EAST JAVA: GOVERNOR'S RACE ENDS WITH MURKY LESSONS FOR 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SURABAYA 000010 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, INR/EAP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV ID KISL KIRF SUBJECT: EAST JAVA: GOVERNOR'S RACE ENDS WITH MURKY LESSONS FOR 2009 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN REF: A. A) 2008 SURABAYA 94 (EAST JAVA'S FIRST FEMALE GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE) ¶B. B) 2008 SURABAYA 131 (RUN-OFF SIGNALS VOTER APATHY AND PARTY DISUNITY) ¶C. C) 2008 SURABAYA 88 (WEAK PARTY LOYALTY IN GENERAL ELECTION) SURABAYA 00000010 001.2 OF 002 The message is sensitive but unclassified. Please protect accordingly. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Indonesia's most populous province has finally elected a new governor after one general election and two run-off elections. Unprecedented televised testimony in Indonesia's Constitutional Court triggered a second runoff after vote buying in Madura was revealed. In a province of nearly 40 million, East Java's Election's Commission (KPU) and the Constitutional courts effectively managed complex logistic and legal challenges through three rounds of elections. With only 34,000 votes out of more than 15 million cast separating winners from losers, this election raised more questions that it has answered about what it takes to win over today's Indonesian voter. End Summary Good Ground Game Plus Religious Conservatism -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After three rounds of voting, Soekarwo and Syaifullah Yusuf, supported by the National Mandate Party (PAN),Party Democrat (PD),and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),again narrowly defeated Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Mudjiono, supported by the United Development Party (PPP),the Patriot Party, and a coalition of smaller parties. Voters in the court-mandated January 21 run-off in two regencies on the conservative island of Madura cast the deciding votes in a closely fought election. Discussions with voters at polling stations in Madura showed that village heads were critical in getting out the vote for Soekarwo. One village head claimed that he provided transportation to the polls for each of the village's 300 registered voters -- intercepting them on the way to work their fields. Similar claims were made at two other polling stations. ¶3. (SBU) Perhaps reflecting Soekarwo's behind the scenes campaigning during the Madura run-off, one conservative Muslim voter told us that he could not vote for Khofifah on religious grounds since she is a woman. This was also the reason Soekarwo got the backing of PKS, who reportedly declined to support Khofifah due to her gender. The KPU received reports of vague threats made to voters by Khofifah's Patriot Party supporters, who are reportedly tied to gangsters or 'preman'. (Ref A). Khofifah has yet to concede and will reportedly file formal complaints regarding new irregularities found by her campaign's poll watchers. KPU officials have told us, however, that reported irregularities do not appear to be systematic and are very unlikely to affect the outcome. The Courts' Evolving Role in Elections -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Staff attorney for East Java KPU, Mr. Fahmi Bachmid, told us that the Constitutional Court's decision to hold hearings in response to Khofifah's original allegations of widespread fraud during the general election was unnecessary and weakened the role of the KPU. He noted that while Khofifah's campaign alleged violations in only some of Madura's polling stations, the courts decided that the run-off should include two entire regencies containing nearly half a million people. The KPU had no choice but to comply with the decision. However, violations during the election did not rise to the levels required for a recount, according to Bachmid. And the court's order put a real strain on the KPU at a time when it could ill afford the extra expense. ¶5. (SBU) The KPU's unease with the courts echoes what we have heard from KPU officials in South Sulawesi, which was the scene of a contentious courtroom drama over the results of last year's governor's election. KPU officials expressed concern that the courts might increasingly wade into election disputes due to pressure from political parties hoping to overturn a loss at the polls. Other observers said that the Constitutional Court's decision was an attempt to play a constructive role and clear the air over the results in a close race. General Election vs. Runoff --Strategies for 2009 -------------- --- ¶6. (SBU) The East Java governor's race shows the complex electoral landscape facing presidential campaign strategists. In SURABAYA 00000010 002.2 OF 002 a crowded field, early campaigning in East Java sought support based on party platforms. This culminated in a first-ever televised debate between the original five East Java candidate teams. Discussion of issues faded, however as get-out-the-vote efforts focused on the candidates' persona alone in the run-off elections between Soekarwo and Khofifah. Voter turnout also dropped dramatically after the general election (Ref B). While East Java is home to Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, Nadlatul Ulama (NU),the political role of local Islamic leaders (or Kiai) was weakened during the campaign as voters ignored their endorsements and NU support splintered between two NU-affiliated candidates. Religion seems to have been repositioned too. While Islamic credentials loomed large early in public discussions regarding the candidates, an anticipated Islamic voting bloc never coalesced decisively behind a single pair of candidates. If the East Java governor's election is a guide, issues like employment, healthcare and education will continue to motivate voters' choice of a candidate rather than party affiliation. However, a strong ground operation and direct appeals to individual voters are required to get voters to the polls. MCCLELLAND