AUSTRALIA GROUP: GUIDANCE FOR AUSTRALIA GROUP

UNCLAS STATE 096945

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC IN CH
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: GUIDANCE FOR AUSTRALIA GROUP
PLENARY - SEPTEMBER 21-25, 2009


1. (U) This message provides guidance for the U.S.
delegation to the Australia Group (AG) Plenary in Paris,
September 21-25, 2009.

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OBJECTIVES
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2. (SBU) The principal U.S. objectives at the AG
plenary include:

-- Maintaining the current AG position on Russian
membership in the AG through plenary discussions and
informal consultations with AG members;

-- Attaining acceptance for USG proposals to modify the
chemical manufacturing equipment control list;

-- Ensuring the AG initiates expert-level discussions
on the proliferation potential of micro-reactor
technology;

-- Continuing discussion of the regional security
threat emanating from chemical and biological warfare
programs in non-member countries and non-member
suppliers, and agreeing on steps AG members can take to
address these threats;

-- Encouraging continuing AG engagement on the
advancing field of synthetic biology.

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SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING
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3. (SBU) At the Synthetic Biology Technical Experts
Meeting, the Del:

-- Should deliver a presentation on the current state
of sequence screening practices within the global gene
synthesis industry;

-- Should also provide an update on U.S. efforts to
develop sequence screening guidance for its domestic
gene synthesis industry;

-- Encourage AG participants to task the experts group
to determine whether it would be desirable for the AG to
provide guidance on screening orders of commercial
synthesis of gene-length DNA sequences.

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CONTROL LISTS AND EXPORT CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION
-------------- --


4. (SBU) At the Implementation Meeting, the Del:

-- Should agree to support a UK proposal to include an
explanatory note at the end of the Control List of
Chemical Weapons Precursors that states the Chemical
Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers on the list cannot be
used as unique identifiers for their respective
chemicals in all situations (AG/Sep09/CL/GB/35). This
note is similar to one maintained on the Wassenaar
Arrangement?s Military List and will help address
situations where a chemical has multiple CAS numbers
because it comes in different forms (e.g. hydrates) or
when a chemical?s CAS number changes;

-- May not/not agree to the Dutch proposal to expand
the control for corrosion resistant valves as it is
written (AG/Sep09/CL/NL/3),but the Del can agree to
support adding interior valve components, such as balls,
discs, stems and plugs to the list of components in the
first paragraph of the control. The Del should make it
clear that we cannot support the terms ?principal
components? and ?closure elements? and the associated
technical note because we see them as unnecessary.

-- Should agree to support a UK proposal to modify the
definition of ?software? on the Control List of Dual-Use
Chemical Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment and
Related Technology and Software to decontrol software
that is either in the public domain or is generally
available to the public through commercial retailers
(AG/Sep09/CL/GB/36). Since there are so few items on
the AG?s control lists that contain software, the the
U.S. would prefer to allow AG participants develop their
own approaches to addressing it. We also recognize that
adopting such an approach will help the AG?s
participants from the European Union in drafting their
common export control list;

-- Should agree to support Germany?s proposed best
practices guide for implementing end-user controls
(AG/Aug09/Pol/D/1). The best practices should be useful
for other AG members. They are consistent with U.S. and
Missile Technology Control Regime best practices for
end-user controls.

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INFORMATION EXCHANGE DISCUSSION
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5. (SBU) During the Information Exchange, the Del
should present information on emerging trends and
threats, including the indigenous capabilities of
countries of proliferation concern, alternative pathways
for chemical weapons precursor synthesis, the
proliferation of chemical incapacitants, and the
circumvention of export controls in major non-member
supplier countries.

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ENFORCEMENT EXCHANGE DISCUSSION
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6. (SBU) During the Enforcement Experts Meeting, the
Del should present two export control enforcement case
studies that highlight key lessons on executing of
undercover investigations and taking down proliferation
networks.

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POLICY CONSULTATIONS
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7. (SBU) During opening remarks, Head of Delegation
should:

-- Thank the Australians for their continued efforts in
support of CBW nonproliferation as chair and secretariat
of the Australia Group;

-- Welcome back Ambassador John Sullivan as the
Australia Group?s chair;

-- Convey the USG?s firm desire to continue to
strengthen the AG to make it more effective in combating
CBW proliferation by reaching out to key supplier
countries outside of the group to encourage them to
adopt both the AG?s lists and guidelines;

-- Highlight the Australia Group?s importance to the
nonproliferation standards enshrined in UN Security
Council Resolution 1540 and other resolutions;

-- Express the belief that the success of these
nonproliferation standards has reduced CBW proliferation
down to a handful of committed proliferators;

-- Suggest that the AG should begin to examine its
options for addressing the continuing challenge posed by
these committed proliferators over the coming year;

-- Voice continued support for the AG?s consistent and
balanced approach to membership issues in continued
conformity with its factors and criteria for
consideration of membership;

-- Express continued support for effective and
universal implementation of and adherence to the CWC and
BWC.


8. (U) Membership: Guidance on membership issues will
be provided septel.


9. (SBU) Outreach:

-- The Del should seek AG participant support for an AG
chair-led visit to India. The Indians have made
significant strides towards harmonization with the AG?s
guidelines and control lists, but gaps remain. The
attitude in New Delhi towards the importance of
effective, legally-based export controls has also
impoved in recent years, so an outreach visit is likely
to be well-received.

-- The Del should also seek AG participant support for
an AG-chair led visit to China. The chair?s last visit
to Beijing ended acrimoniously because he mentioned
plans to send a representative to visit Taiwan in
passing. The AG chair should visit Beijing again and
press the Chinese on closing gaps in their export
control rules, particularly in the area of intangible
technology transfer. Del should ask AG participants to
consider passing to the Chinese a sanitized version of
the best practices guide on intangible technology
transfer it adopted in 2008.

-- The Del may support suggestions by other AG
participants to conduct outreach visits to Israel,
Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.

-- The Del may support a UK proposal for the AG to
conduct an industry outreach event. Though the U.S.
agrees with the view that industry outreach is the
prerogative of AG participants, an outreach event
coincident to a future AG plenary could help raise the
AG?s public profile. If prompted, the Del should
indicate its intention to complete the questionnaire
attached to the proposal.


9. (SBU) Interaction with the UNSCR 1540 Committee: The
Del should express disappointment over Russia?s decision
to block efforts by the 1540 Committee to invite the AG
to participate in its Comprehensive Review scheduled for
September 30 - October 2. Del should urge AG members
that will participate in the Comprehensive Review to
make positive representations on the Australia Group?s
behalf.


10. (SBU) Regional Nonproliferation: Guidance on
regional nonproliferation issues will be provided
septel.


11. (SBU) Intangible Technology Transfer Booklet:

-- The Del should volunteer to draft Chapter 3 (?AG
Controlled Biological Agents, Including Synthetic
Biology?) of the Intangible Technology Transfer Booklet
funded by a voluntary contribution from South Korea, in
addition to drafting Chapters 9 and 10, which the U.S.
has already volunteered to draft;

-- The Del should thank Germany for volunteering to
draft three chapters of the booklet and encourage other
AG participants to draft the remaining chapters of the
booklet;

-- The Del should approach the Austrian, Japanese and
Turkish delegations and suggest that as current members
of the UN Security Council, they are well-placed to
draft Chapter 7 (?UN Sanctions and ITT?).


12. (U) The Del should endorse holding the next AG
plenary meeting in June 2010, as well as intersessional
meetings as appropriate.


13. (U) The Del should ensure that the press release on
the AG meeting is consistent with U.S. policy
considerations delineated in paragraphs 2 and 7. In
particular, the Del should ensure that the final press
release references:

-- The well-established global norms against chemical
and biological weapons and CBW nonproliferation;

-- The AG?s commitment to working with all interested
parties to address the challenges posed by a small
number of committed CBW proliferators that reject these
global norms;

-- The AG?s signficance to the work of the 1540
Commitee;

-- The commitment of AG participants to ensuring the
1540 Comprehensive Review is successful;

-- The importance of UNSCR 1874 to ensuring a Korean
peninsula free of weapons of mass destruction;

-- AG members? gratitude to Rogelio Pfirter for his
leadership at the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons.
CLINTON