PROPOSED DATES FOR TAIWAN POL/MIL TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000759 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP AND PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR TW SUBJECT: PROPOSED DATES FOR TAIWAN POL/MIL TALKS REF: A. TAIPEI 349 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) inquired earlier this month about Washington's views on its proposal to hold U.S.-Taiwan political-military talks in Washington. MOFA offered August 31 - September 2 as its preferred window for the meeting. MOFA again stressed that the important goals for Taiwan in these talks are to learn how to structure its relatively weak interagency process and how to improve and strengthen Taiwan's civil-military relationship. End Summary. IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COORDINATION -------------- ¶2. (C) MOFA Research and Planning Committee's National Defense and Security Unit Chief Paul Chen phoned Poloff June 4 to ask if the United States has views on MOFA's proposal to initiate annual political-military talks in Washington (ref A). MOFA's main goal for the talks, Chen reiterated, is to learn from the U.S. model as Taiwan looks to improve its own interagency coordination on security issues. PROPOSED DATES -------------- ¶3. (C) Taiwan is flexible on the dates, Chen said. MOFA is now suggesting August 31 - September 2 as possible dates for the talks in Washington, followed by a visit to PACOM and the East-West Center by the delegation on their way back to Taiwan. LOW PROFILE VISIT -------------- ¶4. (C) Chen stressed that, as previously stated by North American Division DG Harry Tseng, MOFA intends to keep the visit low profile as it does with the AIT/W-led visits and the Monterey Talks. The only support Taiwan would need is assistance in scheduling USG meetings. TECRO is prepared to handle all administrative and logistics issues and expenses for the delegation, according to Chen. COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) These talks have the potential to strengthen our bilateral relationship with Taiwan and contribute to our overall objective of maintaining a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region. Security cooperation activities in support of our significant defense-related commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act have led to a robust U.S.-Taiwan military-to-military relationship. Such cooperation, however, has largely neglected the political and interagency component that buttresses this relationship. Taiwan's proposal provides an opportunity to address this by developing our association in a more strategic direction that includes, but is not dominated by, military issues. ¶6. (C) Giving Taiwan civilian and defense officials at working levels better access to more senior U.S. officials and letting them hear a broader range of U.S. voices is particularly important now, during a time of significant change in the U.S., Taiwan, and in cross-Strait relations. By providing a platform for greater political-military exchange and offering Taiwan one model for interagency coordination, the MOFA proposal would help advance Taiwan's fledgling efforts to improve policy coordination and would also enhance the role of Taiwan's civilian leadership in formulating national security policy. The proposed talks would also complement existing dialogues which predominantly focus on military issues and should strengthen the relatively weak political and interagency aspects of our bilateral TAIPEI 00000759 002 OF 002 relationship. YOUNG