SWEDISH FM CARL BILDT ON IRAN AND SANCTIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000738 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: EUN IR PREL SW SUBJECT: SWEDISH FM CARL BILDT ON IRAN AND SANCTIONS REF: STATE 120288 Classified By: Ambassador Matthew Barzun for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Swedish FM Bildt is skeptical but not dogmatic about the likely effectiveness of Iran sanctions. His experts tell him sanctions on the energy sector will not be enforceable, and while sanctions on the financial sector would have an immediate effect, Iran would quickly develop "work-arounds." In general, sanctions benefit "the wrong guys"; in Iran, the Revolutionary Guards, who control the smuggling routes, would likely benefit under a sanctions regime. Iran will not accept the proposed deal involving fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor because of fears that "we will steal the uranium when they ship it out." An "escrow-type deal" involving Turkey or China could work if there were enough time, but Bildt thinks the Iranian leadership is presently too divided to make a "rational" decision and "impatience" in the West is too high. "Overall, I'm not a fan of sanctions because they are more a demonstration of our inability than our ability," Bildt stated. End Summary. ¶2. (S) The Ambassador delivered reftel points to Swedish FM Carl Bildt in a November 24 meeting and urged that the EU issue a strong statement on Iran at the December 10 European Council. The Ambassador also asked about a November 20 blog entry in which Bildt discussed Iran sanctions. (Note: Bildt wrote, "We have to prepare additional measures, sanctions that might come into effect. But that demands analysis and a lot of pondering to make sure we do not end up in the wrong place. The history of sanctions is in large part a history of failure.") Bildt replied at length, outlining his views on the effectiveness of sanctions, on the Iranian leadership, and on the proposed deal involving the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). -- On the possibility of a new statement by the European Council on December 10, Bildt said, "The problem is that we've already issued strong statements and I don't want to keep saying the same thing. It sounds empty." Bildt continued that he was "skeptical" that another statement on Iran would have much effect. -- Calling the question of sanctions "not easy," Bildt said that the only role for sanctions is to support the negotiations, and to fulfill that role any proposed sanctions must: a) command sufficient support regionally and globally; b) be enforceable; c) actually impact Iran; and, d) that impact must be "positive" for the negotiations. -- The history of Iran sanctions is problematic, Bildt continued. "When we took Iran to the UN Security Council last time, they backed out of the Additional Protocol, which was our only really good source of information on the nuclear program. We do not want Iran to back out of the IAEA completely." -- Another "downside," he continued, is that sanctions tend to strengthen the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is "more and more involved in running the economy." Because the IRGC historically made money through its smuggling operations, sanctions would simply strengthen the hand of those already in charge of the smuggling routes. -- Overall, sanctions generally strengthen "the wrong guys," Bildt argued. For example, the main effect of the oil-for-food program in Iraq was that the entire population became dependent on the regime because "Saddam controlled the food coupons." In "Milosevic,s Serbia," the main effect was the development of networks of criminality that ran the smuggling operations -- "networks we are still dealing with today." -- If there must be sanctions, Bildt continued, then the most effective way to implement them would be through the UN Security Council. If UNSC sanctions are not possible in the end, "then we would be looking at regional sanctions, either on energy or financial instruments." Swedish experts have assessed that sanctions on the energy sector would not really work, Bildt stated. -- With respect to sanctions on Iranian finances, Swedish experts assess that they would have an immediate effect that would erode over time as the Iranians developed work-arounds. Iran is already developing alternate financial networks via Singapore and Brazil, Bildt said, "so if we want the intended effects of the sanctions to last for any amount of time, then we would need to tie up a lot of knots around the globe." STOCKHOLM 00000738 002 OF 002 -- Bildt said Swedish and U.S. experts agree that energy sanctions will not work and financial sanctions will erode in effectiveness. Specifically, he said he found general agreement with NSC staff he met on the margins of the U.S.-EU Summit in early November. -- Asked about the utility of sanctions in slowing down the Iranian weapons program, Bildt said that Europe has already "done all it can" to hinder the nuclear trade. At this point, he continued, Europe could only pursue sanctions that would impose "either general harm on the population or specific harm to certain individuals to compel them to negotiate." -- For sanctions to be effective, they will need to have "a broad base, which will weaken the sanctions but strengthen their impact," Bildt said. "If it looks like Iran versus the West, then the regime will successfully mobilize the people against the United States and the United Kingdom. But if Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia also support a sanctions regime, then the leadership will feel isolated," Bildt stated. -- Bildt commented that the Iranian leadership is internally so divided that they spend 80 percent of their energy fighting each other and only 20 percent on the negotiations. Majlis Speaker Larijani has been opposing deals made by President Ahmadinejad simply because they were made by Ahmadinejad. -- Turning to the proposed Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal, Bildt said that the Iranians fear "we will steal the uranium when they ship it out of the country, as has happened a couple times in the past." That is why the Iranians offered a counterproposal in which fuel rods for the TRR are first imported into Iran before any LEU is sent out. -- Bildt opined that "an escrow-type deal" involving Turkey or China might work "if there were a rational negotiating partner in Tehran. But for me, I have real doubt whether the internal rivalries will allow the Iranians to deal." In the long run, there might be ways to structure an acceptable deal, "but is there enough time in Washington? And what about Paris, another impatient place?" -- In any case, Bildt said, resolving the TRR would not resolve the nuclear issue, although it would clearly be a big breakthrough that would give the negotiations more time and begin the process of "rebuilding trust." -- "Overall, I'm not a fan of sanctions because they are more a demonstration of our inability than our ability," Bildt concluded. ¶3. (C) Comment: Bildt is skeptical about the effectiveness of proposed sanctions but he is not dogmatic. He would, we think, change his mind if presented with a well-reasoned argument as to why a particular sanctions plan would help bring about desired outcomes. BARZUN