Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TAIPEI579
2009-05-13 10:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
DEEP GREEN LEADERS FRET OVER CROSS-STRAIT AND
VZCZCXRO3062 PP RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #0579/01 1331034 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131034Z MAY 09 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1571 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9180 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0158 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0691 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 3101 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0248 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0612 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2556 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 7049 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000579
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: DEEP GREEN LEADERS FRET OVER CROSS-STRAIT AND
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE MA ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000579
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: DEEP GREEN LEADERS FRET OVER CROSS-STRAIT AND
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE MA ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: At a dinner for the Director on May 12
hosted by DPP Legislator Trong Chai, a group of Deep Green
leaders registered their concerns about President Ma "selling
out" Taiwan to the PRC. Trong Chai expressed hope the U.S.
would take a more balanced approach to Taiwan politics and
not publicly endorse President Ma and his cross-Strait
policies. Participants suggested Taiwan is becoming more
politically polarized and the potential for violence is
increasing, as some "radicals" are arguing that confrontation
will be needed to "stop" Ma. The group also suggested that
government officials have begun to interfere in student
protests and academic and press freedom under the Ma
administration. The Director underscored the importance of
avoiding political violence and pursuing political goals
through democratic processes. The discussion also covered
upcoming demonstrations against the Ma government and the
recent remarks by Japanese Representative Saito suggesting
Taiwan's status is undetermined. End Summary.
Criticizing Ma's Cross-Strait Policies
--------------
2. (C) On May 12, DPP Legislator Trong Chai hosted the
Director, DDIR, and POL Chief and Deputy to a dinner with
nine other prominent pan-Green leaders. The Green leaders
focused mainly on concerns about the direction and pace of
President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policies. After
several guests suggested Ma was "selling out" Taiwan to the
mainland, former Presidential Advisor Peng Ming-min went a
step further, claiming Ma was actually "giving away" Taiwan.
The group maintained that Ma was hastily negotiating
agreements with China without protecting Taiwan's
"sovereignty." For example, former Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu said he had always been careful to
prevent Beijing from being able to claim cross-Strait flights
were domestic rather than international. However, Ma has
said publicly that "one China" is no problem for him, and had
proved this by opening Taiwan's domestic as well as
international airports to cross-Strait flights.
3. (C) Our hosts claimed that the Ma administration and the
pro-Blue media -- itself coming under increasing PRC
influence -- have been effective in spreading the idea that
Taiwan has to rely on China to avoid being marginalized
economically. In fact, it is Beijing which has been working
to marginalize Taiwan by blocking its moves to negotiate FTAs
with other countries. While the Green camp does not oppose
developing economic relations with China on the basis of
equality, Taiwan's interests must be protected in this
process. The Ma administration, though, has announced major
initiatives without interagency reviews and evaluations and
without building a broad public consensus for them.
Moreover, the Legislative Yuan (LY) has not been allowed to
play a proper oversight role. For example, Joseph Wu said,
in one case, President Ma saw off a ship sailing across the
Strait while the LY was still reviewing the agreement
authorizing the trip. The group also faulted the Ma
administration for not taking a strong enough stand against
the PRC military threat.
March 17 Demonstrations
--------------
4. (C) The Green leaders all planned to participate in one
or both demonstrations on May 17 protesting the Ma
administration's policies. Former Examination Yuan President
Yao Chia-wen predicted 200,000 would join the DPP
demonstration in Taipei, and the other guests said they also
expected a large crowd at the event in Kaohsiung, which is
being put on by Deep Green organizations. One guest
suggested that pressure from the Deep Green had led to DPP
Chair Tsai Ing-wen's decision to hold a 24-hour silent
protest sit-in following the May 17 event.
Political Polarization and Potential for Violence
-------------- --------------
TAIPEI 00000579 002 OF 003
5. (C) Soochow University Professor Lo Chih-cheng asserted
that Taiwan has become increasingly polarized politically
since Ma came into office. Several guests expressed concern
about the potential for violence. Green supporters are
frustrated by Ma's "pro-China tilt," and some radicals
believe they will have to "spill blood" to stop Ma. One
guest suggested that Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin might be greeted
by even larger protests during his next visit to Taiwan than
those he encountered in Taipei last November.
Importance of Democracy
--------------
6. (C) Stressing the importance of preserving and further
developing Taiwan's democracy, the Director cited the
destructive turmoil in Thailand as an example of what can
happen when political parties fail to maintain dialogue and
instead resort to violence. The Director acknowledged the
DPP's frustration at having only 25 percent of the seats in
the LY despite winning 40 percent of the votes. He asked
what the DPP should do to improve its standing and whether
the party was considering making any adjustment to its
cross-Strait policy to attract more supporters. Several
participants suggested that the new LY electoral system plus
vote buying by the KMT would make it difficult for the DPP to
win elections. Moreover, President Chen's practice of
recruiting local DPP leaders into the central government had
depleted the party's talent pool at the local level. Former
Taiwan representative to Japan Lo Fu-chen said a recent poll
indicated a majority of the public in Taiwan dislike both the
KMT and DPP. The DPP needs to do a better job of
articulating alternative policies rather than simply
rejecting whatever the KMT proposes, he suggested. Lo
Chih-cheng suggested that the December local elections will
not be a good test for the DPP because such elections hinge
on local factions, personalities, and issues.
Backsliding on Human Rights
--------------
7. (C) The group suggested that there has been some
backsliding on human rights issues under the KMT government,
hearkening back to the KMT's authoritarian past. According
to Lo Chih-cheng, school officials had asked instructors at
his university to identify participants in a protest
movement, and some demonstrators had been contacted by
Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) officers.
Other guests noted that scholars in some thinktanks had been
warned not to criticize President Ma's proposed Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China and that
advertising on some television stations had also been cut
off.
Japan Representative Saito's Remarks on Taiwan's Status
-------------- --------------
8. (C) As a result of democratization, Lo Chih-cheng
maintained, the people of Taiwan have come to regard Taiwan
as a sovereign state. The sovereignty of Taiwan resides in
its 23 million people, who vote for their national
legislature and president, he suggested. Lo noted he had
attended the May 1 seminar in Chiayi at which Japan
Interchange Association (JIA) Director Masaki Saito had made
remarks suggesting that Taiwan's status is undetermined. Lo
interpreted Saito's remarks as a response to a statement by
President Ma on April 28 claiming that the 1952 Japan - ROC
peace treaty proved that Taiwan belongs to the ROC.
According to Lo, no media was present at the Chiayi seminar,
but NSC official Philip Yang, who complained to Saito, leaked
the story to two pro-Blue newspapers. The guests suggested
that Saito's remarks represented the Japanese internal view,
though the Japanese government does not state this publicly.
Citing past statements by U.S. officials, former Presidential
Advisor Wu Li-pei suggested the U.S. position, though
ambiguous, also could be interpreted as indicating Taiwan's
status is undetermined.
TAIPEI 00000579 003 OF 003
9. (C) In conclusion, Trong Chai expressed hope the U.S.
would take a balanced approach to Taiwan's party politics,
and consider de-emphasizing public endorsement of President
Ma and his cross-Strait policies. According to Chai, public
statements endorsing Ma have been discouraging to DPP
supporters.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Trong Chai and the other Green leaders seemed to
hope the dinner discussion would help us better understand
their objections to the Ma administration's policies,
especially on cross-Strait relations. These leaders were
from the highly committed Deep Green wing of the Green camp,
so it is not surprising that they did not see any need to
adjust their own views on cross-Strait issues. Although most
of the participants were leaders of Deep Green political
organizations, only three were actual DPP members, so it is
also not surprising that they did not have much to say on
what the DPP needs to do to make a comeback. Nevertheless,
the frustration, unease, and low morale they exuded
illustrate the challenge the opposition faces as it struggles
to reconstitute itself as a credible alternative to KMT
dominance.
YOUNG
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: DEEP GREEN LEADERS FRET OVER CROSS-STRAIT AND
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE MA ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: At a dinner for the Director on May 12
hosted by DPP Legislator Trong Chai, a group of Deep Green
leaders registered their concerns about President Ma "selling
out" Taiwan to the PRC. Trong Chai expressed hope the U.S.
would take a more balanced approach to Taiwan politics and
not publicly endorse President Ma and his cross-Strait
policies. Participants suggested Taiwan is becoming more
politically polarized and the potential for violence is
increasing, as some "radicals" are arguing that confrontation
will be needed to "stop" Ma. The group also suggested that
government officials have begun to interfere in student
protests and academic and press freedom under the Ma
administration. The Director underscored the importance of
avoiding political violence and pursuing political goals
through democratic processes. The discussion also covered
upcoming demonstrations against the Ma government and the
recent remarks by Japanese Representative Saito suggesting
Taiwan's status is undetermined. End Summary.
Criticizing Ma's Cross-Strait Policies
--------------
2. (C) On May 12, DPP Legislator Trong Chai hosted the
Director, DDIR, and POL Chief and Deputy to a dinner with
nine other prominent pan-Green leaders. The Green leaders
focused mainly on concerns about the direction and pace of
President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policies. After
several guests suggested Ma was "selling out" Taiwan to the
mainland, former Presidential Advisor Peng Ming-min went a
step further, claiming Ma was actually "giving away" Taiwan.
The group maintained that Ma was hastily negotiating
agreements with China without protecting Taiwan's
"sovereignty." For example, former Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu said he had always been careful to
prevent Beijing from being able to claim cross-Strait flights
were domestic rather than international. However, Ma has
said publicly that "one China" is no problem for him, and had
proved this by opening Taiwan's domestic as well as
international airports to cross-Strait flights.
3. (C) Our hosts claimed that the Ma administration and the
pro-Blue media -- itself coming under increasing PRC
influence -- have been effective in spreading the idea that
Taiwan has to rely on China to avoid being marginalized
economically. In fact, it is Beijing which has been working
to marginalize Taiwan by blocking its moves to negotiate FTAs
with other countries. While the Green camp does not oppose
developing economic relations with China on the basis of
equality, Taiwan's interests must be protected in this
process. The Ma administration, though, has announced major
initiatives without interagency reviews and evaluations and
without building a broad public consensus for them.
Moreover, the Legislative Yuan (LY) has not been allowed to
play a proper oversight role. For example, Joseph Wu said,
in one case, President Ma saw off a ship sailing across the
Strait while the LY was still reviewing the agreement
authorizing the trip. The group also faulted the Ma
administration for not taking a strong enough stand against
the PRC military threat.
March 17 Demonstrations
--------------
4. (C) The Green leaders all planned to participate in one
or both demonstrations on May 17 protesting the Ma
administration's policies. Former Examination Yuan President
Yao Chia-wen predicted 200,000 would join the DPP
demonstration in Taipei, and the other guests said they also
expected a large crowd at the event in Kaohsiung, which is
being put on by Deep Green organizations. One guest
suggested that pressure from the Deep Green had led to DPP
Chair Tsai Ing-wen's decision to hold a 24-hour silent
protest sit-in following the May 17 event.
Political Polarization and Potential for Violence
-------------- --------------
TAIPEI 00000579 002 OF 003
5. (C) Soochow University Professor Lo Chih-cheng asserted
that Taiwan has become increasingly polarized politically
since Ma came into office. Several guests expressed concern
about the potential for violence. Green supporters are
frustrated by Ma's "pro-China tilt," and some radicals
believe they will have to "spill blood" to stop Ma. One
guest suggested that Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin might be greeted
by even larger protests during his next visit to Taiwan than
those he encountered in Taipei last November.
Importance of Democracy
--------------
6. (C) Stressing the importance of preserving and further
developing Taiwan's democracy, the Director cited the
destructive turmoil in Thailand as an example of what can
happen when political parties fail to maintain dialogue and
instead resort to violence. The Director acknowledged the
DPP's frustration at having only 25 percent of the seats in
the LY despite winning 40 percent of the votes. He asked
what the DPP should do to improve its standing and whether
the party was considering making any adjustment to its
cross-Strait policy to attract more supporters. Several
participants suggested that the new LY electoral system plus
vote buying by the KMT would make it difficult for the DPP to
win elections. Moreover, President Chen's practice of
recruiting local DPP leaders into the central government had
depleted the party's talent pool at the local level. Former
Taiwan representative to Japan Lo Fu-chen said a recent poll
indicated a majority of the public in Taiwan dislike both the
KMT and DPP. The DPP needs to do a better job of
articulating alternative policies rather than simply
rejecting whatever the KMT proposes, he suggested. Lo
Chih-cheng suggested that the December local elections will
not be a good test for the DPP because such elections hinge
on local factions, personalities, and issues.
Backsliding on Human Rights
--------------
7. (C) The group suggested that there has been some
backsliding on human rights issues under the KMT government,
hearkening back to the KMT's authoritarian past. According
to Lo Chih-cheng, school officials had asked instructors at
his university to identify participants in a protest
movement, and some demonstrators had been contacted by
Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) officers.
Other guests noted that scholars in some thinktanks had been
warned not to criticize President Ma's proposed Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China and that
advertising on some television stations had also been cut
off.
Japan Representative Saito's Remarks on Taiwan's Status
-------------- --------------
8. (C) As a result of democratization, Lo Chih-cheng
maintained, the people of Taiwan have come to regard Taiwan
as a sovereign state. The sovereignty of Taiwan resides in
its 23 million people, who vote for their national
legislature and president, he suggested. Lo noted he had
attended the May 1 seminar in Chiayi at which Japan
Interchange Association (JIA) Director Masaki Saito had made
remarks suggesting that Taiwan's status is undetermined. Lo
interpreted Saito's remarks as a response to a statement by
President Ma on April 28 claiming that the 1952 Japan - ROC
peace treaty proved that Taiwan belongs to the ROC.
According to Lo, no media was present at the Chiayi seminar,
but NSC official Philip Yang, who complained to Saito, leaked
the story to two pro-Blue newspapers. The guests suggested
that Saito's remarks represented the Japanese internal view,
though the Japanese government does not state this publicly.
Citing past statements by U.S. officials, former Presidential
Advisor Wu Li-pei suggested the U.S. position, though
ambiguous, also could be interpreted as indicating Taiwan's
status is undetermined.
TAIPEI 00000579 003 OF 003
9. (C) In conclusion, Trong Chai expressed hope the U.S.
would take a balanced approach to Taiwan's party politics,
and consider de-emphasizing public endorsement of President
Ma and his cross-Strait policies. According to Chai, public
statements endorsing Ma have been discouraging to DPP
supporters.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Trong Chai and the other Green leaders seemed to
hope the dinner discussion would help us better understand
their objections to the Ma administration's policies,
especially on cross-Strait relations. These leaders were
from the highly committed Deep Green wing of the Green camp,
so it is not surprising that they did not see any need to
adjust their own views on cross-Strait issues. Although most
of the participants were leaders of Deep Green political
organizations, only three were actual DPP members, so it is
also not surprising that they did not have much to say on
what the DPP needs to do to make a comeback. Nevertheless,
the frustration, unease, and low morale they exuded
illustrate the challenge the opposition faces as it struggles
to reconstitute itself as a credible alternative to KMT
dominance.
YOUNG