SWEDEN, COLUMBIA AND THE FARC

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000543 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL XT XM RS CO VE SW SP SUBJECT: SWEDEN, COLUMBIA AND THE FARC REF: A. A STATE 83014 ¶B. B STATE 86734 ¶C. C MADRID 00833 Classified By: PolCouns Marc Koehler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Swedish Foreign Ministry officials noted their dismay with recent evidence that Swedish arms, originally sold to Venezuela, were diverted to the FARC. They said this evidence would be sufficient to prevent any future proposed arms sales from Sweden to Venezuela and promised that they would consult with other MFA officials about the broader EU measures proposed in Ref A. We think briefings by USG experts on the scale of Venezuelan-FARC cooperation could help the Swedes gain traction with other EU Member States. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Swedish MFA officials noted their dismay with the discovery that three M-136 AT4 anti-tank missiles had been diverted from Venezuela to the FARC in Colombia during an August 21 meeting with Poloffs regarding ref A points. Maria Lundqvist, Head of Americas Department and Ulf Lindell, Deputy Director for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, noted that Sweden had, through its regional ambassador in Bogota, pressed Alejandro Fleming, Venezuela's Vice Minister for European Affairs, for a thorough explanation of how the missiles ended up in FARC hands. So far. they have received no formal or definitive response. Swedish Ambassador Nordstrom will visit Venezuela in mid-September to arrange high-level meetings to clarify the situation. Our Swedish MFA contacts welcomed the information presented in ref B, adding that it would help the MFA combat Venezuelan misrepresenations of U.S. presence in Colombia. They stated that briefings by USG experts to Sweden and other EU Member States on the scale of Venezuelan-FARC cooperation would be helpful given an overall low level of knowledge about such ties. ¶3. (C) Lindell said that Sweden's relevant autonomous agency, the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP),had not received any requests for export licenses to Venezuela since ¶2006. He noted that the ISP takes a number of factors into account when granting licenses, including evaluating the risk that the sold product would be diverted from the recipient country. While careful to point out that MFA officials could not influence the independent ISP's decisions, Lindell opined that any future applications would almost certainly be declined based on Venezuela's failure to prevent the diversion of the anti-tank missiles. ¶4. (C) Lindell responded that ref A suggestions about Russia and joint EU action were constructive, but he deferred comment pending further MFA consultations. He noted that while the EU could adopt a common position regarding arms sales to Venezuela, it would still fall to each Member State to enact legislation putting it into effect. He stated that AK-47 sales would be raised in mid-October at the Wassenaar General Working Group. ¶5. (C) Comment: Despite the MFA's encouraging responses, we worry that under present circumstances, Sweden can do little more than restrict its already-thin bilateral sales to Venezuela. Stockholm's relations with Moscow are currently strained -- planning for the EU-Russia summit has stalled and Moscow has refused to attend the meeting if it is held in Stockholm. In this context, Swedish officials at more senior levels will be reluctant to confront Russia on its MANPADS sales. And while Sweden could put Venezuela on the EU agenda during the September Gymnich or GAERC, the recalcitrance expressed by Spain (ref C) likely reflects views of other EU Member States as well. Against that backdrop, the requested briefings by USG experts would likely be essential if the Swedes are to get traction on this issue in Brussels. End Comment. BARZUN