Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TAIPEI559
2009-05-08 11:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU ON WHA, JAPAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAGR CH TW 
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VZCZCXRO9570
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #0559/01 1281102
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081102Z MAY 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1541
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9163
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0276
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0145
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0166
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0678
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 3088
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0234
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0598
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2543
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 7036
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0121
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1919
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 000559 

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR
USDA FOR FAS/OA, OSTA, OCRA, AND OFSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAGR CH TW
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU ON WHA, JAPAN
REPRESENTATIVE, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, TRAVEL PLANS, BEEF

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 000559

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR
USDA FOR FAS/OA, OSTA, OCRA, AND OFSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAGR CH TW
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU ON WHA, JAPAN
REPRESENTATIVE, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, TRAVEL PLANS, BEEF

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou told the Director on
May 7 that Taiwan plans to focus on participation in WHA and
WHO activities for the present and not push to join other
international organizations. Taiwan will proceed cautiously
because Beijing is worried the WHA observership breakthrough
could a produce a domino effect. Taiwan would like to make
contributions to the work of WHO, for example, providing
medical training or providing vaccines if Taiwan is able to
produce an H1N1 vaccine. According to Ma, Taiwan has
established a measure of high-level trust with Beijing, which
understands that his administration will not play games. Ma
expressed appreciation for U.S. support on the WHA issue and
the improvement of cross-Strait relations. He said he is
planning to go ahead with his upcoming trip to El Salvador,
and predicted Japan representative Saito will have difficulty
discharging his duties effectively as a result of the
controversy caused by his remarks suggesting Taiwan's status
is undetermined.


2. (C) Summary continued: The Director raised the beef
issue. Ma said Taiwan is prepared to open its market to
bone-in beef in mid-June, but Health Minister Yeh Ching-chuan
wants to postpone opening the market to "ground beef" and
"offals" until six months later (Ma suggested this might be
reduced to 3-4 months or less). Yeh wanted time to gauge
consumers' reactions to the bone-in beef opening before
proceeding to full opening. The Director stressed that
Washington, which is looking for full opening at one time,
will be very disappointed by this two-stage proposal, and he
urged Ma to push his Health Minister and give him the
political support he might need to agree to full opening in
one stage. Emphasizing he did not have instructions and this
was purely a personal idea, the Director suggested that if
Yeh insisted on his position, perhaps the package could be
presented as a full market opening with the understanding

there would be a short specified delay for the two
categories. Ma expressed interest in this idea. End Summary.

WHA
---


3. (C) President Ma Ying-jeou and the Director discussed
bilateral and international issues during a cordial 70-minute
meeting at the Presidential Office on May 7. President Ma
was accompanied by National Security Council Secretary
General Su Chi, and the Director was accompanied by Deputy
POL Chief (notetaker). The Director conveyed Washington's
congratulations on Taiwan's breakthrough in receiving an
invitation from the WHO Director-General to observe the
upcoming WHA meeting in Geneva. Health and Human Services
Secretary Sebelius will head the U.S. WHA delegation, and we
are working on setting up a meeting with Minister Yeh
Ching-chuan in Geneva.


4. (C) The Director asked Ma about Taiwan's strategy for
developing cross-Strait relations and participating in
international organizations. Ma said he does not want to
give China the impression that Taiwan will try to move
quickly and jump into other international organizations.
Beijing is concerned about Taiwan's intentions and fears that
the WHA breakthrough could have a domino effect on other
international organizations, he explained. Therefore, Taiwan
will proceed cautiously in the international arena. At the
WHA meeting, Taiwan will work to make itself known to the
other delegations and to explain what it can contribute in
the health area. For example, Taiwan is interested in
providing training opportunities to medical personnel of WHO

TAIPEI 00000559 002 OF 005


members. Also, Taiwan hopes to produce an H1N1 vaccine by
the end of the year and may be able to help WHO by providing
vaccines to other countries. Taiwan intends to show it can
play a very constructive role as a WHA observer and would
like to see if it can attend other WHO activities.


5. (C) Ma attributed Taiwan's success in gaining WHA
observership to three factors. First, domestic efforts,
including by the DPP and past Health Ministers, were
important. Second, senior KMT leaders, including Honorary
Chairman Lien Chan and Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, had mentioned
the issue to PRC President Hu Jintao, and Hu included the
topic in his December speech on cross-Strait policy. The
third factor was international support from the U.S., EU,
Japan and others. Ma noted that Taiwan's draft resolution at
the UN last fall, calling for Taiwan's participation in
specialized UN organizations, had been very pragmatic, and
Taiwan appreciated the U.S. response. Because almost all
countries supported Taiwan's attendance at the WHA, Beijing
must have decided early on to let Taiwan participate, Ma said.

One China, Different Interpretations
--------------


6. (C) Ma said he frequently mentions the March 26, 2008
phone conversation between President Bush and Hu Jintao,
which "legitimated and clarified" the 1992 consensus as
meaning "one China, different interpretations." This had
helped Ma convince the people that Taiwan's attendance would
not be under the title of "one China." Also, the WHO
invitation letter had referred to Yeh Ching-chuan as
"Minister," and the Chinese translation of the WHO letter
translated "Chinese Taipei" as "Zhonghua Taibei," not
"Zhongguo Taibei (China Taipei)." The titles and
arrangements for Taiwan at the WHA are all very good, and the
DPP has little to criticize.

High-Level Cross-Strait Trust
--------------


7. (C) The Director observed that Ma's efforts to
recalibrate cross-Strait relations had been another important
factor in the WHA breakthrough. According to Ma, Taiwan and
the mainland have established a measure of high-level trust,
and Beijing understands that "We don't play games. That is
very important." Ma expressed appreciation to the U.S. for
sending a clear message about supporting cross-Strait
rapprochement. This will help build a good atmosphere
between the three sides (U.S., Taiwan, PRC),Ma observed.

Plans to Attend El Salvador Inauguration on Track
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Ma said he was planning to attend the presidential
inauguration in El Salvador, unless Health Minister Yeh
advised otherwise. He confirmed he is dropping the stop in
Honduras this time, but insisted there is "no big problem" in
the relationship. Although the Legislative Yuan (LY) cut
funding for a proposed BOT power project in Honduras,
financing could be obtained elsewhere, and Taiwan (Taipower)
was still planning to provide technical assistance, which was
more important. Given the rapid cross-Strait rapprochement,
Ma suggested, the mainland now understands how destructive it
would be if Taiwan were to lose a diplomatic ally.
Therefore, Taiwan's 23 diplomatic relationships are
relatively stable. Also, Taiwan's diplomats have regained
their dignity and can say no in some cases (to unwarranted
demands from allies).

Japan Representative Saito's Controversial Remarks

TAIPEI 00000559 003 OF 005


-------------- --------------


9. (C) Ma raised the controversy caused by Japan Interchange
Association Director Masaki Saito's recent remarks suggesting
that Taiwan's status is undetermined. Ma noted he had
written an article on the 22-year life span of the concept of
Taiwan's undetermined status. President Truman, the first to
say Taiwan's status was undetermined, made the statement as
part of master strategy related to the Korean War and Cold
War. At the time of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, the
U.S. and the UK both changed their position on the issue but
did not make their new position very clear. Ma wondered
whether the U.S., after the 1972 Shanghai Communique, had
ever said Taiwan's status was undetermined. Although Taiwan
has not asked Saito to leave, he inadvertently stuck his head
into the most sensitive issue, and "he will have a lot of
difficulties to discharge his duties effectively," Ma
predicted. According to Ma, Saito had made similar
controversial remarks in the past to the Rotary Club and to a
gathering of provincial officials.

Beef
--------------


10. (C) The Director asked Ma where Taiwan stood on the beef
issue. It has been our hope that the full opening of
Taiwan's market could occur soon, as Su Chi had suggested,
possibly as early as mid-May, but in any event by June. Much
hinges on our successful management of this issue as we look
ahead to other issues in the bilateral trade relationship.


11. (C) Ma began by acknowledging the importance of this
issue, and stated his intention to open the Taiwan market by
mid-June to U.S. exports of bone-in beef in cattle under
thirty months. However, Health Minister Yeh Ching-chuan
remains quite concerned about a potential backlash from
consumer organizations over the two categories of "internal
organs" and "ground beef." Yeh, Ma continued, believes
Taiwan consumer groups are not yet ready for import of these
parts, which Ma stressed he has been told account for only 4
percent of total U.S. export potential. The idea was to open
to the other 96 percent in June, and then wait about six
months before doing a review and proceeding with the rest of
the opening. Yeh, Ma explained, remains quite cautious about
these last aspects of the problem, and has urged Ma not to
move on them in the first tranche, but to go about it in a
second stage.


12. (C) The Director responded by indicating how
disappointed Washington policymakers will be to hear this
proposal, rather than a decision to open the markets fully at
one time. The Department of Health (DOH)-sponsored risk
assessment completed at the beginning of this year had found
infinitesimal risk factors for all cattle parts, the Director
underscored, and furthermore, the four months of risk
communication that DOH has conducted has not shown real
opposition to full opening, as far as our monitoring of the
process has shown. The Director also recounted how Su Chi's
discussions in Washington last September and all our
exchanges since have focused on the importance of reaching a
science-based decision, grounded in OIE standards. U.S.
practices meet OIE standards, and the DOH risk assessment
bears this out. Minister Yeh will understand that he takes a
much greater risk to his health by riding his bicycle on the
streets of Taiwan, than in consuming any of the categories of
U.S. beef in question. Besides, this is not a matter of what
portion, four percent or more, of the market in involved, but
is grounded in the principle of a scientific solution.


13. (C) The Director urged President Ma to go back to

TAIPEI 00000559 004 OF 005


Minister Yeh and press him to move forward on complete
opening in one package. Ma pointed out that Yeh is currently
polling as Taiwan's most popular cabinet member (Comment:
largely as a result of his management of H1N1 and his role in
the WHA breakthrough). The Director suggested Yeh should use
some of that capital to make the beef decision quickly.
Waiting will not change things, except to give any critics
more confidence that they can bully the government into not
completing the process. Yeh needs the political cover of his
President, the Director suggested, and he encouraged Ma to
let him know he would stand with his Health Minister in the
decision to fully open by June.


14. (C) Ma acknowledged that Yeh is cautious, and that this
isn't about the science. But he repeated Yeh's concern that
full opening could be criticized domestically. He also
acknowledged that such a partial opening might be a problem
for us with South Korea. The Director agreed that this was a
problem, since we could not very well justify holding Seoul
to one standard and Taipei to another. The Director said he
would report back what Ma had proposed, though it was very
likely to be received with disappointment.


15. (C) Ma said perhaps the interval between initial opening
to bone-in beef and full opening could be shortened from six
to 3-4 months, or even less. The Director responded that
whatever the interval, if we announced that we were not
reaching a comprehensive opening, it would be a political
problem for us, and would spill over to the broader trade
relationship at a time when we should be moving forward.
Friends of Taiwan in the administration, Congress and
industry would find this approach hard to understand. He
also reminded Ma that we need to work on other agricultural
issues, including rice and MRLs. The new team is coming on
board in USTR, and we have much catch up work to do. So
resolving beef soon and comprehensively is key to our trade
relationship.


16. (C) The Director then suggested that if Ma was unable
for political reasons to work out full opening of the market
now, one possibility, which he stressed was only his own
idea, and might not find favor in Washington, would be to
announce a full opening, with the quiet understanding that
there might be a short delay of perhaps three months before
offals and ground beef began to be shipped. Ma expressed
some interest in exploring this idea. The Director quickly
repeated that the much surer approach to resolving the issue
would be for the President to persuade Minister Yeh that the
domestic political risk to full opening soon was manageable
and would be shared by his boss.


17. (C) On the way out of the meeting, the Director stressed
to Su Chi the importance of the president and he working to
persuade Yeh to bite the bullet and get this problem solved.
Yeh needs political support from his boss, the Director
suggested. Su agreed that Yeh, whom he has been getting to
know better these past few months, seems excessively
cautious. He promised to work with President Ma to urge Yeh
to reconsider.

Comment:
--------------


18. (C) Overall, President Ma seemed comfortable with the
current state of his foreign policy, particularly involving
cross-Strait issues, and not overly concerned about criticism
from his opposition. On beef, while not what we had wanted
to hear, this response from Ma is consistent with what we
have been hearing recently from officials in both NSC and
DOH. While the bulk of the Director's response was to

TAIPEI 00000559 005 OF 005


highlight the dangers of the approach Ma has proposed, and to
urge his intervention with Yeh to get to full opening by
June, he also emphasized the importance of avoiding
announcing a two-phased opening, even if the Taiwan side
still insists on a short interval between bone-in and the two
categories of offals and ground beef. On other issues, Ma's
caution on international initiatives seems well thought out,
as do the plans to try to make a positive contribution on
health issues at the WHA. His comments on Director Saito
suggest that Ma may be hoping Japan will withdraw him and
assign someone less prone to making controversial remarks.

YOUNG