TAIWAN CONFIRMS SETBACKS ON WHO VACCINE, EXECUTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TAIPEI 001484 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2019 TAGS: PREL WHO TW CH SUBJECT: TAIWAN CONFIRMS SETBACKS ON WHO VACCINE, EXECUTIVE BOARD EFFORTS REF: EAP/TC E-MAIL DATED DECEMBER 11 Classified By: Dave Rank, AIT POL Chief, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations Section Chief Jonathan Sun confirmed the information contained in ref, telling AIT Pol Chief on December 14 that the WHO would not accept a contribution of 500,000 doses of H1N1 vaccine because Taiwan was not &pre-qualified8 to donate vaccines. At its heart, however, Sun emphasized, the issue was political, and not simply a technical difficulty. Taiwan attempted to go through the WHO,s pre-qualification process, Sun explained, but was unable to do so because the WHO would not work with officials from Taiwan,s Department of Health (DOH). Nevertheless, Sun said, DOH intended to continue to pursue its efforts to be pre-qualified. ¶2. (C) ESTH Officer followed up with DOH Department of International Cooperation Specialist Coco Lee, who noted that the WHO Legal Counsel's office told Taiwan the "prequalification" problem was primarily technical at this point. Before the WHO would consider accepting a drug donation, Lee said, Taiwan health authorities needed to submit paperwork asking the WHO to certify a "national regulatory authority" (NRA) on Taiwan. This certification would require WHO inspectors to visit Taiwan and approve the proposed NRA. (Note: Taiwan's NRA likely would be the FDA, an entity that will come into full existence in January 2010.) Lee noted that four countries in Asia had WHO-approved NRAs: Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and India, and suggested that, from scientific and quality assurance standpoints, Taiwan should be able to easily pass the certification process. However, she admitted, PRC objections could prevent the WHO from accepting Taiwan's NRA paperwork and/or from sending an inspection team. Taiwan did not yet have a timeframe for submitting the required paperwork, she said. Lee made clear that DOH, up to and including Minister Yaung Chih-liang, strongly rejected the idea of a bilateral donation, based in part on warnings from representatives at the U.S. Mission in Geneva about liability issues. ¶3. (C) Although the WHO,s handling of the vaccine issue was disturbing, MOFA official Sun said, of greater concern were reports of PRC comments about Taiwan,s desire to take part in the January WHO Executive Board (EB) meeting. PRC representatives in Geneva had warned other WHO members that Taiwan,s efforts to increase its involvement in the WHO could jeopardize its ability to participate in the May 2010 World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting. Moreover, he said, the PRC appeared to be engaged in a coordinated effort to mischaracterize the agreement that allowed Taiwan to take part in the May 2009 WHA meeting. Contrary to PRC assertions, there was no cross-Strait consensus that Taiwan,s involvement in the WHO would be limited exclusively to observing at the WHA meeting each May, and that Beijing would have complete discretion to decide what else Taiwan might do with the WHO. This was entirely false, Sun insisted. Taiwan,s participation in the May 2009 WHA meeting was the result of efforts by many countries. Taiwan did not, and would not, agree to a PRC veto on that or any other aspect of Taiwan,s international involvement. Comment -------------- ¶4. (C) MOFA and DOH appear to have slightly different understandings of where Taiwan is in the "prequalification" process. This is not uncommon here, and we regularly push authorities to improve interagency coordination. In this case, we expect that MOFA's assessment -- that the PRC will oppose contacts between the WHO and a Taiwan "national regulatory authority" -- is likely accurate. While Taiwan has made progress towards expanding its "international space," many more challenges lie ahead. STANTON