MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): MISSILE

S E C R E T STATE 098749 SIPDIS PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): MISSILE PROLIFERATION TRENDS Classified By: ISN/MTR Deputy Director Ralph Palmiero. Reasons: 1.4 (B),(D),(H). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph ¶2. ¶2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "Missile Proliferation Trends" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners. Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE. ¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) Missile Proliferation Trends In the following presentation, we provide an overview of missile proliferation trends that the United States has identified over the last several years. Proliferation of Short-Range, Solid-Propellant Missiles A key trend in recent years has been the proliferation of short-range, solid propellant ballistic missile systems with range and payload capabilities below the MTCR Category I threshold. A number of countries, including many with well-established liquid propellant missile programs, have sought to acquire short-range, solid propellant missile systems. These systems are attractive because of their increased availability on the international market, their accuracy, and their ease of handling as compared to liquid propellant systems. In addition, short-range, solid propellant missiles also require less preparation prior to launch, less maintenance, and can be stored for longer periods of time than liquid-fueled missile systems. Decline of New Interest in Scud-Derived Technology The growing interest in short-range solid-propellant missiles for many countries also is related to an emerging missile proliferation trend -- a decline in new governments seeking to acquire Scud-type short-range ballistic missiles, such as those marketed by North Korea. Decreased sales of Scud-based missiles and technology is in part due to efforts by MTCR countries to promote missile nonproliferation and discourage new missile customers, as well as the effect of United Nations sanctions. Potential new customers may also calculate that more accurate, short-range solid- propellant missiles are a better investment and more readily available than Scud technology, which is known for its poor accuracy and requires the purchase of extensive support equipment. (Note: While North Korean exports of complete Scud-derived missile systems may have declined in recent years, North Korea likely does continue to provide Scud maintenance and refurbishment services to previous Scud missile customers.) China as a Key Source of Solid Propellant Missiles Another reason may be that purchasing countries seeking a Category II SRBM capability can work fairly easily and above board with less disreputable arms suppliers such as China, rather than deal with a state such as North Korea that has been internationally recognized as a proliferator and is subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions. For example, China has supplied a short-range, solid-propellant missile system to at least one former missile customer of North Korea and is marketing the P12 and B611M solid propellant systems to customers in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The P12 is advertised as having a 150-km range with a 450 kg warhead, and the B611M is marketed as a 260-km-range system that carries a 480-kg warhead. Although these missiles are below the MTCR Category I threshold, sales of these systems are likely to accelerate the diffusion of sophisticated and previously unavailable solid propellant missile technologies to regions of tension. Parallel Space Launch Vehicle and Ballistic Missile Development Efforts Another key missile proliferation trend has been for countries seeking to develop long-range missiles to establish developmental programs for space launch vehicles (SLVs). SLVs and ballistic missiles are derived from virtually identical and interchangable technologies, and the similarities between SLVs and ballistic missiles extend from subcomponents to production facilities. SLV programs can allow a country to test propulsion systems, stage separation, and some guidance and control technology, and provide a path to gain access to controlled, missile-related technologies and materials under the guise of peaceful space ambitions. North Korea A clear example of a country attempting to mask its missile development efforts behind an SLV program is North Korea. On April 5, 2009, North Korea tested a multi-stage Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile, which it characterized as an effort to place an "experimental communications satellite" into orbit. This test failed to place an object into orbit, but demonstrated North Korea's development of technologies such as stage separation that are applicable to longer-range ballistic missile systems. In the case of the April 2009 test, few countries accepted North Korea,s claim that the TD-2 launch was simply an activity carried out as part of a peaceful space program. This was reflected in the United Nations Security Council,s adoption of a Presidential Statement on April 13, 2009 that condemned this launch as being in contravention of Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires North Korea to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program. Iran Iran has established an SLV program that complements and advances its missile development. For many years, Iran has had active MTCR Category I ballistic missile programs. These programs helped establish a technology base that assisted Iran,s development of an SLV known as the Safir, which successfully placed a small satellite into orbit in February 2009. Although currently the Safir is restricted to very small payloads, Iran,s ability to place a satellite into orbit has demonstrated several technical capabilities applicable to longer-range ballistic missile systems, including staging, clustering small engines, and using gimbaled engines for control of the Safir,s second stage. As such, Iran,s SLV program remains a key concern, as many technologies required for this program will directly benefit Iran,s long-range ballistic missile development efforts. The Role of Front Companies Increased Use of Intermediaries Proliferators, reliance on cover companies has been well-documented at annual MTCR Information Exchange meetings. Proliferation-related transactions now regularly involve multiple layers of intermediaries, resulting in deals that are more difficult for export control officials to detect. The challenges posed by the use of multiple intermediaries were illustrated in a 2008 U.S. Information Exchange presentation, which provided an overview of a three-year effort by Iran,s solid propellant ballistic missile program to procure environmental test chambers from foreign sources. In that case, Iran used at least six different intermediaries and front companies, listed false end- users and false countries of destination, and used complicated routing to avoid export control regulations, in an effort to purchase the test chambers from two manufacturers in two foreign countries. Ultimately, this attempt was unsuccessful, but this example shows the intricacy of Iran,s efforts -- and its willingness to use multiple intermediaries -- to procure a single commodity required for its missile development programs. Similar tactics have been adopted by Syria,s missile program, which in 2009 used two false intermediaries to target companies in at least four different MTCR Partner countries in an effort to acquire uncontrolled imaging equipment suitable for missile testing. Such use of multiple intermediaries to facilitate procurement is likely to continue as long as programs of concern remain dependent on foreign suppliers and experience difficulty procuring missile-related technology due to export control restrictions. Brokering In recent years, the role of cover companies in assisting procurement by proliferation programs has expanded. These entities not only pose as end-users for controlled and dual-use missile technologies, but they also have become involved in brokering, shipping, and financing. Brokering has become particularly critical to procurement efforts by missile programs of concern. Brokering entities regularly orchestrate proliferators, purchases of controlled and dual-use equipment and often are the only party to a transaction in direct contact with both the supplier and end-user. While brokers can be located in the supplier country, a transshipment state, or within the recipient country, many base their operations in countries through which purchased goods are never physically shipped. For example, from an office within an MTCR Partner country, a broker could coordinate a missile-related purchase on behalf of an Iranian front company from a supplier in China. To further complicate the transaction, the broker could arrange for the export to be routed through an intermediary in the UAE, Singapore, or Malaysia, making it more difficult for export control authorities to link the broker to the ultimate end-user or the commodity to a program of concern. Commercial Industries as a Procurement Cover Most intermediaries assisting proliferation related- procurement are not overtly affiliated with government- owned entities. In fact, many are engaged in legitimate commercial activities. In the case of Iran, commercial enterprises often are used as a cover through which dual- use items are purchased. These firms, primary functions are as commercial manufacturers or distributors, and the use of such entities by programs of concern provides a seemingly plausible end-use for dual-use and controlled items. This in turn helps these transactions avoid detection from licensing and export control officials in supplier countries. One example of this trend has been in Iran,s continuing use of the automotive industry as a procurement cover for its missile programs. Stating that commodities are intended for automobile manufacturing allows Iran a means of purchasing a variety of dual-use goods, particularly specialty metals and industrial machine tools, which could have utility in the automobile sector, but which also often are diverted to support its missile production and development efforts. Intermediaries Operating in Malaysia Front companies and intermediaries involved in missile-related procurement often operate in countries with weak export control oversight and enforcement. This continues to be the case in Malaysia, which, as noted in an Australian presentation from the 2008 MTCR Information Exchange, increasingly serves as a procurement hub for missile-related goods and technology. Malaysian entities act as brokers and false end-users for items intended for missile-development organizations in third countries. Over the past several years, companies in Malaysia repeatedly have attempted to procure a variety of aerospace-qualified electronics from the U.S. and other MTCR Partner countries on behalf of military- and missile-related end-users in Iran. It also appears such companies in Malaysia are expanding their procurement operations, regularly using multiple cover names and fraudulent end-user documentation, and routing their transactions through additional intermediaries to conceal the ultimate destination of an export. This trend of missile-related intermediaries basing their procurement operations in Malaysia is largely the result of Malaysia,s lack of a comprehensive export control system due to its government,s concern that efforts to improve its export controls will impede international trade. Until robust controls are put in place, Malaysia, as well as other countries without effective export controls, will continue to attract proliferation-related intermediaries seeking to evade the export control systems of supplier countries. Conclusion Each of the trends identified above poses challenges to international efforts to prevent missile proliferation. They also demonstrate that the missile proliferation threat is not static and will continue to evolve as technology progresses, becomes more widely available, and as proliferators develop more sophisticated methods to evade export control restrictions. All of these trends underscore the importance of effective export control systems -- in both MTCR and non-MTCR countries -- that are able to detect proliferation-related transactions and ensure that transfers of missile technology are licensed in a responsible manner that limits proliferation risks. Meeting these challenges will require MTCR Partners to continue to work together, and with key non-Partners, to ensure the MTCR continues to effectively respond to the evolving nature of global missile proliferation. END TEXT OF PAPER. ¶4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON