SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING

S E C R E T STATE 098566 SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS SUBJECT: SFO-V GUIDANCE-004: MOBILE MISSILE MONITORING PROVISIONS REFS: A. STATE 84678 (SFO-DIP-09-001) ¶B. MOSCOW 1347 Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, VCI. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). 1.(S) Background: In a non-paper delivered on August 14, 2009, the United States informed Russia that it remained committed to including in the START Follow-on Treaty provisions that would continue the U.S. right to conduct Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk (Ref A). In addition, the non-paper underscored the U.S. would continue to exercise its START Treaty right to conduct PPCM at Votkinsk through December 4, 2009, and acknowledged, without prejudice to the U.S. position in the START Follow-on negotiations, the necessity of planning for the conclusion of PPCM at Votkinsk upon the expiration of START. The Russian side has consistently made clear that Russia will not agree to include a provision on any U.S. PPCM rights at Votkinsk in the START Follow-on Treaty, and that U.S. inspectors and equipment must be removed from Votkinsk before START expires (Ref B). ¶2. (S) Washington recognizes that the U.S. START Treaty right to conduct PPCM at Votkinsk expires on December 4, 2009, and that time is growing short to work out the practical arrangements for the withdrawal of U.S. equipment and personnel from the Votkinsk facility by that date. In light of Russia's clearly stated position that it will not permit the United States to conduct PPCM at Votkinsk under a future Treaty, Washington is willing to consider alternative measures that would give the United States an adequate level of confidence regarding the number of mobile ICBMs Russia possesses. ¶3. (S) Guidance: On the margins of the SFO negotiations, Delegation is authorized to conform the draft Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and letters of exchange on the use of ground transportation and settlement of accounts in connection with the Agreement that have been previously negotiated in the JCIC. Delegation should request authorization from Washington before signing the documents, and should make a recommendation to Washington regarding the modalities of getting the necessary signatures from Belarus. ¶4. (S) With respect to mobile missile monitoring under the START Follow-on Treaty, Washington instructs the delegation to table a new U.S. position that the United States would be willing to consider foregoing PPCM at Votkinsk, if the following monitoring measures could be included in the new treaty in its place: 1) continuation of the practice of placing permanent unique identifiers on each mobile ICBM; 2) prenotification to the United States at least 60 hours in advance of the exit from the facility of a mobile ICBM subject to the limitations of the Treaty, to include information about the type and variant of the missile, the scheduled time of departure of the mobile ICBM, and its unique identifier number; and 3) installation and operation of a closed circuit TV camera at the rail exit of the facility that would be connected via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring facility to track the entry and exit of railcars from the final missile assembly facility to confirm that declarations are being provided accurately. As a gesture of reciprocity, the United States would be prepared to pre-notify the exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United States facility and install a closed circuit TV there. At para 5 below are talking points the Delegation may draw upon in presenting this proposal to the Russian side. ¶5. (S) Begin talking points: --Since the beginning of our talks on the START Follow-on Treaty, the United States has been clear about its view that the unique monitoring challenges associated with mobile missiles make it necessary to retain in the new treaty the START provisions on conducting Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk. --The reason for our position is simply that the United States needs to be able to verify with confidence the number of mobile ICBMs deployed by the Russian Federation. The exercise of our right to conduct PPCM at Votkinsk has provided that confidence under the START Treaty. --However, the Russian side has made it very clear that it is not prepared to extend this right under a new Treaty, particularly since there is no analogous facility in the United States for Russia to monitor in the same fashion. --We, therefore, have been giving thought as to what alternative measures could give the United States an adequate level of confidence regarding the number of mobile ICBMs Russia possesses. --We are prepared to explore, instead of PPCM, a set of less intrusive measures that would assist our ability to effectively monitor this aspect of the Treaty. --Specifically, we would like to propose, in lieu of PPCM, the following package of measures: 1) Continuation of the Russian practice of permanently affixing a unique identifier to each mobile ICBM; 2) Prenotification to the United States at least 60 hours in advance of the exit from the facility of a mobile ICBM subject to the limitations of the Treaty, to include information about the type and variant of the missile, the scheduled time of departure of the mobile ICBM, and its unique identifier number; and 3) Installation and operation of a closed circuit TV camera at the rail exit of the facility that would be connected via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring facility to track the entry and exit of railcars from the final missile assembly facility. --Finally, if the Russian side were to agree to this proposal, the United States would be prepared, as a gesture of reciprocity, to provide pre-notification of the exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United States facility and to install a closed circuit TV camera there. --In making this proposal, the United States has come a long way in the direction of Russia's position. We trust, therefore, that you will give serious consideration to our proposal and our underlying objective, which is to ensure the United States will be able to verify with confidence the number of Russian mobile ICBMs. End talking points. End guidance. CLINTON