NEW DPP SECRETARY GENERAL WU NAI-JEN DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000505

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: NEW DPP SECRETARY GENERAL WU NAI-JEN DISCUSSES
ELECTION PROSPECTS, CROSS-STRAIT TIES

REF: A. TAIPEI 0438

B. TAIPEI 0500

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary. New DPP Secretary General Wu Nai-jen and the
Director discussed the party's prospects for the December
local elections and cross-Strait developments during an April
27 meeting at DPP headquarters. Wu, a senior DPP campaign
strategist, characterized the December elections as "very
important" for party morale. In addition to fighting to
retain the 6 (of 23) local governments seats it currently
holds, the DPP is also setting its sights on Yilan and Taipei
Counties. Former Premier Su Tseng-chang, the likely DPP
candidate in Taipei County, would face a difficult contest
because the population structure favors the KMT. Unlike many
other DPP leaders, Wu did not focus his argument against
President Ma's cross-Strait initiatives by claiming they were
damaging Taiwan's sovereignty. Rather, he asserted that the
business community was dissatisfied with the cross-Strait
agreements signed on April 26 (ref B). End Summary.

Cautious on DPP Election Prospects
--------------


2. (C) DPP Secretary General Wu Nai-jen told the Director on
April 27 that the December local elections are "very
important," explaining that party morale would suffer if the
DPP does not do well. Wu modestly downplayed the media hype
that he was brought back to the DPP Secretary General
position on April 13 to spearhead the party's campaign
strategy. (Note: Wu, a founding leader of the DPP's New Tide
faction and one of the party's foremost election strategists,
served previously as Secretary General in 2000-2002 and then
left to head various state-controlled corporations.) Wu
underscored the party's need to at least maintain the number
of local governments it currently holds (6 of 23). In terms
of winning new cities or counties, Wu judged the party's best
chances are in Yilan and Taipei Counties.


3. (C) Wu acknowledged that former Premier Su Tseng-chang is
the most likely DPP candidate for Taipei County magistrate
but noted Su is "not yet ready" to make an announcement. Wu
believed the KMT is operating on the assumption that Su will
be the DPP nominee. He opined that no matter who the KMT
candidate is, the race will not be easy for Su given the
KMT's grassroots strength in the county. Wu judged that
candidates' personalities will make the difference in races
where there is close competition between DPP and KMT
contenders. He maintained, however, that it would be
"useless" to field candidates in areas where the DPP does not
stand a chance such as Hualien and Miaoli Counties. In such
districts, the DPP may decide not to nominate its own
candidate but rather back an independent running against the
KMT.


4. (C) Wu suggested it will take some time to resolve the
situation in Tainan County, with former Presidential Office
Secretary General Mark Chen continuing his bid even though
the DPP has selected legislator Lee Chun-yee to run for
county magistrate (ref A). Wu stressed that DPP Chair Tsai
Ing-wen will not change her decision to nominate Lee and
acknowledged the party is trying to put forward candidates
who do not have close ties to former President Chen
Shui-bian. The party needs to create room for a "new
generation" of talent such as Lee, Wu said. (Note: Lee is 50
and Chen is 73.) Although Mark Chen does not have much
influence, he is currently not willing to listen to the
party. Therefore, the DPP will need to wait a bit longer
before trying once again to persuade Chen to end his maverick
campaign, which could lead to a split party vote and endanger
the DPP's hold on Tainan County. We suggested as Chen's
polling numbers drop, he'll see the light and search for a
fave-saving exit.


5. (C) Acknowledging that Chen Shui-bian contributed to the
party's losses in the 2008 legislative and presidential
election, Wu predicted that the former president's influence

TAIPEI 00000505 002 OF 002


will gradually wane. Taiwan people will be able to
distinguish between the DPP and Chen, he added.

Leery of Ma's Cross-Strait Overtures
--------------


6. (C) Wu expressed doubts about President Ma Ying-jeou's
moves to develop closer cross-Strait ties. Unlike most other
DPP leaders, however, Wu focused on the impact on Taiwan
businesses rather than on sovereignty issues. He criticized
the results of the third round of cross-Strait talks, which
were held in Nanjing on April 25-26 (ref B). For example, he
said, the agreement to expand flights by adding destinations
to "small" cities such as Hefei does not help Taiwan airlines
whereas a larger number of flights to Shanghai would have.
Wu also said the KMT administration should have pushed harder
for "fifth freedom" rights to enable Taiwan airlines to fly
to China and then continue on to other destinations. Wu
claimed the Taiwan stock market's 3 percent drop on April 27
reflected the business community's dissatisfaction with the
new agreements. (Note: Some others have attributed much of
the drop to concerns about the effects of the swine flu
outbreak. Taiwan recorded the worst performance among East
Asian bourses on that day, but has generally been among the
faster rising markets over the past two months.)


7. (C) Wu argued that the nature of the Taiwan-China
relationship needs to be spelled out in agreements and other
documents, and he questioned what Taiwan really gains from
deepened cross-Strait ties. If Taiwan continues to receive
whatever China hands out, then it will eventually reach the
"point of no return" where Taipei cannot change course and
has no choice but to accept Beijing's demands. Wu did note
that the DPP has some confidential channels for dialogue with
Beijing but he did not go into details.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Wu Nai-jen seemed up to the challenge of developing
and executing a campaign strategy to help the DPP fare well
in the December local elections. With many years of senior
party experience, Wu may be able to deflect calls by the more
radical elements within the party who are urging Tsai to do
more to protect Chen Shui-bian and to confront Ma Ying-jeou.
Wu's business experience and connections may also prove
helpful. At the same time, Wu's connections to the New Tide
faction could make him a target for critics of the party's
strongest faction.
YOUNG