Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STOCKHOLM446
2009-07-21 16:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Stockholm
Cable title:
BALTIC SEA STRATEGY: A PRIORITY FOR SWEDISH EU
VZCZCXRO2720 PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHSM #0446/01 2021642 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 211642Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4538 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000446
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NEI PREL ECON SENV ENRG EUR RU SW
SUBJECT: BALTIC SEA STRATEGY: A PRIORITY FOR SWEDISH EU
PRESIDENCY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000446
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NEI PREL ECON SENV ENRG EUR RU SW
SUBJECT: BALTIC SEA STRATEGY: A PRIORITY FOR SWEDISH EU
PRESIDENCY
1. (SBU) Summary: The Baltic Sea Strategy, a Swedish
initiative that is one of its EU Presidency priorities, is a
regional approach to deeper integration of environmental,
economic, energy/transport, and security regulations and
practices among the eight EU member states that surround the
Baltic Sea. The project will neither allocate additional
funding nor add new institutions to the region, but will
focus on better using existing resources by coordinating
projects and the implementation of EU directives. Russia
remains outside the strategy, though negotiations on regional
issues will continue with Russia through the Northern
Dimension and between Russia and individual Member States.
Comment: In the Swedish view, improving the economic
stability and energy independence of the three former Soviet
Baltic republics enhances its buffer against Russia. End
Comment and Summary.
EU Presidency Priority
--------------
2. (U) The Swedish government has highlighted the Baltic Sea
Strategy (BSS) as one of its priorities for Sweden's upcoming
EU presidency. This is a regional approach to deeper
integration among the eight Member States that border the
Baltic Sea (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Germany),which collectively comprise
over one-quarter of the EU's population. It differs from the
Union for the Mediterranean in that it only includes EU
member states. The strategy aims to look at development and
integration of the region as a whole rather than focusing on
the individual member states. During a "Swedish Presidency
2009" seminar held on May 28-29 by the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs and the Swedish Institute for European
Policy Studies, Adrian Solitander, DG Regional Policy of the
European Commission, said that this is a pilot case for
possible future regional approaches, such as the Danube.
3. (U) The original initiative for the Baltic Sea Strategy
came from Member States themselves and the European
Parliament. The Commission drafted a proposal on this topic
and presented its action plan on June 10, and in its June
18-19 meeting, the European Council endorsed it. There will
be a Ministerial Conference on the Baltic Sea Strategy in
Stockholm on September 17-18. The Swedish government hopes
that consensus on a final plan will be reached at the
European Council meeting in October.
4. (U) The BSS is one of the few declared Swedish EU
Presidency priorities in which Swedish efforts alone could
lead to concrete deliverables. Therefore, a concerted push
on the BSS is likely during the Presidency. One challenge is
to market the Baltic Sea Strategy to the EU as a whole, while
mollifying Russia, the ninth country bordering the Baltic.
Rikard Bengtsson of Lund University suggested at the May
28-29 seminar that framing the Baltic Sea Strategy in terms
of its environmental rather than economic aspects would make
non-Baltic member states more receptive; the EU appears to be
marketing the strategy this way.
Basic Strategy
--------------
5. (U) The strategy advocates pooling resources and
advancing cooperation by coordinating implementation of EU
directives in the areas of environment, transportation, and
trade. The BSS does not require such cooperation, but offers
cooperation as a multiplier for allocated funds and creation
of policy. Even though the plan does not call for capital
infusion to the region, there is hope that coordination under
BSS will lead to greater effectiveness of existing EU support
funds, some 50 billion euros from structural funds allocated
to the region between 2007 and 2013 in 80 different projects.
Environmental Cooperation
--------------
6. (U) The eight nations will also work more closely on
maritime and environmental issues, such as eutrophication,
overfishing, and algal blooms. These are critical to the
region since the Baltic Sea is a shallow inland water system
with limited circulation, which makes pollution a bigger
issue than in other bodies of water. Experts say that if a
major oil spill occurred here, it would take over 20 years
for the water to replenish itself. Some environmental
projects include phasing out phosphates in detergents,
creating more effective fishing controls, and reducing the
negative effects of fertilizers. Each Member State has been
put in charge of several of these associated projects; for
example, Sweden will take the lead on decontaminating ship
wrecks and nuclear weapons on the Baltic Sea floor.
Economic Cooperation
STOCKHOLM 00000446 002 OF 002
--------------
7. (U) The Swedish government, as stated in its June 23
"Work Programme for the Swedish Presidency," hopes that the
Baltic Sea Strategy will help members of the region work
together to meet the challenges of the financial crisis,
which has deeply impacted these countries. Economic
cooperation in the region will include drafting similar
legislation to implement EU directives that deal with
internal market issues as well as several concrete projects
to develop energy markets, infrastructure, and transport
systems, including the construction of a new railway from
Warsaw to Tallinn. Other economic projects include creating
larger joint initiatives in the areas of research,
innovation, and entrepreneurship; working with small
businesses; removing trade barriers; and increasing
investments in IT and electronic communication.
Security Cooperation
--------------
8. (U) Security coordination will focus on cooperation to
prevent cross-border crime, with a special emphasis on human
trafficking and organized crime. The BSS aims to create a
coordinated maritime surveillance system, which will provide
for monitoring and joint surveillance of the Baltic as well
as information and intelligence sharing between the BSS
states. The BSS would seem to entail only "soft" security
cooperation rather than military-to-military cooperation, and
MOD officials have told us there is no specific mil-mil
cooperation envisioned under the BSS. They add, however,
that the type of common sea operating picture called for
under the BSS would be an extremely important for their
defense planning.
No Real Role for Russia
--------------
9. (U) The Baltic Sea Strategy does not include a direct role
for Russia. According to presenters at the May 28-29
seminar, Russia is skeptical of the BSS and Sweden will be
pressed to develop the BSS without raising Russian
suspicions, especially on the sensitive issue of energy.
Negotiations with Russia on regional issues will still take
place through the Northern Dimension, the EU's program for
coordinating on regional issues with non-EU member states
Norway, Iceland, and Russia. The BSS is not meant to replace
this, though DG Solitander stated that this strategy may
encourage a more flexible approach among Member States in
dealing with Russia in regional issues where a clear
EU-Russia partnership does not yet exist, such as integration
of maritime surveillance in the Baltic.
Comment
--------------
10. (SBU) The BSS is the latest in a number of public and
private fora geared at enhancing cooperation among the Baltic
Sea states since the end of the Cold War. Like earlier
initiatives - and extensive bilateral cooperation between the
Nordics, and their formerly communist neighbors - the BSS is
aimed at deepening the integration of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania into the west and reducing the amount of leverage
that Russia can exert over them. In the Swedish view,
improving the economic stability and energy independence of
the three former Soviet republics enhances its buffer against
Russia, Stockholm's traditional if often unenunciated threat.
Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors publicly highlighted the
Baltic dimension of Sweden's new defense policy in his 3 July
speech, stressing the need for joint maritime surveillance to
guard against environmental and military threats. Sweden and
the other Nordic countries, whose banks have considerable
investments in the three Baltic states, will also gain
directly from economic improvement there and from
environmental initiatives that are popular with publics fed
up with swimming among algal mats.
11. (SBU) Comment Continued: Given Sweden's small size and
the many external factors that could scuttle its other
headline EU presidency goals -- procuring global agreement on
climate change and ameliorating the effects of the financial
crisis -- we expect Stockholm to work quietly but steadily on
getting the BSS off the ground. In Stockholm the strategy is
coordinated by the deputy minister for European Affairs, but
lobbying by Swedes in Brussels will be key to ensuring
continued EU support for the initiative, perhaps laying the
groundwork for its extension to other regions. Creating
other EU-only zones of cooperation may also work to assuage
possible Russian fears of western collusion against Moscow.
SILVERMAN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NEI PREL ECON SENV ENRG EUR RU SW
SUBJECT: BALTIC SEA STRATEGY: A PRIORITY FOR SWEDISH EU
PRESIDENCY
1. (SBU) Summary: The Baltic Sea Strategy, a Swedish
initiative that is one of its EU Presidency priorities, is a
regional approach to deeper integration of environmental,
economic, energy/transport, and security regulations and
practices among the eight EU member states that surround the
Baltic Sea. The project will neither allocate additional
funding nor add new institutions to the region, but will
focus on better using existing resources by coordinating
projects and the implementation of EU directives. Russia
remains outside the strategy, though negotiations on regional
issues will continue with Russia through the Northern
Dimension and between Russia and individual Member States.
Comment: In the Swedish view, improving the economic
stability and energy independence of the three former Soviet
Baltic republics enhances its buffer against Russia. End
Comment and Summary.
EU Presidency Priority
--------------
2. (U) The Swedish government has highlighted the Baltic Sea
Strategy (BSS) as one of its priorities for Sweden's upcoming
EU presidency. This is a regional approach to deeper
integration among the eight Member States that border the
Baltic Sea (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Germany),which collectively comprise
over one-quarter of the EU's population. It differs from the
Union for the Mediterranean in that it only includes EU
member states. The strategy aims to look at development and
integration of the region as a whole rather than focusing on
the individual member states. During a "Swedish Presidency
2009" seminar held on May 28-29 by the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs and the Swedish Institute for European
Policy Studies, Adrian Solitander, DG Regional Policy of the
European Commission, said that this is a pilot case for
possible future regional approaches, such as the Danube.
3. (U) The original initiative for the Baltic Sea Strategy
came from Member States themselves and the European
Parliament. The Commission drafted a proposal on this topic
and presented its action plan on June 10, and in its June
18-19 meeting, the European Council endorsed it. There will
be a Ministerial Conference on the Baltic Sea Strategy in
Stockholm on September 17-18. The Swedish government hopes
that consensus on a final plan will be reached at the
European Council meeting in October.
4. (U) The BSS is one of the few declared Swedish EU
Presidency priorities in which Swedish efforts alone could
lead to concrete deliverables. Therefore, a concerted push
on the BSS is likely during the Presidency. One challenge is
to market the Baltic Sea Strategy to the EU as a whole, while
mollifying Russia, the ninth country bordering the Baltic.
Rikard Bengtsson of Lund University suggested at the May
28-29 seminar that framing the Baltic Sea Strategy in terms
of its environmental rather than economic aspects would make
non-Baltic member states more receptive; the EU appears to be
marketing the strategy this way.
Basic Strategy
--------------
5. (U) The strategy advocates pooling resources and
advancing cooperation by coordinating implementation of EU
directives in the areas of environment, transportation, and
trade. The BSS does not require such cooperation, but offers
cooperation as a multiplier for allocated funds and creation
of policy. Even though the plan does not call for capital
infusion to the region, there is hope that coordination under
BSS will lead to greater effectiveness of existing EU support
funds, some 50 billion euros from structural funds allocated
to the region between 2007 and 2013 in 80 different projects.
Environmental Cooperation
--------------
6. (U) The eight nations will also work more closely on
maritime and environmental issues, such as eutrophication,
overfishing, and algal blooms. These are critical to the
region since the Baltic Sea is a shallow inland water system
with limited circulation, which makes pollution a bigger
issue than in other bodies of water. Experts say that if a
major oil spill occurred here, it would take over 20 years
for the water to replenish itself. Some environmental
projects include phasing out phosphates in detergents,
creating more effective fishing controls, and reducing the
negative effects of fertilizers. Each Member State has been
put in charge of several of these associated projects; for
example, Sweden will take the lead on decontaminating ship
wrecks and nuclear weapons on the Baltic Sea floor.
Economic Cooperation
STOCKHOLM 00000446 002 OF 002
--------------
7. (U) The Swedish government, as stated in its June 23
"Work Programme for the Swedish Presidency," hopes that the
Baltic Sea Strategy will help members of the region work
together to meet the challenges of the financial crisis,
which has deeply impacted these countries. Economic
cooperation in the region will include drafting similar
legislation to implement EU directives that deal with
internal market issues as well as several concrete projects
to develop energy markets, infrastructure, and transport
systems, including the construction of a new railway from
Warsaw to Tallinn. Other economic projects include creating
larger joint initiatives in the areas of research,
innovation, and entrepreneurship; working with small
businesses; removing trade barriers; and increasing
investments in IT and electronic communication.
Security Cooperation
--------------
8. (U) Security coordination will focus on cooperation to
prevent cross-border crime, with a special emphasis on human
trafficking and organized crime. The BSS aims to create a
coordinated maritime surveillance system, which will provide
for monitoring and joint surveillance of the Baltic as well
as information and intelligence sharing between the BSS
states. The BSS would seem to entail only "soft" security
cooperation rather than military-to-military cooperation, and
MOD officials have told us there is no specific mil-mil
cooperation envisioned under the BSS. They add, however,
that the type of common sea operating picture called for
under the BSS would be an extremely important for their
defense planning.
No Real Role for Russia
--------------
9. (U) The Baltic Sea Strategy does not include a direct role
for Russia. According to presenters at the May 28-29
seminar, Russia is skeptical of the BSS and Sweden will be
pressed to develop the BSS without raising Russian
suspicions, especially on the sensitive issue of energy.
Negotiations with Russia on regional issues will still take
place through the Northern Dimension, the EU's program for
coordinating on regional issues with non-EU member states
Norway, Iceland, and Russia. The BSS is not meant to replace
this, though DG Solitander stated that this strategy may
encourage a more flexible approach among Member States in
dealing with Russia in regional issues where a clear
EU-Russia partnership does not yet exist, such as integration
of maritime surveillance in the Baltic.
Comment
--------------
10. (SBU) The BSS is the latest in a number of public and
private fora geared at enhancing cooperation among the Baltic
Sea states since the end of the Cold War. Like earlier
initiatives - and extensive bilateral cooperation between the
Nordics, and their formerly communist neighbors - the BSS is
aimed at deepening the integration of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania into the west and reducing the amount of leverage
that Russia can exert over them. In the Swedish view,
improving the economic stability and energy independence of
the three former Soviet republics enhances its buffer against
Russia, Stockholm's traditional if often unenunciated threat.
Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors publicly highlighted the
Baltic dimension of Sweden's new defense policy in his 3 July
speech, stressing the need for joint maritime surveillance to
guard against environmental and military threats. Sweden and
the other Nordic countries, whose banks have considerable
investments in the three Baltic states, will also gain
directly from economic improvement there and from
environmental initiatives that are popular with publics fed
up with swimming among algal mats.
11. (SBU) Comment Continued: Given Sweden's small size and
the many external factors that could scuttle its other
headline EU presidency goals -- procuring global agreement on
climate change and ameliorating the effects of the financial
crisis -- we expect Stockholm to work quietly but steadily on
getting the BSS off the ground. In Stockholm the strategy is
coordinated by the deputy minister for European Affairs, but
lobbying by Swedes in Brussels will be key to ensuring
continued EU support for the initiative, perhaps laying the
groundwork for its extension to other regions. Creating
other EU-only zones of cooperation may also work to assuage
possible Russian fears of western collusion against Moscow.
SILVERMAN