TAIWAN MAKES A CASE FOR UNFCCC PARTICIPATION AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 001093 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE ALSO FOR EAP/TC, OES/PCI, OES/E, IO/T, EPA OIA LUIS TROCHE, JUSTIN HARRIS AND MARK KASMAN, DEPT OF ENERGY FOR INTERNATIONAL, COMMERCE FOR 4431/ITA/MAC/AP/OPB/TAIWAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: AORC SENV PGOV PREL UNGA XE CH TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN MAKES A CASE FOR UNFCCC PARTICIPATION AS "EMISSIONS ENTITY" REF: A. TAIPEI 1065 ¶B. TAIPEI 645 ¶C. TAIPEI 937 Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Taiwan is seeking U.S. assistance in a proposed bid to join the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as an "emissions entity." Taiwan argues it should be allowed to actively participate through the UNFCCC in global environmental discussions that may affect its economy, and should not be excluded from carbon-trading mechanisms under the UN. According to Taiwan officials, the PRC's initial reaction to Taiwan's plan has not been positive for reasons that reportedly include the fear of public embarrassment because Taiwan has specific CO2 reduction targets and China does not. We believe it is important to our bilateral relationship with Taiwan to express support for its effort to seek meaningful participation in the UNFCCC. Regardless, however, of how Taiwan's UNFCCC bid plays out, there are other meaningful ways serving both U.S. and Taiwan interests for us to support Taiwan's desire for increased international engagement in the environmental field. END SUMMARY. -------------- TAIWAN SEEKS UNFCCC PARTICIPATION -------------- ¶2. (C) Over the past month, President Ma Ying-jeou, National Security Advisor Su Chi, Foreign Minister Ou Hong-lien, and other contacts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have all directly raised with AIT the issue of Taiwan participation in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC currently consists of 192 parties (all states) and four observer states (Andorra, The Holy See, Iraq, and Somalia). In addition, 985 NGOs and 67 IGOs are admitted as observers. NGO observers include local governments, parliaments, and research and academic institutions, which can register to attend yearly Conference of Parties (COP) meetings, such as the upcoming December 2009 COP-15 in Copenhagen. Taiwan's UNFCCC strategy, according to Ma and Ou, is to have one or more of Taiwan's diplomatic allies make a statement during the September UNGA supporting Taiwan's participation in the UNFCCC. Ma suggested that the U.S. could play a helpful role in supporting UNFCCC participation for Taiwan, noting that the USUN website statement supporting WHA observership played an important role in Taiwan's breakthrough in that organization (ref A). ¶3. (C) According to MOFA IO Director General Paul Chang, Taiwan,s current thinking on how best to realize its desire to be treated as a party to the UNFCCC would be to find an appropriate place to insert language on "emissions entities" into relevant UNFCCC documents (Chang did not specify to us which documents he had in mind). This strategy is largely based on Taiwan's success in joining international fisheries agreements as a "fishing entity," and aims to circumvent the rule that only states can join the UNFCCC. TAIPEI 00001093 002 OF 005 ¶4. (C) Taiwan has, in fact, participated in the UNFCCC COP meetings since 1995 as an NGO, represented by the island's Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). ITRI, which is listed in official UNFCCC documents as an NGO located in "Hsinchu, China," plans to attend COP-15 this December. According to the UNFCCC, NGOs vetted and admitted by the organization can, in principle, attend all open UNFCCC sessions, ask to speak during sessions, host side events and exhibits, and make submissions in the same manner as a Party to the Convention. -------------- TAIWAN'S ARGUMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Nevertheless, Taiwan has submitted to AIT a non-paper making the case for UNFCCC participation, which states the island can only attend peripheral UNFCCC events, cannot attend working conferences, important discussions, or negotiations, all because Taiwan's role is limited to that of an NGO. Taiwan's arguments for increased participation in the UNFCCC include pointing to a long list of voluntary actions the island has taken toward reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the interest of "global welfare," and noting that, "We wish to gain recognition (for) assuming our shared responsibility as a member of the international community." Officials add that Taiwan's total annual CO2 emissions are already three times the world average, and Taiwan ranks 16th globally in CO2 emissions per capita (higher than Japan, Korea, and the OECD average). The argument follows that, as a major per capita emitter of CO2, Taiwan should play an important role in drafting legally binding international agreements on climate change. Moreover, Taiwan authorities add, climate change is a transboundary issue that requires a global solution, and it is thus appropriate to define contributors to the problem (and the solution) as "emissions entities," rather than necessarily as states. Finally, Taiwan adds, the rights of its 23 million people should not be ignored by excluding the island from international decisions that could affect its industries and the livelihood of its people. For instance, a mandated cap on emissions would likely restrict traditional forms of industrial output. ¶6. (C) Officials are also concerned that even if Taiwan is not party to a UN agreement, and has no role in the drafting process, the island will still be compelled by the specter of sanctions to comply with GHG emissions caps (our contacts note that in 1994 the U.S. sanctioned Taiwan for non-compliance with the UN's Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, to which Taiwan was not a party). Authorities here are also concerned that as a non-member of the UNFCCC, Taiwan will not be eligible to take part in carbon trading programs such as the UN's Clean Development Mechanism. Taiwan officials worry that international pressure and the threat of trade-related sanctions will compel Taiwan to abide by emissions targets, but Taiwan will have no way to purchase carbon credits to meet these targets. TAIPEI 00001093 003 OF 005 -------------- IS THERE A "RED LINE" AROUND THE UN? -------------- ¶7. (C) Based on precedent, Taiwan's reliance on the "fishing entity" argument may not work in the UN context. In cases where Taiwan has joined fisheries organizations as an "entity," Taiwan's participation is typically necessary for the effective functioning of the regime, since it has one of the largest distant water fishing fleets in the world. In the case of climate change, however, mainland opponents of Taiwan's participation may argue an effective global agreement is possible without Taiwan's participation. Indeed, when Taiwan has attempted to join a UN fisheries agency as a "fishing entity," China has blocked Taiwan's participation. MOFA IO DG Chang in fact told us that Taiwan understood the importance of securing PRC support for any approach to joining the UNFCCC, and agreed that Beijing had not agreed to the "fisheries entity" model for UN-affiliated fisheries agreements. This is why, for instance, Taiwan attends meetings of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) as an "invited expert." In cases where Taiwan has joined international organizations under apolitical nomenclature, such as an "economic entity" in APEC or a "separate customs territory" in the WTO, the apparent "red line" of membership in a UN organization was not crossed. ¶8. (C) In light of past experience, it is not surprising that FM Ou told us Beijing's initial response to Taiwan's plan to join the UNFCCC "has not been positive." Separately, a MOFA official who deals specifically with international environmental affairs echoed Ou's read-out on the PRC's position. TEPA Minister Stephen Shen, meanwhile, recently confided to us that through close contacts in Beijing he has learned that the State Council objects to Taiwan's participation in the UNFCCC because China does not have specific CO2 reduction targets while Taiwan does, and Taiwan's positive stance and active participation in the UNFCCC would thus be an "embarrassment" to China. -------------- COMMENT: AREAS FOR MEANINGFUL U.S. SUPPORT -------------- ¶9. (C) We believe it is important to our bilateral relationship with Taiwan to express support for its effort to seek meaningful participation in the UNFCCC. Based on precedent, the "emissions entity" strategy may work for Taiwan in the context of international environmental organizations outside of the UN system, and is worth supporting in order to further Taiwan's meaningful participation in global environmental forums. Meanwhile, the island's advanced scientific and technological base would make Taiwan a true asset to international organizations involved in renewable and alternative energy, in particular. Our local ESTH interlocutors frequently note that Taiwan is extremely interested in increasing technical cooperation with the U.S. on environmental issues. The U.S. has been asked for assistance in promoting Taiwan's participation in TAIPEI 00001093 004 OF 005 international environment-related organizations such as the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy, the International Renewable Energy Agency, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. In addition, Taiwan's Bureau of Energy hopes to boost cooperation with the U.S. through the 2004 AIT-TECRO Agreement on Clean Coal Technologies and Advanced Power Systems, and ITRI and the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) have each recently submitted a project proposal to the U.S. Department of Energy (ref b). Taiwan has also been at the forefront of support for new international bodies that would regulate GHG emissions, such as the proposed Global High-Tech Industries Climate Protection Council (ref c). In terms of Taiwan's bilateral cooperation with the U.S., we should be forward-leaning in reviewing Taiwan's requests for partnerships and respond positively whenever possible. ¶10. (C) Although it appears unlikely at this time that China will support Taiwan's participation in the UNFCCC, the U.S. can facilitate Taiwan's interests vis-a-vis this organization on two separate levels. First, for the sake of accuracy, Taiwan's GHG emissions will need to be taken into account when calculating global emissions targets. Some MOFA contacts believe that China would express willingness to take responsibility for Taiwan's emissions as a "back door" way to exert sovereignty over the island. In this case, the U.S. could encourage parties to climate change agreements to recognize that the Taiwan authorities themselves are responsible for emissions from the island, which is preferable to allowing China to act as the self-nominated guarantor of Taiwan's emissions levels. Second, the U.S. could promote Taiwan's ability to take part in emissions trading mechanisms. Taiwan EPA is working on proposals to register private foundations in UNFCCC member countries (Japan is frequently mentioned) that could purchase carbon credits on behalf of Taiwan, using those countries' status as UNFCCC members for cover. U.S. EPA experts who visited Taiwan in August 2009 are reviewing Taiwan's proposals, but we understand that preliminary assessments of their technical feasibility are not favorable. ¶11. (C) In terms of cross-Strait relations, environmental management can serve as a relatively apolitical vehicle to promote dialogue and cooperation. In July 2009, environmental issues and climate change were discussed for the first time in the context of the KMT-CPC cross-Strait forum. That same month, National Taiwan University and Peking University in Beijing reached an initial agreement to begin formal academic and research cooperation in the fields of climate change and environmental protection. Meanwhile, academic contacts tell us there are frequent visits by Taiwan scholars to environmental workshops and seminars on the mainland and vice-versa. At the same time, cross-Strait cooperation is necessary to improve the quality of the integrated China-Taiwan ecosystem in areas such as transboundary air pollution. The necessity of cooperation in such areas can be exploited to encourage further cross-Strait interaction in other environmental areas including sandstorm TAIPEI 00001093 005 OF 005 and air quality monitoring, integrated environmental information exchange systems, acid rain control and management, indoor air quality control (especially in the area of tobacco smoke control),and environmental education programs. An array of cross-Strait cooperative projects spanning various environmental fields can also serve as non-traditional confidence building measures (CBMs) between China and Taiwan, and support for such projects is in the U.S. interest of stable cross-Strait relations. STANTON