FORMER PREMIER SAYS OPPOSITION PARTY HAS A CHANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001112 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PG TW PGOV SUBJECT: FORMER PREMIER SAYS OPPOSITION PARTY HAS A CHANCE AT COMEBACK REF: A. TAIPEI 1109 ¶B. TAIPEI 1082 ¶C. TAIPEI 781 Classified By: The Director for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Former Premier Su Tseng-chang told the Director on September 14 he was optimistic the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could return to power by regaining the people's confidence. The former DPP chairman criticized the current party leader as ineffective and hinted he wanted to lead the party's comeback himself. He did not rule out the possibility of running for Taipei County Magistrate in 2010 and President in 2012. While he acknowledged that peaceful ties with China were desirable, he expressed concern at the rapid pace of President Ma Ying-jeou's rapprochement with Beijing. Offering his opinion on the internal politics of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT),Su said Ma would face increased criticism from within his party once he assumed its chairmanship in October. He also suggested that new Premier Wu Den-yih would unlikely be a calming force within the party. End summary. An Opening For the DPP If It Can Prove Itself -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Premier and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang told Director Stanton at their introductory meeting that his party could make a political comeback after losing badly in the Legislative Yuan and Presidential elections of 2008. He said the party did a good job handling the Typhoon Morokat aftermath this summer. Instead of focusing on criticizing Ma's poor leadership, DPP members worked closely with the Taiwan people to overcome the devastation. To return to power, the DPP needed a leader with empathy who could provide a contrast to Ma, whose stiff and distant manner Su argued left people disappointed and angry. (Comment: Su was probably suggesting he could fulfill that position but did not explicitly say so. End comment.) For now, Su said, a key DPP task would be to "supervise" Ma and his administration. KMT control of presidential and legislative power left no institutional checks and balances, making it all the more important for the DPP to perform the role of watchdog. ¶3. (C) Su acknowledged former President Chen Shui-bian's corruption conviction on September 11 (ref A) had hurt the party. The DPP had made a mistake by not making an early and clean break from Chen. He suggested DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen should focus her efforts on using Chen to advocate more broadly for Taiwan citizens' fair and impartial treatment by the judicial system and separate the party from Chen personally. More broadly, Su argued that Tsai had not proven to be up to the task of revamping the party after its major electoral losses in 2008. He said Tsai simply was not a strong leader and could not resolve problems quickly. Wu As Premier, Ma As KMT Chair May Spell Trouble for KMT -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) In response to the Director's questions on recent KMT developments, Su claimed Ma's new choice for Premier, Wu Den-yih, could fuel KMT infighting. This was particularly problematic for Ma because of what Su described as the lukewarm support the President received in his bid to become party Chairman. Indeed, Su claimed, several party supporters had criticized Ma during his campaign visits throughout Taiwan this past summer. (Note: Ma ultimately ran uncontested and won the KMT Chairmanship on July 26 with 92.5 percent of the vote. The turnout rate was 58 percent. End note.) Su predicted the President would leave himself little room to maneuver politically after taking office as Chairman on October 17. Ma would be the "first and front" line with nobody to run political interference and this, Su argued, could prove very "painful and difficult." Ma Should Move Slowly On China Ties TAIPEI 00001112 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) Taiwan had to overcome numerous significant challenges, such as reviving its ailing economy and coping with H1N1, Su said. For Taiwan's sake, the former Premier hoped Ma would succeed as President. The Director noted that the Taiwan people appeared to be pleased with Ma's effort to improve relations with China. Su acknowledged that peaceful ties were good but stressed the importance of their development on equal terms. It was fine for Taiwan businessmen to make money but not at the expense of "kowtowing" to China, he said. Taiwan was already "listening to and obeying" China, a sign Ma was indeed moving too fast on deepening cross-Strait ties. Tellingly, Su said, Ma had not repeated since becoming President his campaign stance that Taiwan's future should be decided by the Taiwan people. Also disturbing, Su added, was the refusal of KMT leaders to meet with the Dalai Lama during his recent Taiwan visit (ref B). On Su's Own Return To Politics: "Anything Is Possible" -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Su clearly remained interested in Taiwan politics. "Anything is possible," he responded when the Director asked whether he would run for Taipei County Magistrate in 2010 or for President in 2012. Su clearly was disappointed that the election for Taipei County Magistrate was postponed a year from December 2009, and he blamed the KMT for playing politics in orchestrating the delay (ref C). U.S. Remains A Key Taiwan Ally -------------- ¶7. (C) Su stressed Taiwan's relationship with the United States was "very important" and should not be ignored, suggesting that Ma had paid too much attention to improving ties to China. He identified Taiwan's three important partners as China, Japan and the United States. Whereas Su was leery of China's positive gestures to get what it wanted from Taiwan, he appreciated the steady support the U.S. had given the island. STANTON