MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): IRAN'S

S E C R E T STATE 098727 SIPDIS PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. Reasons: 1.4 (B),(D),(H). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2. ¶2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "Iran,s Ballistic Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners. Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE. ¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) Iran,s Ballistic Missile Program Introduction Iran has the largest and most active missile program in the Middle East. It possesses a sizable number of MTCR Category I and Item 19 missile systems, and is developing more capable systems with greater ranges. Iran's improving domestic ballistic missile capabilities raise concerns that it could act as a supplier of ballistic missile technology to other parties -- a development that is particularly troubling in view of Iran,s expanding military cooperation with Syria. However, Iran also remains reliant on foreign sources for some critical materials, and continues to use its extensive procurement network to acquire these goods from entities in states both within and outside the MTCR. Capabilities Iran currently is involved in researching, developing, and producing multiple ballistic missile systems. Iran produces liquid- and solid- propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs),liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM),and on May 20, 2009 successfully tested a two-stage solid propellant MRBM called the Sajjil. Iran's inventory of SRBMs includes the liquid-propellant Scud B and Scud C (which Tehran calls the Shahab-l and -2, respectively),the solid-propellant Fateh-110, and the Chinese-supplied CSS-8 (Western designation) based on the SA-2 surface-to-air missile. Iran has moved beyond the point of merely assembling these systems and appears capable of producing many of these missiles' subsystems, as well as liquid and solid propellants. Iran's expertise now includes guidance technology -- often the most difficult field for fledgling missile producers to master -- which Iran is marketing to third countries at defense exhibitions and on government websites. Shahab MRBMs Iran has pursued programs to develop a range of liquid- propellant MRBMs, most building on Scud technology. Iran claims to have delivered the 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 to its military and, as has been discussed at prior MTCR Information Exchange (IE) meetings, has flight-tested the system multiple times. Recent development efforts have focused on an improved variant of the Shahab-3, often referred to in the press as the Shahab-4 (and in previous IE sessions as the "Shahab-3 Lite"). Iranian officials have claimed that this missile has a range of 2,000-km and is more accurate than the standard Shahab-3. During a military parade in September 2007, Iran displayed a new MRBM, referred to as the Ghadr-l, which Iranian officials claimed had a range of 1,800-km. The missile is considered a variant of the Shahab-series ballistic missiles, and was seen with a "baby-bottle shroud" or triconic warhead. The Sajjil Iran is developing a two-stage solid-propellant MRBM publicly called the Sajjil. However, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, head of Iran,s Research Institute for Strategic Defense, has noted that the Sajjil project originally was called the Ashura. Iran first announced this system in November 2007, claiming it had developed a new solid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of 2,000-km. But prior to these statements, Iran's defense ministry revealed it had conducted some tests related to solid-propellant missile technology that likely were related to the design for a two-stage 2,000-km-range system. Iran flight-tested the Sajjil on November 12, 2008 and again on May 20, 2009. The 2008 test probably failed, but the May 2009 test probably was successful. Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) Iran has accelerated its work toward developing a domestic space program, announcing in February 2008 its intent to place a satellite into orbit, utilizing a new SLV called Safir that Iran has displayed for the media. Iran tested the Safir on August 17, 2008, and claimed that it successfully placed a dummy satellite into orbit. However, no such object was ever detected in orbit. Prior to the launch, President Ahmadinejad publicly announced that Iran would orbit the Omid satellite, with no mention that it would be a mockup or a dummy satellite. Taken together, these factors suggest that the launch actually failed. Iran's second attempt to orbit a satellite using the Safir was successful. The Omid satellite was launched on February 2, 2009, and remained in orbit until April 25, ¶2009. Although the Safir is restricted to very small payloads (the Omid weighed only 27 kg),Iran - through the Safir launch - has demonstrated several capabilities necessary for longer-range ballistic missiles: staging, clustered engines in the second stage (although these were small),and gimbaled engines for control of the second stage, a more advanced technique than the jet vanes used in the first stage. Support to Foreign Ballistic Missile Programs As its missile program has advanced, Iran has increasingly been acting as a supplier of missile technology to other states, which could violate United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1737, 1747, and 1803. Iran now offers a number of missile-related products on the global market, including electromechanical Scud gyros, propellants, and missile- related production facilities. Iran has been assisting Syria in the ballistic missile field since the early 1990s. In addition to the joint construction with Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) of both solid- and liquid-propellant production facilities in Syria, Syria and Iran have entered into an agreement for the transfer of Fateh-110 production technology from Iran to Syria. By at least 2007, Syria began receiving missile parts and technical assistance from Iran related to this project and successfully flight tested two Fateh-110 missiles in December of 2007 and one in December 2008. Syria -- and possibly Iran -- has made available the 270-km-range Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to Lebanese Hizballah, as part of Iran's agreement to share Fateh-110 production technology with Syria. Hizballah personnel probably participated in Fateh-110 meetings and test launches in both Syria and Iran over the past three years. This is consistent with Iran and Syria's past practice of supplying Hizballah with long-range rockets, which Hizballah used in the 2006 war against Israel. Foreign-Procured Materials Despite Iran's progress, and its overarching goal of self-sufficiency, its ballistic missile program remains reliant on outside sources for a variety of materials. Moreover, even though some of these materials are available domestically, Tehran has continued to acquire such goods abroad. This may be because the missile program does not trust the quality of indigenously produced goods and therefore cannot reliably sustain its missile development efforts without foreign sources of supply. Much of Iran's procurement needs still lie in the field of advanced materials, and Iranian ballistic missile entities continue to seek specialized steels and aluminum from foreign suppliers. These materials are often sought to produce ballistic missile airframes due to their high- strength, low weight, and corrosion-resistant properties, and are suitable for Iran's Shahab series of missiles. For example, Iran has sought MTCR-controlled titanium- stabilized duplex stainless steel (TiDSS) that can be utilized in structural components for liquid-propellant missiles, as well as AISI 4130-grade and AISI 4340-grade steel. AISI 4340 and AISI 4130 are not MTCR-controlled, but have been used by Iran to produce first- and second- stage motor cases for its solid propellant MRBM. In addition, Iran has sought specialized aluminum alloys such as types AlMg6 and 7075. The lightweight AlMg6 would allow Iran's ballistic missiles to achieve significant increases in range and the 7075 high-strength alloy is usable in missile airframes, reentry vehicles, and structural support elements. Iran also has sought tungsten-copper alloys that are not MTCR-controlled but have been associated with the production of missile jet vanes. Iranian missile entities also continue to be dependent on foreign suppliers for graphite. High-quality graphite could be used to produce nose cone tips, nozzle throat inserts, and jet vanes for Iran's Scud-based and solid- propellant missiles. Similarly, Iran probably cannot produce machine tools of the quality and sophistication needed in the production of ballistic missiles, requiring procurement of these items abroad. Iranian missile entities or front companies have sought machine tools such as lathes, vertical machining centers, milling machines, and turning centers. Iranian missile entities also have sought equipment to test missiles or their components, including vibration and acoustic test equipment, data acquisition systems, and thermal shock chambers. In addition to items controlled by the MTCR, Iran continues to seek non-listed items on the international market. For example, Iran often attempts to procure lower-grade, non-MTCR-controlled graphite that could contribute to Iran,s ballistic missile program through its use in machining processes or metals production. In 2008, Iran sought quantities of sodium perchlorate from suppliers in China. Sodium perchlorate is not controlled by the MTCR, but can be used in the production of ammonium perchlorate. Procurement Infrastructure and Front Companies The Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO),a subordinate entity to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, was created in 1998 and oversees all of Iran's missile-related research, development, and production efforts. This includes efforts for ballistic missiles, surface-to-air systems, anti-tank guided rockets, and anti-ship cruise missiles. The key missile- related AIO subordinates are: the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG),the organization responsible for development and production of liquid-propellant ballistic missiles; the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG),the organization responsible for development and production of solid-propellant ballistic missiles and rockets; and the Fajr Industrial Group (FIG),the organization responsible for the development of ballistic missile guidance systems. As has been discussed extensively in previous IE sessions, these organizations often use an elaborate set of front companies to hide their involvement with AIO and the actual nature of their procurement. The following front companies are commonly used as procurement covers for AIO and its subordinate organizations in dealings with technology suppliers outside of Iran: - Ettehad Technical Group - Everend Asia Company - Helal Co - Joza Industrial Co - Mahestan (Import and Export) Co. - Mehr Engineering and Industrial Group - Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (3MG) - Pejman Industrial Services Corp - Safety Equipment Procurement (S.E.P. Inc) - Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO) - Tiz Pars Technical and Engineering Company - Ecxir Trading Company - Sabalan Co. - Baharan Factories Group - RAFIZCO - Noavin Ltd. - Pars Novin Industrial Company - Parto Angizan Company - South Industrial Power - Aban Commercial and Industrial Group - Pooya Commercial and Engineering Co. - Selm Commercial Co. - Saba Machinery Supplying Co. It is important to note that other AIO-affiliated organizations involved in non-ballistic missile enterprises also may share resources and technology with SHIG, SBIG, and FIG. These entities include the Sanam Industrial Group, Sanam Projects Management (SPM),and Ya Mahdi Industries Group. Transfers of raw materials and machinery to these entities may contribute to Iran's production of MTCR Category I missile systems. In addition to the various companies linked to AIO, we also believe that the following Iranian entities have engaged in procurement activities for Iran's WMD/missile/conventional arms programs: - Electro Sanam Company (E.S. Company) - Instrumentation Factories Plan - Iran Cement Engineering and Parts (ICEP) Co. Ltd. - Kaveh Cutting Company - M. Babaie Industries - Missile Industries Group - Motlagh Industrial Factory - Parchin Missile Industries - Sanam Industrial Group - Sanam Projects Management (SPM) - Schiller Novin - Shafizadeh Industries - Shahabadi Industies - Shahid Babaie Industries Complex (SBIC) - Shiveh Tolid Company - State Purchasing Office (SPO) These entities act as key nodes in a global network of procurement agents and fictitious end-users that provide Iran with access to dual-use goods, raw materials, and critical technologies for its ballistic missile programs that would otherwise be unavailable. Outlook Iran currently appears focused on increasing the capability and range of its ballistic missiles. Although Iran is unlikely to deploy the Safir SLV as a ballistic missile, the Safir, and the development and test of the two-stage Sajjil MRBM, has provided Iran with much of the technology and experience necessary to develop and produce longer-range ballistic missiles, including ICBMs. Tehran could attempt to develop and test much of this technology under the guise of an SLV program. Iran remains dependent on foreign technology, however, and this dependency will continue to affect Iran's ability to acquire critical materials for its ballistic missile programs. A key challenge to MTCR Partners is to ensure that Iran does not gain access to the technologies it needs to develop longer-range missiles. END TEXT OF PAPER. ¶4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON