MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): SYRIA,S

S E C R E T STATE 098667

SIPDIS
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): SYRIA,S
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM

Classified By: Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
Reasons: 1.4 (B),(D),(H).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.


2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris
provide the interagency cleared paper "Syria,s Ballistic
Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for
distribution to all Partners. Info addressees also may
provide to host government officials as appropriate. In
delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is
sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the
Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the
MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional
IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.


3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:

(SECRET REL MTCR)

Syria's Ballistic Missile Program

Introduction

Despite having produced liquid propellant, short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) derived from Scud technology for
nearly ten years, Syria continues to rely on foreign sources
for critical components and technical expertise to support its
ballistic missile development efforts. North Korea remains
Syria's key Scud ballistic missile technology supplier,
although Syria's missile program has tried to procure missile-
related technology from suppliers outside North Korea,
including entities in MTCR Partner countries. North Korea has
also aided Syria in procuring parts for a medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM) system based on No-Dong technology.
Additionally, Iran has supplied Syria with solid propellant
Fateh-110 SRBMs.

Foreign Support

Syria's lack of a self-sufficient ballistic missile
infrastructure has resulted in Syria turning to foreign
suppliers for items critical to its liquid and solid-
propellant ballistic missile programs. For example, Syria has
attempted - at times directly through its missile-related
entities - to procure hardware significant for the maintenance
and production of Scud airframes, as well as various
electronic components used in Scud SRBM guidance and control
systems. Additionally, Syria has procured dual-use items from
Iran to support its Fateh-110 production and continues to rely
on North Korea to acquire materials and equipment for its
missile efforts.

North Korea

North Korean support has been critical to the success
and
advancement of Syria,s liquid-propellant missile program.
Syria probably will continue to focus its procurement efforts
on finding key raw materials, specialty metals, alloys, and
chemicals. For example, between 2005 and 2006, North Korean
entities sought, on Syria's behalf, raw materials, including
graphite necessary to construct the jet-vanes for Scud SRBMs
and nozzle throats for long-range battlefield rockets. In one
case, Syria solicited North Korean assistance to procure
graphite from third countries, including China. In another
case, in 2005, a North Korean entity sought missile-related
alloys, such as titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel
(Ti-DSS),for a Syrian ballistic missile entity. Ti-DSS is an
MTCR-controlled steel developed exclusively for Scud missile
production, and remains ideally suited for Scud-type short-
range ballistic missiles due to its strength and corrosion-
resistance. In yet another example, a North Korean company
shipped several tons of Chinese-origin missile-related
specialty steel to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research
Center (SSRC).

North Korea,s procurement of missile-related goods for
Damascus continued in 2007 and 2008. From January-April 2008,
a North Korean entity worked to procure probable missile-
related steel and other materials from a China-based entity
for Syria, and in August 2008 a North Korean entity contracted
with a China-based entity for Scud electronics. This
dependence on North Korean sources both directly and via North
Korean brokers for a range of missile-related materials,
advanced chemicals, and technology is likely to continue,
given the difficulties Syria has encountered purchasing such
items directly from other suppliers.

As in many other aspects of its missile program,
Damascus
relies upon Pyongyang for the acquisition of machine tools and
testing equipment. North Korea on several occasions has
brokered sales of controlled machine tools from entities in
Europe and Asia on behalf of Syria. Syria's acquisition of
these types of advanced machine tools could allow it to expand
and improve its ballistic missile production capabilities.
Syria also has independently sought similar equipment from
Western firms using front companies affiliated with Syria's
SSRC.

North Korea has assisted Syria in acquiring necessary
parts for a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) based on No-
Dong technology. In March and October 2005, a North Korean
entity based in Syria sought ball bearings with specific
applications for the No-Dong class rocket engine from several
sources, probably on behalf of SSRC. Successful development
of an MRBM by Syria would allow it to strike targets at
greater ranges and/or with heavier payloads.

Iran

Iran also has been assisting Syria in the ballistic
missile field since the early 1990s. In addition to the joint
construction with SSRC of both solid- and liquid-propellant
production facilities in Syria, Syria and Iran have entered
into an agreement for the transfer of Fateh-110 production
technology from Iran to Syria. By at least 2007, Syria began
receiving missile parts and technical assistance from Iran
related to this project and successfully flight-tested two
Fateh-110 missiles in December of 2007 and one in December

2008. Syria and possibly Iran have made available the 270-km-
range Fateh-110 SRBM to Lebanese Hizballah, as part of Iran,s
agreement to share Fateh-110 production technology with Syria.
Hizballah personnel probably participated in Fateh-110
meetings and test launches in both Syria and Iran over the
past three years. This is consistent with Iran and Syria,s
past practice of supplying Hizballah with long-range rockets,
which Hizballah used in the 2006 war against Israel.

Outlook

Syria is likely to continue seeking material and
technological support for its ballistic missile program from
foreign suppliers. Damascus will continue to rely on
Pyongyang for assistance because of the North's extensive
procurement networks and historical association with Syria's
ballistic missile program. However, we assess Syria's
acquisition of the Iranian Fateh-110 solid-propellant missile
system has allowed Iran to emerge as a key foreign partner in
Syria's ballistic missile program. Over time, Iran,s
provision of solid-propellant technologies, expertise, and
materiel to Syria could lead to a reduction in Syria's
dependence on North Korea. Nonetheless, for the foreseeable
future, North Korea will continue to act as a key procurement
agent for raw materials, production equipment, and possibly
guidance equipment, which Syria is unable to produce
indigenously.

END TEXT OF PAPER.


4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR
issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON