MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): SYRIA,S

S E C R E T STATE 098667 SIPDIS PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): SYRIA,S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM Classified By: Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. Reasons: 1.4 (B),(D),(H). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2. ¶2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "Syria,s Ballistic Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners. Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE. ¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) Syria's Ballistic Missile Program Introduction Despite having produced liquid propellant, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) derived from Scud technology for nearly ten years, Syria continues to rely on foreign sources for critical components and technical expertise to support its ballistic missile development efforts. North Korea remains Syria's key Scud ballistic missile technology supplier, although Syria's missile program has tried to procure missile- related technology from suppliers outside North Korea, including entities in MTCR Partner countries. North Korea has also aided Syria in procuring parts for a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system based on No-Dong technology. Additionally, Iran has supplied Syria with solid propellant Fateh-110 SRBMs. Foreign Support Syria's lack of a self-sufficient ballistic missile infrastructure has resulted in Syria turning to foreign suppliers for items critical to its liquid and solid- propellant ballistic missile programs. For example, Syria has attempted - at times directly through its missile-related entities - to procure hardware significant for the maintenance and production of Scud airframes, as well as various electronic components used in Scud SRBM guidance and control systems. Additionally, Syria has procured dual-use items from Iran to support its Fateh-110 production and continues to rely on North Korea to acquire materials and equipment for its missile efforts. North Korea North Korean support has been critical to the success and advancement of Syria,s liquid-propellant missile program. Syria probably will continue to focus its procurement efforts on finding key raw materials, specialty metals, alloys, and chemicals. For example, between 2005 and 2006, North Korean entities sought, on Syria's behalf, raw materials, including graphite necessary to construct the jet-vanes for Scud SRBMs and nozzle throats for long-range battlefield rockets. In one case, Syria solicited North Korean assistance to procure graphite from third countries, including China. In another case, in 2005, a North Korean entity sought missile-related alloys, such as titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel (Ti-DSS),for a Syrian ballistic missile entity. Ti-DSS is an MTCR-controlled steel developed exclusively for Scud missile production, and remains ideally suited for Scud-type short- range ballistic missiles due to its strength and corrosion- resistance. In yet another example, a North Korean company shipped several tons of Chinese-origin missile-related specialty steel to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). North Korea,s procurement of missile-related goods for Damascus continued in 2007 and 2008. From January-April 2008, a North Korean entity worked to procure probable missile- related steel and other materials from a China-based entity for Syria, and in August 2008 a North Korean entity contracted with a China-based entity for Scud electronics. This dependence on North Korean sources both directly and via North Korean brokers for a range of missile-related materials, advanced chemicals, and technology is likely to continue, given the difficulties Syria has encountered purchasing such items directly from other suppliers. As in many other aspects of its missile program, Damascus relies upon Pyongyang for the acquisition of machine tools and testing equipment. North Korea on several occasions has brokered sales of controlled machine tools from entities in Europe and Asia on behalf of Syria. Syria's acquisition of these types of advanced machine tools could allow it to expand and improve its ballistic missile production capabilities. Syria also has independently sought similar equipment from Western firms using front companies affiliated with Syria's SSRC. North Korea has assisted Syria in acquiring necessary parts for a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) based on No- Dong technology. In March and October 2005, a North Korean entity based in Syria sought ball bearings with specific applications for the No-Dong class rocket engine from several sources, probably on behalf of SSRC. Successful development of an MRBM by Syria would allow it to strike targets at greater ranges and/or with heavier payloads. Iran Iran also has been assisting Syria in the ballistic missile field since the early 1990s. In addition to the joint construction with SSRC of both solid- and liquid-propellant production facilities in Syria, Syria and Iran have entered into an agreement for the transfer of Fateh-110 production technology from Iran to Syria. By at least 2007, Syria began receiving missile parts and technical assistance from Iran related to this project and successfully flight-tested two Fateh-110 missiles in December of 2007 and one in December ¶2008. Syria and possibly Iran have made available the 270-km- range Fateh-110 SRBM to Lebanese Hizballah, as part of Iran,s agreement to share Fateh-110 production technology with Syria. Hizballah personnel probably participated in Fateh-110 meetings and test launches in both Syria and Iran over the past three years. This is consistent with Iran and Syria,s past practice of supplying Hizballah with long-range rockets, which Hizballah used in the 2006 war against Israel. Outlook Syria is likely to continue seeking material and technological support for its ballistic missile program from foreign suppliers. Damascus will continue to rely on Pyongyang for assistance because of the North's extensive procurement networks and historical association with Syria's ballistic missile program. However, we assess Syria's acquisition of the Iranian Fateh-110 solid-propellant missile system has allowed Iran to emerge as a key foreign partner in Syria's ballistic missile program. Over time, Iran,s provision of solid-propellant technologies, expertise, and materiel to Syria could lead to a reduction in Syria's dependence on North Korea. Nonetheless, for the foreseeable future, North Korea will continue to act as a key procurement agent for raw materials, production equipment, and possibly guidance equipment, which Syria is unable to produce indigenously. END TEXT OF PAPER. ¶4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON