FRAUD SUMMARY - STOCKHOLM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000662 STATE FOR CA/FPP PASS to KCC Williamsburg SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CMGT CVIS KFRD ASEC CPAS SW SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - STOCKHOLM REF: STOCKHOLM 0224 STOCKHOLM 00000662 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. Summary: As Sweden hosts the Presidency of the European Union from June through December 2009, one of the top priorities at the EU and national level remains refugees. Embassy Stockholm continues to deal with Sweden's large population of third country nationals, many with insufficient identification documents and weak ties to Sweden. In addition, the ESTA program has highlighted several Swedish travelers with possible ineligibilities. FPU Stockholm has had several notable fraud cases and is working on developing fraud intelligence products useful for the Nordic Baltic region. End Summary. Country Conditions -------------- ¶2. Sweden has long been considered a low-fraud post, but FPU Stockholm questions whether these categorizations are helpful, if not outright misleading. Sweden is a Visa Waiver Program country, so most business and tourist travelers utilize their Swedish passport to travel to the United States. When Swedish passport holders do apply for B1/B2 visas, they are usually looking for extended visits or have been required to do so by the new Electronic System for Travel Advisory (ESTA). Sweden is also home to a diverse population of Third Country Nationals, including one of the largest concentrations of Iraqis and Iranians in Europe. Because of Sweden's relatively liberal refugee and asylum policies, many these refugees receive Swedish citizenship relatively quickly. The result is steady stream of difficult cases in all three units of the consular section and a very busy FPU. ¶3. FPU notes that Sweden's economic recovery drags behind much of the rest of Western Europe with unemployment projected to stand at 11 percent for the next 12 months. While the Swedish state's generous unemployment benefits guard against abuse of the Visa Waiver program, many younger Swedes are looking to travel to the U.S. for lack of economic opportunities in Sweden. More importantly, newer immigrants to Sweden will have an increasingly difficult time entering the Swedish labor market and may seek opportunities in the U.S. ¶4. In the last year, the Swedish Migration Board has become less willing to grant permanent residence to many asylum seekers, particularly Iraqis. Not surprisingly, the number Iraqi asylum seekers have dropped considerably. Somalis are now the leading asylum seeking population in Sweden with a steadily increasing rise in Afghanistan refugees. As part of its EU Presidency, Sweden is pushing for the EU to share the financial and social burden of hosting asylum seekers will dedicate a significant portion of its EU Presidency to establishing EU-wide asylum/refugee policies. NIV Fraud -------------- ¶5. Most of the FPU's time is focused on NIV applicants. During the reporting period, Stockholm adjudicated over 16,582 NIV cases with a refusal rate of 18.82 percent (including 221g refusals). Stockholm's applicant pool represented 126 different countries. Over 21 percent of our NIV applicants apply with non-Swedish passports. The refusal rate for Swedish citizens was 13.80 during the reporting period. The FPU provides three basic services: pre-checking foreign passports and select applicant categories; consular interview assistance; and referral investigations. During the reporting period, the FPU pre-checked approximately 900 third country NIV applicants. Approximately 100 cases were referred to the FPU during or after the interview process, resulting in 26 confirmed cases of NIV fraud and 11 outstanding requests for additional documentation from suspect applicants. Not reflected in these statistics is the number of fraudulent activities discovered during pre-interview checks which lead to 214(b) refusals. ¶6. Impact of ESTA. With the implementation of the ESTA for Visa Waiver Country travelers, Post has seen an increase in Swedish citizens with legal issues applying for B1/B2 visas often because of prior criminal or immigration violations. In most of these cases, visas are eventually issued after receiving appropriate DHS waivers. ¶7. Comprehensive investigation techniques helped FPU Stockholm crack a number of cases. As one example, a single male wanted to spend 6 months traveling the US after a recent 3 month VWP visit. After questioning by the FI, the applicant confessed that he was actually planning to resume his work as an auto mechanic. A blog betrayed a disc jockey who told the consular officer that he never worked in the US even though his blog highlighted his work in several major US cities. An aspiring yoga "student" had her plans to continue working illegally as a model and yoga teacher revealed, STOCKHOLM 00000662 002.2 OF 004 in a twist, by her roommate's blog. Finally, one failed applicant to a Texas community college gave an interview to a local Swedish tabloid in which she claimed that she was refused for being "too beautiful for a visa" and suspected of being a sex-worker during her previous stay in Texas. The FPU was not, in fact, concerned with her looks so much as her provocative internet advertisements for "sexy modeling," which were purged from the internet shortly after her visa interview. ¶8. Iranian B1/B2 applicants. Post conducted a validation study of B1/B2 Iranian applications in Sweden and compared the profiles of successful travelers with overstays and refused applicants. (REFTEL) Given Sweden's large Iranian expat and visitor application pool, the study confirmed that Post's general approach is effective at avoiding overstays. In follow on discussions with FPP, FPU used recent studies from Frankfurt and Ankara to urge other FPUs to collect a more uniform set of data points to assist in comparing and evaluating future studies. Post's NIV Chief, Claire Smolik, also attended the September FPP conference on Iranian travelers and is working with FPU to implement best practices. ¶9. Russian B1/B2 applicants. Stockholm is working with several other regional FPUs to finalize a collaborative study of Russian B1/B2 applicants. Although initial indications are that Nordic-Baltic posts make good decisions on issuing to Russian applicants, there are clearly local differences in the social and economic conditions for expat Russians that warrant closer attention. FPU Stockholm hopes to conduct future region-wide validation studies to continue to foster cooperation. ¶10. FPU Stockholm is increasingly concerned with NIV E Visa applications and is reviewing our standard operating procedures for handling this case. In May, an NIV Clerk who handles this portfolio met with FPU London to discuss best practices. One ongoing case involves a restaurant possibly being used as a front for illegal business activities. IV Fraud -------------- ¶11. The IV Unit provides FPU Stockholm with ample opportunity to hone our fraudulent documentation analysis techniques. The IV unit has seen a rise in fraudulent IV and K visa cases among a growing number of applications from petitioners and beneficiaries coming from refugee populations from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Thirteen IV cases were formally referred to the FPU during the reporting period, two of which remain unresolved. The FPU also inspects various identification documents, mostly from Iraqi or African applicants, on average 1-3 cases per week. ¶12. Inter-Embassy cooperation is vital. Because of the large Iraqi asylum community in Sweden, Post continues to find a heightened number of questionable Iraqi passports and other supporting documents. Post works closely with Embassies Amman and Baghdad in addressing these issues. Several African posts have similarly been helpful in confirming document fraud in Sweden's growing African TCN community. ¶13. Relationship fraud presents the most difficult evidentiary challenge. Time-intensive and detailed interviews, including telephone interviews with the petitioner in the U.S., can lead to positive results. In one case, the FI noted the absence of wedding bands in a photo taken the day after a wedding ceremony. Further interviews of both the applicant and his petitioner (by telephone) resulted in a series of conflicting statements. More than convinced that a marriage broker arranged the entire trip, Post returned the petition with a recommendation for revocation. In another case, the fiance applicant could not identify the store where his Amcit petitioner worked, but managed to recall the address. This was a remarkable lapse because the petitioner works at an American chain convenience store called Seven-Eleven that is also ubiquitous in Sweden. DV Fraud -------------- ¶14. Stockholm had three significant DV fraud cases. In one case, FPU Asmara assisted in confirming Stockholm's suspicions that two documents supporting an applicant's claim of marriage were fraudulent. In a second case, a DV applicant's high school records were proven to be fraudulent, thanks to assistance from FPU Kinshasa. In the third case, the Facial Recognition feature in the CCD indicated that a DV applicant may have used his brother's identity in an earlier NIV application. The applicant stalled for weeks on Post's request for a recent photograph of his brother. In late September, the applicant's last minute effort to send in an undated "recent" photo of his brother (probably himself) confirmed STOCKHOLM 00000662 003.2 OF 004 FPU's concerns. ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud -------------- ¶15. Stockholm's use of a four part ACS fraud checklist has lead to greater use of FPU in ACS cases. FPU reviews approximately 4-7 ACS cases per week based on these indicators and conducts an average of one ACS fraud interview per week. The checklist has been shared with other EUR posts. In one case involving an otherwise routine passport renewal application, FPU confirmed that the applicant's Swedish mother had taped a more recent photograph of the child on the expired passport. After careful investigation, FPU concluded that the altered passport was never used for travel or identification purposes and permitted the applicant's parents to present additional proof of identity. In an ongoing case, FPU has confirmed a US passport holder maintaining different, if similar, identities. Adoption Fraud -------------- ¶16. Post has had no adoption cases in this reporting period. Use of DNA Testing -------------- ¶17. Post has utilized DNA testing for DV and some ACS cases. Overall, our experience has been positive. FPU and IV are working to implement the new DNA testing guidelines. In one K-1 case, DNA testing was required of the beneficiary. The fiance claimed to have impregnated the petitioner while they resided in a Guinean refugee camp. The child was born in the U.S., but the applicant was not listed on the birth certificate. After the petitioner received the DNA test results, she refused to share them with her fiance who decided to withdraw his application in August. Asylum and other DHS benefit Fraud -------------- ¶18. Although post has no fraud to report, Post's increasing number of Iraqi translator visa applications has demanded an increasing amount of attention from FPU. FPU works closely with Embassy Baghdad to confirm identification documents and often returns security badges retained by former State Department and Department of Defense workers. Even with Embassy Baghdad's support, Post often has a difficult time verifying prior employment in Iraq or other claims. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorist Travel -------------- ¶19. Sweden is often regarded as a transit center for Chinese and Eastern European trafficking rings to other European countries, but not to North America. However, Swedish authorities are highly focused on combating sex trafficking and has made it a centerpiece of their EU Presidency. Sweden is a destination country for asylum-seekers. To date, FPU has detected no systematic effort to use Sweden as a transit to the United States. FPU is following up on leads suggesting emerging routes through Central America and Canada. Although limited in travel funds, FPU has made an effort to visit immigrant-intensive communities to better understand those populations. Increased cooperation with FPUs in Oslo and Copenhagen can assist Stockholm in understanding the two Swedish cities (Gothenburg and Malmo) that are both close to and demographically similar to Oslo and Copenhagen. ¶20. There are false document production rings in Sweden that are targeting Swedish authorities and many Iraqis also utilize false documents in order to get to Sweden. Some of these falsified documents pass through the Embassy, but more importantly, the Swedish identification documents are more often used in applying for United States visas. A typical Iraqi refugee will pay money to be smuggled to Copenhagen, often via Turkey using the authentic passport of an Iraqi-Swedish or Iraqi-UK citizen. The subject returns the false documents to the smuggler travelling with him or her and then enters Sweden without identification papers on a train. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations -------------- ¶21. Post has no pending DS criminal investigations. Cooperation with the RSO and RSO staff has been good. RSO Stockholm currently has individuals with experience in Iraq, which has proven to be very helpful in dealing with Iraqi applicants. STOCKHOLM 00000662 004.2 OF 004 Swedish Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry -------------- ¶22. Sweden issues EU-compliant passports. FPU has previously documented the Swedish government's relaxed attitude about identity requirements for refugees. In the case of refugees who have obtained Swedish citizenship, FPU never relies on the Swedish passport as sufficient proof of identity. In the case of refugees with permanent residency in Sweden, FPU notes that an "identity not confirmed" is used by the Swedish authorities when original birth documents are not presented, which are rarely subjected to serious scrutiny otherwise. FPU also notes that Swedish migration authorities have become more rigorous in their identification requirement for asylum-seekers. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities -------------- ¶23. Sweden's privacy rules restrict the sharing of most personal information about Swedish citizens and residents by Swedish law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Swedish authorities work very hard within the constraints of the Swedish legal system to be of assistance to FPU inquiries. FPU has good relationships with all of the major migration and law enforcement authorities and regularly receives fraud email alerts from regional airports. In addition, Mr. Sandmark has provided training on lie detection and document fraud to ICTS (International Consultants on Targeted Security) staff at Stockholm International Airport. In the reporting period, FPU has had successful outreach meetings with representatives from the government student loan agency (CSN),which promises to develop into a mutually beneficial collaboration. In our first case, FPU Stockholm helped CSN identify a ring of Swedes using a fraudulent I-20 to apply for Swedish government loans, but with no plans to actually apply for a student visa. Finally, FPU Stockholm is engaging with representatives from Sweden's higher educational admissions verification team to help combat fraudulent foreign student applications to Swedish universities. Staffing and Training and Outreach -------------- ¶24. The FPU consists of one part-time Fraud Prevention Manager (Dan Mangis) and one LES Fraud Investigator (Marten Sandmark) with significant non-FPU duties in the NIV during certain parts of the year. The current FPM arrived at Post in August 2008 and will leave in July 2010. He serves as the Deputy Consul and manages the IV Unit. His replacement is receiving FPU training this spring. The FI also has significant responsibilities in the NIV Unit, but works full time in the FPU when seasonal help is available. Post has trained a backup Fraud Investigator, Maria Sederholm in order to free additional time for fraud analysis projects, particularly relating to regional issues and trends. Both the present FPM and Mr. Sandmark have taken all of FSI's available fraud training courses. When practical, FPU will nominate backup Fraud Investigator Ms. Sederholm for fraud training. ¶25. Stockholm is piloting the new Consular Case Management System (CCMS) and is happy to lend a small post perspective to the program's evolution. Post has made several suggestions and looks forward to the rollout of the final product. ¶26. Reaching out to other Posts: FI Sandmark has attended the Frankfurt Fraud Conference in September and participated in a panel discussion with other experienced fraud investigators. Earlier in the year, FI Sandmark joined an innovative "chat conference" with other EUR LES fraud investigators in order to develop cost-efficient ways to collaborate with other posts. FPU has hosted consultation visits from FPUs in Oslo and Copenhagen and provides and receives ad hoc support to posts in EUR, AF, and SCA. FPU Stockholm initiated the first regional study of Russian B1/B2 applicants in the Nordic-Baltic region and plans to use H&L funding from FPP to conduct training/consultation visits with Copenhagen, Oslo and at least one Baltic post. FPU Stockholm hopes to establish a more structure regional FPU working group to develop more regional studies. BARZUN