DPP HEAVYWEIGHT FRANK HSIEH: OPPOSITION MUST CHECK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001121

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL TW CH
SUBJECT: DPP HEAVYWEIGHT FRANK HSIEH: OPPOSITION MUST CHECK
MA'S EMBRACE OF CHINA

Classified By: the Director for reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) Summary. The opposition needed to play an oversight
role in Taiwan politics, given KMT dominance of the executive
and legislative branches, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
former Presidential candidate Frank Hsieh told the Director
during their introductory meeting. In particular, the DPP
had to slow down what Hsieh called President Ma's over-eager
push for improved cross-Strait ties. While Chen Shui-bian
likely broke the law, Hsieh said, there were serious
procedural irregularities with the former President's trial.
Hsieh projected that Taiwan politics -- both between and
within the DPP and KMT parties -- would remain contentious.
End Summary.

DPP Needs to Put Brakes on Ma's Rush towards China
-------------- --------------


2. (C) With control of the executive and legislative branches
of Taiwan's government, the ruling KMT party had too much
power and needed to be monitored, opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) former Presidential candidate and
Premier Frank Hsieh told the Director during their September
15 introductory meeting. The DDP could play this role, Hsieh
suggested, as could the "Shadow Government," an NGO he
created after his unsuccessful run for the Presidency in

2008. The Shadow Government's primary outlet for exercising
this supervisory role was a website, Hsieh explained, which
served as a platform for "alternative" news sources from
around Taiwan. After one year in operation, the site now
received an average of more than 30,000 page hits per day, he
boasted.


3. (C) The opposition's primary concern with the Ma
administration was its cross-Strait policy, Hsieh said.
Simply put, President Ma was moving much too quickly in his
efforts to improve relations with China. Hsieh agreed with
the Director's suggestion that closer Taiwan-China ties were
inevitable and in many ways positive, but said that there was
no need to actively encourage the trend. The danger, he
argued, was that Taiwan would at some point find itself too
far down a one-way path toward reunification to resist PRC
coercion. This was a particularly serious concern, Hsieh
said, because President Ma was not strengthening Taiwan's
ties with the United States to provide a counterweight to
Chinese influence.


4. (C) In too many cases, Hsieh suggested, President Ma
thought first of how Beijing would react to a decision,
rather than what was good for Taiwan or was in the interests
of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Taiwan's increasing dependence on
mainland tourists, trade and investment just gave China
leverage to coerce the island, Hsieh warned. Already, Hsieh
argued, Ma was overly solicitous of Beijing's views, noting
his reticence to invite the Dalai Lama to visit, his initial
unwillingness to accept U.S. assistance in the wake of
Typhoon Morakot, and what Hsieh said was a furtive trip to
Hong Kong by newly-appointed Premier Wu Den-yih's to seek
China's blessing. All of this suggested that, while
President Ma insisted that he did not want reunification, he
would be unable to resist Beijing's urgings to do so in the
future.

Chen Sui-bian Guilty, but Trial Flawed
--------------


5. (C) Hsieh expressed concerns about DPP Chair Tsai
Ing-wen's ability to run the party. Tsai was too scholarly,
he said, and lacked the ability to connect with many DPP
supporters. Her job was complicated by Taiwan business
people's unwillingness to openly contribute to the party, for
fear that doing so would make doing business in China more
difficult. Of course, Hsieh admitted, former President Chen
Shui-bian's legal problems also hurt the party. Ordinary
people did not look beyond the headlines reporting Chen's
arrest and conviction and were prepared to blame the DPP for
Chen's personal failings.


6. (C) Chen had "engaged in things he should not have done,"
Hsieh admitted, noting that he was not particularly close to
the former President despite having served as his Premier for
11 months. While some people were concerned about the length
of Chen's sentence, more disturbing were procedural
irregularities such as the mid-trial decision to change the
presiding judge. In any event, Hsieh said, it was probable
that the life sentence Chen received for his corruption,
fraud and money laundering convictions would be reduced on
appeal. In hindsight, the increasingly "deep green" views
(i.e., assertively pro-independence) Chen adopted during his
presidency likely reflected his understanding that he would

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be prosecuted after he left office. By building up a base
among the DPP's hard core, Hsieh suggested, Chen was ensuring
that he retained some political influence after leaving
office.

KMT and DPP Approval Levels Roughly Even
--------------


7. (C) The recent modest improvement in President Ma's
polling numbers was not the result of his recent Cabinet
reshuffle, Hsieh said. Ma's 13% approval rating in a poll
taken immediately after Typhoon Morakot reflected popular
dissatisfaction with the government's handling of recovery
efforts and was bound to return to a more realistic level.
Ultimately, he said, Ma's approval rating could rise to about
40%, about even with the DPP's numbers. Although it was far
too early to assess how the 2012 presidential and legislative
elections might go, there was reason for optimism in the
nearer term. Unfortunately, most of the local elections
scheduled for this December were in KMT-dominated areas,
Hsieh noted. Thus, despite the gains in DPP popularity, of
the 19 County Magistrate seats being contested, the DPP might
hope to win at most one more seat beyond the 5 it now held.


8. (C) Hsieh projected continued tumult in Taiwan's political
system. While he had said publicly that he had no interest
in pursuing public office, there were a number of candidates
vying for leadership of the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen and Kaohsiung
Mayor Chen Chu each could make a case for becoming leader of
the "next generation" of party leaders. In the KMT, Ma's
appointment of Wu Den-yih and Eric Chu as Premier and Vice
Premier, respectively, would help the President's image
problem in the short run. Longer-term, however, each posed
problems for Ma and the party. Wu was smart and capable,
Hsieh admitted, but had ambitions that were not identical to
the President's. Eric Chu was likewise an attractive
politician, but the widespread perception of him as Ma's
anointed successor meant that some within the KMT would be
rooting for the former Taoyuan County Magistrate to fail.


9. (C) Comment: Hsieh and former DPP Premier Su Tseng-chang
(see septel) both clearly intend to remain active in the
run-up to the 2012 Presidential elections. Especially as
neither had anything good to say about the leadership of the
current DPP Chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen, this suggests trouble
ahead for the DPP, as the old guards appear unable to let go
and discontent simmers among the deep green base of the party.
STANTON