ACADEMIC TALKS SET MILESTONE IN CROSS-STRAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001398 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 TAGS: MARR PGOV PM PREL TW CH SUBJECT: ACADEMIC TALKS SET MILESTONE IN CROSS-STRAIT POLITICAL DIALOGUE REF: A. BEIJING 3111 ¶B. ZARING-BIERS E-MAIL Classified By: AIT Director Bill Stanton for Reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: A November 13-14 conference in Taipei on cross-Strait relations marked a milestone in PRC-Taiwan political discussions. The PRC delegation, which included distinguished academics and retired senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers, was the highest-profile group from the Mainland to have visited Taiwan to discuss the cross-Strait political situation. Although the conference highlighted fundamental differences in approaches to political and security talks and portended the long and difficult process before such talks could formally take place, it nonetheless represented an important initial step. End Summary. Unprecedented Conference -------------- ¶2. (C) PolOff attended the November 13-14 "Cross-Strait at 60 Years" conference hosted by the Pacific Cultural Foundation, which is affiliated with the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party. The 28 Chinese academics, former party officials, and retired military officers were the highest-profile group ever to visit Taiwan to discuss sensitive cross-Strait issues such as a peace accord and military confidence building measures. The PRC delegation was led by Zheng Bijian, Vice President emeritus of the Central Party School in Beijing, founder of the China Reform Forum, developer of the "Peaceful Rise" theory of China's development, and formerly very influential in foreign policy circles. Taiwan academics and media analysts noted the unprecedented level of attendance and speculated that the conference marked the de facto start of Track Two talks that could lay the foundation, eventually, for formal political and security discussion between Taipei and Beijing. According to Taiwan scholars who took part in the conference, PRC academics were already pushing to schedule a follow-on session, beginning on December 18 in Shanghai. ¶3. (C) In Beijing, Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesman Yang Yi commented that, while unofficial in nature, the meeting held "positive significance" for cross Strait relations (Ref A). Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Senior Fellow Xu Shiquan remarked to Embassy PolOff on the high level of the PRC group, but portrayed the delegation as a one-off event and "not an official track two meeting." PRC media coverage of the meeting has been light (Ref B). United Front Effort -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The PRC delegates' united front effort to convince Taiwan of the virtues of unification was in full force at the conference. The PRC delegates repeatedly highlighted the ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties between the two sides, arguing that, but for foreign intervention since the mid-19th century, the Chinese nation would have been whole long ago. The PRC delegation also argued that, while Beijing was against Taiwan independence, it did not oppose a Taiwan identity that existed within a one-China framework. Taiwan participants, most of whom supported the KMT and not the independence-minded opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),also agreed there was but one China of which Taiwan was a part, but disagreed that the PRC government represented all of China. Nevertheless, Taiwan scholars who took part in the conference told AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt during a November 24 conversation that the PRC delegates were taken aback even by the views of the pro-KMT Taiwan participants. Suchow University professor Lo Zhih-cheng (who was not invited to attend) told Burghardt that when DPP-leaning "greens" such as himself entered the conversation, progress would be even more difficult. 1992 Consensus Not a Consensus TAIPEI 00001398 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Following the opening plenary session, conferees divided into sub-groups to discuss political, economic, cultural, and security issues. While there was general agreement on the way forward in the cultural and economic realm (e.g., increasing cross-Strait cultural exchanges, signing more economic agreements),discussions on political and security issues were contentious. ¶6. (SBU) For example, the PRC delegation argued for the need to first pen a peace accord to serve as a framework for future political negotiations. While the PRC representatives were conciliatory about the formal names used to refer to the PRC and Taiwan, they were clear that any accord would have to conform to Beijing's One China principle and, by implication, recognize Beijing as the national authority. While Taiwan participants agreed there was only one China of which Taiwan was a part, they stressed that the China in question was the Republic of China (ROC) -- the name used by the government on Taiwan -- and not the People's Republic of China. They also argued that a peace accord should be the goal of, not a precondition for, negotiations. In addition, two Taiwan academics highlighted the need for public participation by the people of Taiwan, who, according to opinion polls, are overwhelmingly wary of reunification, in deciding the future of cross-Strait political talks. In a November 24 discussion with AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt, Taiwan-based cross-Strait scholars Alexander Huang, George Tsai and Wu Ray-kuo, all of whom took part in the conference, agreed that the two sides appeared to approach political discussions from diametrically opposed directions. Not In My Back Yard -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In discussing cross-Strait security issues and confidence building, the PRC delegation again cited foreign interference and interventions in Chinese affairs dating back to the Opium War as the source of cross-Strait tension. Former People's Liberation Army generals expressed their belief that the two sides could collaborate on a variety of confidence-building measures, including search-and-rescue efforts and joint development projects in the East and South China Seas. The generals further stated that the two sides could resolve existing maritime and territorial issues without interference from the United States or Japan. In fact, they argued, as both sides became more comfortable with one another there would be no need for the United States to be involved in the Western Pacific at all. Asked about PRC ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and the PRC's unwillingness to renounce the use for force, the Mainland participants stressed there should be no preconditions for security talks since everything was negotiable. In fact, the generals described those two items as important tools to use for leverage against pro-independence advocates on Taiwan. Tamkang University professor Alexander Huang recounted a PRC general's comment that Taiwan's ability to rely on the United States for its security would become impractical as China's military capabilities increased. In the future, the general argued, Taiwan's only security guarantee would be reunification. Throughout the conference, the otherwise generally amiable PRC participants harshly rejected Taiwan independence, insisting the movement had no future. This, in turn, led to considerable negative commentary in the Taiwan media. Comment: Long and Difficult Process -------------- ¶8. (C) Taiwan had been planning this conference for some time but seemed to have gotten nervous about how it would be perceived after it actually opened. During a November 23 meeting with AIT Chairman Burghardt (septel),Mainland Affairs Council Chair Lai Shin-yuan said groundwork for the conference was prepared over the last eight months. It took some time, however, before the PRC finally granted permission TAIPEI 00001398 003 OF 003 to senior mainland military officials to come. On November 12, NSC Secretary General Su Chi called the Director to downplay any official role by Taiwan authorities in either sponsoring or organizing the event and asked U.S. observers not to read too much into it. In a November 24 meeting with AIT Chairman Burghardt (septel),however, President Ma revealed that he had paid attention to the proceedings, citing comments made by PRC participants at this conference as evidence that Beijing was impatient to accelerate the pace of political dialogue. ¶9. (C) During her November 23 meeting with Burghardt, Lai volunteered that she had invited the PRC delegates to dinner following the conference "just to hear what they had to say." She commented that the dinner participants were more moderate than they had been in their public statements at the conference, quoting them as saying they understood they had to respect different views and would welcome more DPP participants in future discussions. Lai's comments reinforced the views of other Taiwan cross-Strait experts that the conference was a milestone in PRC-Taiwan relations, bringing an unprecedentedly senior delegation of former PRC officials from the diplomatic, government and military spheres to Taiwan to hold talks with their counterparts. While neither side officially recognized the meetings as the start of a process the would lead to official political talks, the conference had all the hallmarks of such an event, including significant Taiwan media coverage. ¶10. (C) The conference, however, showed that a long and difficult process remains before both sides agree to formal political talks. Fundamental differences between Taiwan and the Mainland over how such talks should be structured (i.e. is a peace accord a precursor to talks or their final goal?) and a lack of consensus among Taiwan's population on whether and how to proceed with political negotiations are just two sticking points. They explain why the Presidential Office in Taipei issued an official statement on November 15 reiterating President Ma Ying-jeou's position that there is no timetable for negotiations on political issues and that improving economic ties should come first. ¶11. (C) With his economic opening attacked by critics who believe it will increase PRC leverage in pressing for reunification, Ma can be expected to continue to move cautiously on the political front. Although Ma has not ruled out meeting PRC President Hu Jintao, most analysts think such a summit would come only after Ma is re-elected. While the cross-Strait conference does not make a meeting more likely in the near term, it is the first of many necessary steps that could ultimately pave the way for a PRC-Taiwan summit. STANTON