COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND GEORGIA: LITTLE TO SHOW AFTER AUGUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STRASBOURG 000017 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM COE FR GG RU SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND GEORGIA: LITTLE TO SHOW AFTER AUGUST WAR STRASBOURG 00000017 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Council of Europe (COE) has had a very limited effect on post-conflict relations between Russia and Georgia. The "quiet diplomacy" of the COE Commissioner of Human Rights has achieved only modest results. While Georgia may seek the suspension of the Russian COE parliamentary delegation's credentials in September, we doubt that the COE will take such a bold step. Inside Georgia, the COE's Venice Commission has labored to build with Tblisi a constitution that meets European standards,and a COE field office in Tbilisi has been coordinating local projects with other international actors in an attempt to encourage stability. End summary. Political Maneuvers and Russian Threats - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) The COE's Committee of Ministers' Deputies (resident ambassadors) and the COE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) continue to debate "the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia." The PACE approved a resolution at the end of September 2008, denouncing the use of arms by both sides as "unacceptable." Though it established that "truth is a precondition for reconciliation," the resolution did not focus on concrete investigation procedures. Instead, the PACE implored both Georgian and Russian officials to first respect the European Convention on Human Rights and, second, to facilitate the work of the international monitors on the ground. This approach - scold the various authorities, plead for the respect of COE human rights standards - was repeated in PACE's January (Resolution 1648) and April 2009 (Resolution 1664) sessions. ¶3. (SBU) Special rapporteurs dispatched by the PACE to report on the consequences of the August 2008 war have produced some of the only incising statements against the involved parties. In June 2009, they condemned Russia's veto of the continuation of the UNOMIG mandate, without which, they claimed, "Abkhazia is in danger of slipping into a human rights black hole." ¶4. (SBU) Then-Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (CM),Carl Bildt, presented a voice for the Ministers' Deputies during the August conflict. Before the Deputies reconvened in September, the Chairman had urged Russia, Georgia, and the separatist administrations to adopt a cease-fire and, later, condemned Moscow's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Chair was likewise quick to reaffirm the territorial integrity of Georgia after the "so-called parliamentary elections" in South Ossetia in May 2009. ¶5. (C) The Swedish Chair continued to seek a strong resolution from the Deputies calling for the monitoring of all of Russia's and Georgia's COE commitments. In response, the Russian Ambassador went on the offensive, threatening privately and publicly that Moscow would cease all cooperation with the COE if it were placed "on the same level as the aggressor - Georgia." Sweden turned over the chairmanship in late November to Spain. The Spanish took a more conciliatory approach and managed to obtain Russian acquiescence to regular reports from the COE Secretary General on the situation in Georgia. Still, the Russians have balked at any COE criticism of their actions. Commissioner of Human Rights - Quiet but active diplomacy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Some of the most productive, albeit limited, efforts from Strasbourg to reconcile the two camps have come from the office of the Commissioner of Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, the COE's "quiet diplomat." Hammarberg visited both Tbilisi and Moscow (in addition to conflict areas like Tskhinvali) from August 22 to 29, 2008. Concluding that the war had incited a humanitarian disaster, the Commissioner presented six principles for the urgent protection of human rights: the right to return; the provision of sufficient aid and living conditions for refugees and returnees; the de-mining of combat zones; the re-establishment of law and order in the "buffer zone"; continued exchanges of detainees and POW; and an international humanitarian presence in affected areas. These principles have become the COE's benchmarks for human rights progress in the Northern Caucasus. Hammarberg has performed three subsequent visits to the region, the most recent in February 2009. ¶7. (SBU) Hammarberg enjoys access to the various authorities involved in the Russia-Georgia conflict. Since August, he has held talks with President Saakashvili and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Speaker of the Russian Duma, the Chairman of the Council of the Russian Federation, and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. He has maintained contact with FM Lavrov and the de facto PM of South Ossetia, Boris Chochiev. His efforts include close cooperation with the Russian Ombudsman, the Georgian public defender, and the de STRASBOURG 00000017 002.2 OF 003 facto Ombudsman in South Ossetia. Hammarberg discussed further humanitarian work with Ilia II, Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church. It is this broad network that has allowed the Commissioner to get results - in October he secured the release by Georgian authorities of an adolescent Ossetian and his father, and in November he ensured the return of a number of corpses from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi. ¶8. (C) Still, Hammarberg has told us he is frustrated with continued obstructionism from the Russians and, at times, a lack of transparency from the Georgians. He will continue, however, to underscore the importance of meeting his six principles to all interlocutors. It is, indeed, Hammarberg's work and limited results that are touted by the COE as evidence of the COE's efficacy. The Russians have seized upon this and threaten explicitly to cease "cooperation" with the Commissioner should the COE take "punitive measures" against Moscow, including equating Russian actions with Georgia's. Training the EUMM - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (U) One of the other modest results of the COE is the human rights training of over 200 European Union Monitoring Mission members. Venice Commission - Working with Georgia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (U) The Venice Commission, the COE's independent advisory body on questions of constitutional law, has worked closely and consistently with Georgian authorities in the wake of the August war. At the request of the Georgian officials, the Venice Commission considered and rendered opinions on two sets of constitutional amendments - mostly relating to the powers of the Executive and the use of referenda - and the Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia. In June 2009, the Venice Commission accepted a request from the Georgian authorities to assess the most recent draft of the nation's Imprisonment Code. COE Field Office - Tbilisi - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (U) The COE's field office in Tbilisi has promoted programs to support IDPs, combat violence in schools, and fight cybercrime. It hosted a delegation from the COE Development Bank that discussed financing Georgian SMEs and prisons. A resident Human Rights Adviser investigates allegations of human rights abuses, coordinates with the national Public Defender's Office, and informs not only Hammarberg's office, but other COE outfits and the EUMM as well. European Court of Human Rights - A wave of complaints - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (U) On August 11, 2008, the Georgian government lodged a rare state-state complaint against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights, the full application for which was submitted in February. While the merits of the case are still under consideration, a previous Georgia v. Russia complaint - concerning the harassment of the Georgian immigrant community in Russia, considered a reprisal for the arrest of four Russians by Georgian officials - was recently declared admissible by the Court. ¶13. (SBU) By February 2009, 3,300 individual applications had been submitted against Georgia by those affected by the hostilities in South Ossetia in August 2008. Several of our contacts have characterized the spike in complaints as having been orchestrated by Moscow. At that same point, the Court had received 90 individual applications involving 565 alleged victims from Georgia complaining about violations perpetrated by the Russian Federation. The Court in Strasbourg has not yet made clear how it will handle the overwhelming bulk of these cases. Comment - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (C) The COE's continued discussions on the consequences of the August war demonstrate two key items. The first is that the COE can effectively promote its "three pillars" - democracy, human rights, and the rule of law - only in permissive environments. The second is the lack of political will from many member states, and therefore many in the COE's secretariat, to confront Russian aggression and threats. Rather, many view limited engagement with Russia as better than confrontation. Despite the reported hope of the Georgian Ambassador to question the Russian parliamentary delegation's credentials at the late September PACE session, we doubt the COE will take such a STRASBOURG 00000017 003.2 OF 003 "confrontational" stand. Few here want to risk Russia's ending its limited cooperation with Commissioner Hammarberg. Nor do they want Russia to walk away from the COE, even temporarily. As one German diplomat here told us, "Do not expect bold decisions - we aren't the Security Council, after all. CARVER