MOFA URGES U.S. SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN ICAO AND UNFCCC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001235 SIPDIS MONTREAL FOR ICAO - KEHOE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 TAGS: PREL EAIR SENV TW SUBJECT: MOFA URGES U.S. SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN ICAO AND UNFCCC PARTICIPATION REF: RANK-MANN 10/16 E-MAIL TAIPEI 00001235 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: the Director for reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) On October 13, Taiwan's diplomatic allies sent letters to the UN Permanent Representatives of all ICAO and UNFCCC member states (except the PRC),urging them to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in those organizations, MOFA International Organizations Director General Paul Chang and MOFA Treaty and Law Division Director General Yang Kuo-tung told Pol Chief during an October 15 meeting. Attached to these letters were position papers laying out the case for Taiwan's participation in each organization. Chang provided Pol Chief a copy of the two letters (one each for ICAO and UNFCCC) sent to U.S. PermRep Rice (ref) and urged the United States to offer some kind of public support for Taiwan's efforts. ¶2. (C) Chang noted that Taiwan had been careful not to spell out specifically what constituted "meaningful" participation but made clear that Taiwan was not seeking to join these organizations as a member state. In the case of ICAO, Taiwan's key goals were to have access to the body's meetings, mechanisms and activities. The WHA model, although itself not perfect, Chang said, should be a reference. There were precedents for non-UN member states participating as observers to the ICAO, including Palestine and a U.S. private corporation, he noted, and ICAO's Council, Standing Committee and regional bodies all had rules that allow participation by "other bodies." ¶3. (C) International support would be a critical factor in Taiwan's efforts to gain meaningful participation in ICAO and UNFCCC, Chang said. He urged the United States to respond publicly to the letters sent by Taiwan's diplomatic allies. Chang suggested that this response might come in the form of: - an announcement posted on the USUN website. - a written response from Ambassador Rice to the various Taiwan ally PermReps, which could then be made public. - a statement posted by the State Department spokesman or a response to a question from a reporter during a regular press briefing. - the inclusion of appropriate language in a speech by a USG official. ¶4. (C) Treaty and Law Division Director General Yang (whose office handles UNFCCC issues) made a similar pitch, noting that Article 7 of the draft Convention specifically allowed for participation by observers. Taiwan did not need a permanent representative assigned to the UNFCCC, Yang stressed, it just needed a way to have its voice heard and to have the same rights and obligations of state parties. If Taiwan were able to participate in some way in the December COP-15 meeting, he added, a side meeting with the U.S. delegation would be useful. ¶5. (C) Pol Chief thanked Chang and Yang for the (long-delayed) written expression of Taiwan's interest in ICAO and UNFCCC. He assured them that the United States continued to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations, including ICAO and the UNFCCC. That said, he suggested, it would be unusual for a USG spokesperson to make an unprompted public comment about letters whose contents we would not ordinarily share. Regardless of whether and how the United States responded publicly to the letters, Pol Chief added, it would be essential for Taipei to engage Beijing directly. Chang noted that MOFA did not have the lead (and, indeed, was not in the loop) on contacts with China. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Although it is encouraging that Taiwan has finally decided on its general approach to ICAO and UNFCCC participation, this approach does not lay out a concrete plan for gaining access to these organizations. We have made clear that Taiwan needs to do so, identifying specifically TAIPEI 00001235 002.2 OF 002 the role it hopes to play in these organizations (i.e., the specific mechanisms and meetings in which it wants to take part, and under what name). Once that is done, we may be able to comment on whether these plans would work from a technical perspective. Taipei will need to resolve the more difficult political questions through direct dialogue with Beijing. ¶7. (C) For now, however, Taiwan is simply looking for a public expression of U.S. support, to encourage other partners (notably the EU and Japan) to do the same, and to demonstrate to its domestic audience that its less confrontational posture offers some political dividends. Since it remains in our interest to foster cross-Strait rapprochement, we should look for opportunities to endorse Taiwan's overall approach. At a minimum, the Department Spokesperson should be prepared to respond to questions about Taiwan's approach by offering a strong endorsement of Taiwan's ability to participate meaningfully in international organizations in general and in these two organizations in particular. STANTON