SFO-V GUIDANCE-002: U.S. NON-PAPER WITH

S E C R E T STATE 097473 SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTING SUBJECT) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS SUBJECT: SFO-V GUIDANCE-002: U.S. NON-PAPER WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) BACKGROUND: On August 25, 2009, U.S. Embassy Moscow provided the texts of the U.S.-proposed Draft START Follow-on treaty articles and the associated definitions annex to the Russian Federation. This cable transmits the U.S. proposals for the content of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of the START Follow-on Treaty, which we plan to use as a mechanism for discussion rather than attempt to provide a mark-up of the MOU. A courtesy Russian language translation will be sent to addressees by e-mail for passage to the Russian Federation. ¶2. (S) GUIDANCE FOR GENEVA: Delegation should provide a copy, including the courtesy Russian language translation, of the U.S. non-paper in para 4 below to the Russian Delegation and explain the U.S. proposals. Delegation should work toward achieving agreement on the categories of data to be included in the MOU and the six-month MOU update notifications. ¶3. (U) ACTION REQUEST FOR USEMBASSY MOSCOW: Embassy is requested to provide a courtesy copy of the U.S. non-paper in para 4 below and its Russian language translation to appropriate host government officials. Embassy should note that the U.S. Delegation in Geneva will be providing the non-paper to the Russian Delegation as well when the next negotiating round begins (on September 21). Embassy is requested to confirm delivery of the text, the name and office of the official to whom it was delivered, the date of delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that time. ¶4. (S/Rel Russia) Begin text of non-paper: U.S. Non-Paper September 21, 2009 U.S. Proposals for START Follow-on Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) The following are the U.S. proposals for changes in the content of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Data Base and the six-month updates of MOU data for the START Follow-on Treaty, as compared to the START Treaty MOU. These proposals are designed to reflect the provisions in the U.S.-proposed Treaty text, Definitions Annex, and Inspection Protocol that have already been provided to the Russian Federation. Section I. Numbers of Warheads and Throw-Weight Values - Delete numbers of attributed warheads. - Declare throw-weight values for each type and variant of ICBM and SLBM. Section II. Aggregate Numbers - Declare the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, as stated in Article II subparagraph (a). Also declare the aggregate numbers of each type of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, each type of deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and each type of deployed heavy bombers. - Declare the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and on or associated with deployed heavy bombers, as stated in Article II subparagraph (b). Also declare the aggregate numbers of nuclear warheads deployed on or associated with each type of ICBM and each type of SLBM. Section III. Reduced Warhead Attribution - Delete section. Section IV. Additional Aggregate Numbers - Delete rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers, transporter-loaders, static displays, former heavy bombers, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers. - Delete from this Section storage facilities and repair facilities for ICBMs and SLBMs, space launch facilities, space launchers, ICBMs and SLBMs at space launch facilities, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, test launchers, training launchers, and non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at training facilities. This data will still be reported in the Annexes to the MOU. Annex A (ICBMs and ICBM Launchers) - Declare numbers of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and numbers of nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, both in aggregate and by ICBM base. - Declare unique identifier (UID) for each mobile ICBM. - Retain all categories of facilities; declare all facilities where deployed and non-deployed ICBMs of existing types are located and the numbers of ICBMs located at those facilities. - Omit static displays, transporter-loaders, silos used as launch control centers, and emplacement equipment. Annex B (SLBMs and SLBM Launchers) - Declare numbers of deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and numbers of nuclear warheads on deployed SLBMs, both in aggregate and by submarine base. - Retain all categories of facilities; declare all facilities where deployed and non-deployed SLBMs of existing types are located and the numbers of SLBMs located at those facilities. - Omit static displays. Annex C (Heavy Bombers) - Declare numbers of deployed heavy bombers and numbers of nuclear warheads on or associated with deployed heavy bombers, both in aggregate and by air base, for existing types of heavy bombers. - Declare nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with each air base. - Omit former heavy bombers and static displays. Annex D (Space Launch Facilities) - Retain with no changes in categories. Annex E (Eliminated Facilities) - Retain with no changes in categories. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, no facilities will be listed in this section. The facilities listed thereafter will become subject to formerly declared facility inspections. Annex F (ICBM/SLBM Technical Data) - Add technical data from agreements and joint statements concluded in the JCIC for existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. - Declare differences between training models of missiles and corresponding types of ICBMs and SLBMs. - Delete transporter-loaders and support equipment for silo launchers. Annex G (Heavy Bomber Technical Data) - Delete most technical data. - Rework the sections to the following: -- Section 1. Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments. Include only recognition features of the bomber type. -- Section 2. Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments. Include only differences that make nuclear and non-nuclear variants of a bomber type distinguishable. -- Section 3. Test Heavy Bombers. Include distinguishing features for test heavy bombers of a bomber type. -- Section 4. Training Heavy Bombers. Include distinguishing features for training heavy bombers of a bomber type. Annex H (Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments Technical Data) - Subparagraph (i): Long-Range Nuclear ALCMS. -- Delete distance between joints for attaching to launcher. -- Add differences between training models, non-nuclear ALCMs, and corresponding types of long range nuclear ALCMS. - Add new subparagraph (ii): Nuclear Bombs. -- Include technical data on length, diameter or cross section, and other distinguishing features, if any. -- Add differences between training models and corresponding types of nuclear bombs. - Add new subparagraph (iii): Nuclear Air-to Surface Missiles with Ranges Less than 600 km. -- Include technical data on length, diameter or cross section, and other distinguishing features, if any. -- Add differences between training models and corresponding types of nuclear air-to surface missiles. Annex I (Other Data) - Add declarations of existing types of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. - Add the point of departure for ground transportation to a monitored facility. - Delete static displays, former heavy bombers, other airplanes, special purpose submarine ports, and suspect-site facilities. Annex J (Other Requirements) - Provide site diagrams for all facilities (to include nuclear armaments weapons storage areas) subject to data update inspections, nuclear warhead inspections, formerly declared facility inspections, and continuous monitoring. - Delete all references to rail garrisons. - It is not necessary to provide again the site diagrams, coastlines and waters diagrams, and photographs that were already provided under START. - Add a provision that the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and on or associated with deployed heavy bombers, as stated in Article II subparagraph (b),may be released to the public every six months. All other nuclear warhead data shall not be released to the public or to any third party, unless agreed between the Parties. - Other portions of the text of Annex J could be simplified. End non-paper. CLINTON