COE: GEORGIA TOUGHENS STANCE; RUSSIA DOES NOT GIVE AN INCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L STRASBOURG 000003 EUR ALSO FOR EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/4/2019 TAGS: PREL AORG FR GG RU SUBJECT: COE: GEORGIA TOUGHENS STANCE; RUSSIA DOES NOT GIVE AN INCH REF: STRASBOURG 001 CLASSIFIED BY: V. Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) SUMMARY - - ¶1. (C) The Council of Europe continued February 4 to discuss the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia. Georgia toughened its rhetoric and called for the COE to issue a statement should Moscow veto UNOMIG's extension. Russia continued to refuse monitoring of its COE commitments. The Czech EU Presidency referred to the EU's September 1 statement, particularly its support for territorial integrity and sovereignty and its condemnation of Russia's recognition of Abkhazia's and S. Ossetia's "independence." We reiterated U.S. support for the EU's statement. Should the COE deadlock continue, and even if Russia vetoes the extension of UNOMIG's mandate, the EU delegations here will likely remain divided on pushing for a formal COE statement that calls for monitoring of Russia. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Spanish Chair noted that FM Moratinos had spoken with his Georgian counterpart January 29 and that Georgia would present new proposals in the coming days. The Georgian Ambassador stressed that Tblisi would not accept an action plan that did not include monitoring of both Georgia's and Russia's conflict-related COE commitments (Note: not a new position). Rather, Georgia will work with the Spanish Chair to try to find "new wording" that might be acceptable to Moscow. The Georgian emphasized that the COE's draft action plan would lose its added value and the COE some of its credibility if it could not include monitoring of both countries' commitments. ¶3. (SBU) The Georgian Ambassador added that he hoped for progress at the Geneva talks February 17-18 on access over the administrative border into South Ossetia. He observed that the OSCE Mission in Georgia had ended because of Russia's "veto," and called on the COE to issue a statement should Russia do likewise with UNOMIG. He highlighted the COE Parliamentary Assembly's (PACE - REFTEL) resolution that had noted that Georgia had met "most" of its obligations regarding an October PACE resolution on the conflict while Russia had met "almost none" (Note: the resolution notes that Russia had met "some" of its obligations). ¶4. (SBU) Adopting a more subdued tone than usual, the Russian Ambassador resorted to his claim that the Georgians were blocking adoption of an action plan. This, he added, would deprive the COE of "any real role in the zone of conflict." The Russian said he was "sorry" about the PACE results, terming the PACE's resolution "a force pulling us back." ¶5. (SBU) The Polish Ambassador stressed that an earlier draft of the action plan had been supported by 37 delegations and "it was not Georgia" that had blocked its adoption. He added that discussion of the war several months after the fact "is a bit ridiculous" and underscored that the COE needs monitoring of both countries to obtain a "good picture" of events on the ground. ¶6. (SBU) The Czech EU Presidency referred to the EU statement of September 1, particularly its condemnation of Russia's recognition of the breakaway republics and its call on other states not to recognize them. Switzerland and Norway supported the EU's statement. We reiterated U.S. support for the statement and for "almost all" of the previous interventions, particularly that of the Polish Ambassador. COMMENT ¶7. (C) The Spanish Chair continues to get nowhere. The Russians stressed months ago that they would not agree to be "put on the same level as that of the aggressors." The Georgians are insisting on monitoring for both countries and have the PACE resolutions of October 2008 and January 2009 to support their position. As evidenced in the "vote to have a vote" on the action plan last November, however, the EU is divided here. Some members do not want to push Moscow with a formal vote. They fear that in so doing, Moscow will retaliate by cutting off its limited cooperation with Human Rights Commissioner Hammarberg, who has been concentrating on the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes. Seen from here, their fear is well founded. We have stressed to many delegations individually that, while we support the Commissioner's work, the apparent price for his continued work in the conflict zone seems high - the credibility of the COE will be diminished if its major decision-making body cannot decide to characterize Moscow's actions for what they are - a contravention of Russia's COE commitments. CARVER