OPPOSITION LEADER ON CROSS-STRAIT TIES AND TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000260 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PINR ETRD PGOV ECON TW CH SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER ON CROSS-STRAIT TIES AND TAIWAN POLITICS REF: TAIPEI 221 Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Taiwan will pay and unacceptably high political and economic cost for President Ma's proposed trade liberalization agreement with China, opposition DPP party Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen predicted during a meeting with the Director March 9. Tsai also criticized Ma for his lack of transparency in formulating policy on this critical issue. She could not confirm that Annette Lu has been invited to visit China, but said that the former VP should consult with fellow DPP members before going and that her hosts should brace themselves for their outspoken guest. Tsai alleged executive interference in the judicial process and, somewhat paradoxically, called on President Ma to take a more active role in the system to ensure its impartiality. End Summary. PRC Trade Talk: Economic, Political Costs Too High -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Director began his March 9 meeting with opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen by noting that there was broad support in Washington for President Ma,s efforts to improve economic relations with the PRC. Tsai pointed out, however, that DPP supporters and many ordinary people on Taiwan worry that President Ma,s proposed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA - see reftel) will have unacceptably high economic and political costs. DPP supporters are particularly vulnerable, she said, since they dominate Taiwan,s low-end manufacturing and agricultural sectors, both of which could be devastated by trade liberalization with the mainland. With China, Tsai said, nothing is free. Beyond the economic cost, China is certain to expect political concessions in return for the economic benefits President Ma seeks. ¶3. (C) Tsai insisted that there is no urgent need to reach an economic deal with China. The government put forward the idea that Taiwan needed immediate action to avoid being marginalized by PRC-ASEAN trade agreements only after the President came under DPP fire for pursuing an agreement modeled after Hong Kong,s CEPA. In fact, Tsai argued, an ASEAN 1 agreement will not severely affect Taiwan,s trade. An ASEAN 3 pact would affect the competitiveness of Taiwan,s petrochemical industry vis-a-vis Korea, she admitted. ;However, these negotiations are far from over and Japan in particular has many reservations. ¶4. (C) If Taiwan is going to pursue a deal with China, it needs to do so in a WTO-consistent manner. In trying to work out a separate arrangement, President Ma is &flying in the face8 of WTO rules, Tsai asserted. WTO procedures allow for preferential trade arrangements that are either between two developing economies or in situations in which there are certain political links between the two parties. The former clearly does not apply and China hopes to avoid the latter, since it would imply that Taiwan has its own separate political status (i.e., sovereignty). ¶5. (C) More fundamentally, though, the administration,s handling of these discussions has revealed the complete lack of transparency on a crucial issue, Tsai said. Even within the government, it seemed clear that there was no consensus on what Taiwan,s policy is, with MAC Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan saying ECFA was not on the agenda for the next SEF-ARATS talks while SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kun was announcing that he would discuss the issue. Tsai dismissed Lai,s role as a policymaker, saying the problem is Ma himself, who tightly controls the mainland agenda and will not respond to requests for information, even from LY members from his own party. Annette Lu Visit to China? -------------- ¶6. (C) Responding to the Director,s question, Tsai expressed skepticism about reports that former Vice President Annette Lu had been invited to visit the PRC. Hu Jintao,s December 31 speech, in which he offered to talk to the DPP on the clearly unacceptable condition that it abandon a key organizing principle, support for Taiwan independence, showed that Beijing was not serious about dialogue. Thus, if the invitation was genuine, it would be a significant signal, given Lu,s ardent support for Taiwan independence. Annette TAIPEI 00000260 002 OF 002 Lu is strong-willed and the PRC must know, or will soon learn, that it is very difficult to prevent her from speaking her mind. Tsai noted that, while there are no formal DPP rules that would prevent Lu from making the trip if invited, party members would expect her to consult closely before making a decision. Electoral Prospects -------------- ¶7. (C) The DPP,s search for candidates for December local elections is proceeding smoothly, Tsai said, without suggesting when the process might be complete. She did not dispute the possibility that party heavyweight Su Tseng-chang may run for Taipei county magistrate, but suggested that Su needed to secure the support of various DPP factions before going public. Tsai conceded that the DPP candidates in two March LY by-elections stand little chance, given the strong pro-KMT leanings of the districts involved (Miaoli county in central Taiwan and Da'an district in Taipei). In the coming months, Tsai said, the DPP would look to the people to determine how best to defend their interests and make their voices heard, whether by demonstrations, speaking out, or other forms of political activity. DPP Legal Troubles and Judicial System Flaws -------------- ¶8. (C) The DPP is now recovering from the low ebb it reached at the arrest and indictment of Chen Shui-bian, Tsai suggested. While making no effort to defend the former president, she noted that the case illustrated flaws in Taiwan,s judicial system and the extent to which the KMT takes advantage of these flaws. Recalling that she had previously made similar allegations, the Director asked Tsai to cite specific examples of abuses. Tsai demurred, offering only to put the Director in touch with a DPP politician now under investigation. The prosecutor in the case, Tsai said, told the politician he was under heavy pressure from the Justice Ministry to pursue the case. Given the sensational nature of the charge and the keen media and public interest in the topic, the Director expressed surprise that the DPP had not gone public with the information. Tsai responded obliquely, noting only that President Ma had not lived up to a campaign pledge to call a halt to some investigations of opposition party members. ¶9. (C) Taiwan,s judicial system is deeply flawed, Tsai concluded, and President Ma needs to step in to fix it. As it stands, he is not exercising his role as President to step in and prevent abuses by lower-level officials. The Director asked whether doing so would open up the President to charges that he was interfering with the judicial system. Tsai responded by stressing that, as President, Ma had a responsibility to ensure that the system was operating fairly. Ultimately, the Director said, the United States was a strong supporter of Taiwan,s democracy, had confidence that the judicial and political systems could handle the challenges they face, and had confidence that the DPP could play an important role in Taiwan society. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Tsai,s calm demeanor belies a tough set of challenges she faces. With party elders Su Tseng-chang and Annette Lu stubbornly in the limelight and disgraced ex-President Chen still dominating the media, her task of guiding the party is daunting. While her depiction of the Ma administration,s occasionally lurching policy on cross-Strait economic talks has some resonance, her accusation that Ma is insufficiently involved in Taiwan,s judiciary strikes us as somewhat disingenuous. There are problems with how Taiwan,s prosecutors work, but more active involvement by the President would be very likely to attract criticism, including by the DPP, of presidential interference and overreach. Similarly, Tsai's opposition to ECFA appears a bit forced. On the one hand, she argues that the economic cost to Taiwan will be heavy. On the other hand, she argues that China will exact a political price in return for the economic benefits Taiwan will receive. YOUNG