SFO-V GUIDANCE-002: U.S. NON-PAPER WITH

S E C R E T STATE 097473

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTING SUBJECT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-V GUIDANCE-002: U.S. NON-PAPER WITH
PROPOSALS FOR THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S) BACKGROUND: On August 25, 2009, U.S. Embassy
Moscow provided the texts of the U.S.-proposed Draft START
Follow-on treaty articles and the associated definitions
annex to the Russian Federation. This cable transmits the
U.S. proposals for the content of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) of the START Follow-on Treaty, which
we plan to use as a mechanism for discussion rather than
attempt to provide a mark-up of the MOU. A courtesy
Russian language translation will be sent to addressees by
e-mail for passage to the Russian Federation.


2. (S) GUIDANCE FOR GENEVA: Delegation should provide a
copy, including the courtesy Russian language translation,
of the U.S. non-paper in para 4 below to the Russian
Delegation and explain the U.S. proposals. Delegation
should work toward achieving agreement on the categories
of data to be included in the MOU and the six-month MOU
update notifications.


3. (U) ACTION REQUEST FOR USEMBASSY MOSCOW: Embassy is
requested to provide a courtesy copy of the U.S. non-paper
in para 4 below and its Russian language translation to
appropriate host government officials. Embassy should
note that the U.S. Delegation in Geneva will be providing
the non-paper to the Russian Delegation as well when the
next negotiating round begins (on September 21). Embassy
is requested to confirm delivery of the text, the name and
office of the official to whom it was delivered, the date
of delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that
time.


4. (S/Rel Russia) Begin text of non-paper:

U.S. Non-Paper
September 21, 2009

U.S. Proposals for START Follow-on Treaty Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)

The following are the U.S. proposals for changes in the
content of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the
Data Base and the six-month updates of MOU data for the
START Follow-on Treaty, as compared to the START Treaty
MOU. These proposals are designed to reflect the
provisions in the U.S.-proposed Treaty text, Definitions
Annex, and Inspection Protocol that have already been
provided to the Russian Federation.

Section I. Numbers of Warheads and Throw-Weight Values

- Delete numbers of attributed warheads.

- Declare throw-weight values for each type and variant of
ICBM and SLBM.

Section II. Aggregate Numbers

- Declare the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs and their
associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated
launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, as stated in
Article II subparagraph (a). Also declare the aggregate
numbers of each type of deployed ICBMs and their
associated launchers, each type of deployed SLBMs and
their associated launchers, and each type of deployed
heavy bombers.

- Declare the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on
deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and on or associated
with deployed heavy bombers, as stated in Article II
subparagraph (b). Also declare the aggregate numbers of
nuclear warheads deployed on or associated with each type
of ICBM and each type of SLBM.

Section III. Reduced Warhead Attribution

- Delete section.

Section IV. Additional Aggregate Numbers

- Delete rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers,
transporter-loaders, static displays, former heavy
bombers, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers
converted for use as ground trainers.

- Delete from this Section storage facilities and repair
facilities for ICBMs and SLBMs, space launch facilities,
space launchers, ICBMs and SLBMs at space launch
facilities, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, training heavy bombers, test launchers,
training launchers, and non-deployed mobile launchers of
ICBMs at training facilities. This data will still be
reported in the Annexes to the MOU.

Annex A (ICBMs and ICBM Launchers)

- Declare numbers of deployed ICBMs and their associated
launchers and numbers of nuclear warheads on deployed
ICBMs, both in aggregate and by ICBM base.

- Declare unique identifier (UID) for each mobile ICBM.

- Retain all categories of facilities; declare all
facilities where deployed and non-deployed ICBMs of
existing types are located and the numbers of ICBMs
located at those facilities.

- Omit static displays, transporter-loaders, silos used as
launch control centers, and emplacement equipment.

Annex B (SLBMs and SLBM Launchers)

- Declare numbers of deployed SLBMs and their associated
launchers and numbers of nuclear warheads on deployed
SLBMs, both in aggregate and by submarine base.

- Retain all categories of facilities; declare all
facilities where deployed and non-deployed SLBMs of
existing types are located and the numbers of SLBMs
located at those facilities.

- Omit static displays.

Annex C (Heavy Bombers)

- Declare numbers of deployed heavy bombers and numbers of
nuclear warheads on or associated with deployed heavy
bombers, both in aggregate and by air base, for existing
types of heavy bombers.

- Declare nuclear armaments weapons storage areas
associated with each air base.

- Omit former heavy bombers and static displays.

Annex D (Space Launch Facilities)

- Retain with no changes in categories.

Annex E (Eliminated Facilities)

- Retain with no changes in categories. Upon entry into
force of the Treaty, no facilities will be listed in this
section. The facilities listed thereafter will become
subject to formerly declared facility inspections.

Annex F (ICBM/SLBM Technical Data)

- Add technical data from agreements and joint statements
concluded in the JCIC for existing types of ICBMs and
SLBMs.

- Declare differences between training models of missiles
and corresponding types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

- Delete transporter-loaders and support equipment for
silo launchers.

Annex G (Heavy Bomber Technical Data)

- Delete most technical data.

- Rework the sections to the following:

-- Section 1. Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear
Armaments. Include only recognition features of the
bomber type.

-- Section 2. Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear
Armaments. Include only differences that make nuclear and
non-nuclear variants of a bomber type distinguishable.

-- Section 3. Test Heavy Bombers. Include distinguishing
features for test heavy bombers of a bomber type.

-- Section 4. Training Heavy Bombers. Include
distinguishing features for training heavy bombers of a
bomber type.

Annex H (Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments Technical Data)

- Subparagraph (i): Long-Range Nuclear ALCMS.

-- Delete distance between joints for attaching to
launcher.

-- Add differences between training models, non-nuclear
ALCMs, and corresponding types of long range nuclear
ALCMS.

- Add new subparagraph (ii): Nuclear Bombs.

-- Include technical data on length, diameter or cross
section, and other distinguishing features, if any.

-- Add differences between training models and
corresponding types of nuclear bombs.

- Add new subparagraph (iii): Nuclear Air-to Surface
Missiles with Ranges Less than 600 km.

-- Include technical data on length, diameter or cross
section, and other distinguishing features, if any.

-- Add differences between training models and
corresponding types of nuclear air-to surface missiles.

Annex I (Other Data)

- Add declarations of existing types of nuclear armaments
for heavy bombers.

- Add the point of departure for ground transportation to
a monitored facility.

- Delete static displays, former heavy bombers, other
airplanes, special purpose submarine ports, and
suspect-site facilities.

Annex J (Other Requirements)

- Provide site diagrams for all facilities (to include
nuclear armaments weapons storage areas) subject to data
update inspections, nuclear warhead inspections, formerly
declared facility inspections, and continuous monitoring.

- Delete all references to rail garrisons.

- It is not necessary to provide again the site diagrams,
coastlines and waters diagrams, and photographs that were
already provided under START.

- Add a provision that the aggregate number of nuclear
warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and on or
associated with deployed heavy bombers, as stated in
Article II subparagraph (b),may be released to the public
every six months. All other nuclear warhead data shall
not be released to the public or to any third party,
unless agreed between the Parties.

- Other portions of the text of Annex J could be
simplified.

End non-paper.
CLINTON