpose at all and hinted there
were personal business considerations involved.)
Who Will Lead?
--------------
6. (C) Although Taiwan's delegation has traditionally been
led by the KMT Chairman, KMT contacts across the board
dismissed speculation that Ma, who was elected KMT Chairman
on July 26, would attend future sessions of the Forum. KMT
SYG Wu Den-yih told the ADIR July 30 that Ma would likely
appoint an Honorary Chairman as well as the Secretary General
to co-lead future delegations. The cross-Strait relationship
was not mature enough yet to have a Ma-Hu meeting, said Wu.
Ma is the president and the Taiwan people would expect him to
be acknowledged as such; this is the basic condition for
accepting a Ma-Hu meeting, Wu insisted.
Cross-Strait Approach Remains Cautious
--------------
7. (C) Despite opposition criticism that the Ma
administration is moving too fast and that economic
over-reliance on China gives Beijing the ability to pressure
Taiwan, SYG Wu underscored the KMT administration's cautious
approach toward the pace of cross-Strait improvements. If
Taiwan moves too fast, said Wu, then the stability of the
relationship is affected. Opening is easy; pulling back is
hard. The KMT does not want to go too fast. One example of
this cautious approach is in the area of finances. Chinese
investment in Taiwan is being limited, precisely because
Taiwan is aware of the imbalance in resources. Wu noted that
this imbalance in land and economic resources affects the
entire relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. Unlike
North and South Korea, or East and West Germany, the
differences in land mass and resources between Taiwan and
China are so large that it is difficult for China to see that
it must deal with Taiwan on an equal basis. This is the real
difficulty, claimed Wu, in the cross-Strait relationship.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) In some ways, Ma's move to run as Chairman
demonstrates his desire to ensure a clear and consistent
message across the Strait. As Chair, he can not only
directly manage this important unofficial channel between
Taipei and Beijing, but also, by denying the possibility of a
Ma-Hu meeting, he can address domestic demands that he
demonstrate his protection of Taiwan's sovereign interests
while he moves forward with his cross-Strait agenda.
WANG