SFO-DIP-09-005B: U.S. DRAFT NEW START TREATY

S E C R E T STATE 095978 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2029 TAGS: KACT PARM START US RS SUBJECT: SFO-DIP-09-005B: U.S. DRAFT NEW START TREATY INSPECTION PROTOCOL ANNEXES, CABLE 2 OF 8 REF: A. STATE 088262 (U.S.-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT PART 1) ¶B. STATE 088263 (U.S.-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT PART 2) ¶C. STATE 091093 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 1 OF 7) ¶D. STATE 091284 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 2 OF 7) ¶E. STATE 091291 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 3 OF 7) ¶F. STATE 091106 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 4 OF 7) ¶G. STATE 091134 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 5 OF 7) ¶H. STATE 091143 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 6 OF 7) ¶I. STATE 091151 (DRAFT NEW START TREATY IP CABLE 7 OF 7) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 4 below. ¶2. (S) BACKGROUND: On August 25, 2009, U.S. Embassy Moscow provided to the Russian Federation the texts of the U.S.-proposed Draft New START Treaty Articles (Refs A and B). On September 2, 2009, the U.S. Delegation to the New START Treaty negotiations provided the texts of the U.S.-proposed Draft New START Treaty Inspection Protocol to the Russian Delegation in Geneva (Refs C-I). This cable contains the U.S.-proposed draft of the New START Treaty Inspection Protocol Annexes. ¶3. (S) This is cable 2 of 8 cables. This cable contains paragraph 10 of Annex 3 through paragraph 6(c)(iv) of Section IV of Annex 4 of the U.S.-proposed Draft Inspection Protocol Annexes. Embassy should note that, due to the length of the draft, the text was sent using multiple cables. ¶4. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Moscow is requested to combine the texts of the U.S. draft New START Treaty Inspection Protocol Annexes contained in the associated cables into one document and provide that text to appropriate host government officials. Washington will provide a courtesy Russian-language translation of the U.S. draft New START Treaty Telemetry Protocol when available; however, delivery of the English language text should not be delayed. Embassy is requested to confirm delivery of the text, the name and office of the official to whom it was delivered, the date of delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that time. ¶5. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text: ¶10. If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, the following procedures shall apply: (a) Before the shroud is removed inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles. (b) During the entire process of preparation of the front section for viewing, inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from that site, or to seal all the exits with seals. During the process of preparation of the front section for viewing, no vehicle, container, launch canister, or object shall leave the site until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it. ¶11. Before the front section is viewed, the inspected Party may cover reentry vehicles and other equipment, including the mounting platform, with covers, in such a manner that the covers shall not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains the number of nuclear-armed reentry vehicles equal to the number of warheads declared for that missile. In implementing this provision, the inspected Party may use individual reentry vehicle covers or a single hard cover which covers the entire front section and consists of a base portion and individual towers that cover the individual reentry vehicles. The inspected Party shall not use individual towers that cover the individual reentry vehicles or individual reentry vehicle covers that are large enough to cover more than one of any reentry vehicle deployed on any ICBM or SLBM of that Party. Therefore, United States individual reentry vehicle towers or covers, other than soft, conformal covers, shall have a base diameter, or width if not circular, of less than 70 centimeters, and Russian Federation individual reentry vehicle towers or covers, other than soft, conformal covers, shall have a base diameter, or width if not circular, of less than 80 centimeters. If a Party flight tests an ICBM or SLBM with a reentry vehicle small enough, such that more than one such reentry vehicle can be contained under any individual reentry vehicle cover or individual tower used by that Party on an ICBM or SLBM, that Party shall subsequently use either smaller individual reentry vehicle covers/individual towers with its ICBMs or SLBMs that are not large enough to cover more than one such reentry vehicle, or soft, conformal covers. A soft, conformal cover is understood to mean a cover that does not have a fixed shape or hard structural elements except for hard elements that cover and protect only the reentry vehicle nose tip and, therefore, the cover conforms to the size and shape of the reentry vehicle it covers. Inspectors shall have the right to view the covers and to measure covers prior to their placement on the reentry vehicles. Any issues relating to the viability and effectiveness of these provisions shall be discussed within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. ¶12. After the process of preparation of the front section for viewing has been completed, inspectors may view the front section continuously for no more than 15 minutes from a place or places designated by a member of the in-country escort no more than five meters from the front section and providing a clear, unobstructed view of the covered reentry vehicles, to ascertain that the front section contains the number of nuclear warheads declared to be on that missile. ¶13. If a member of the in-country escort declares that an object contained in the front section is not a nuclear-armed reentry vehicle, the inspected Party shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a nuclear-armed reentry vehicle. During nuclear warhead inspections, the radiation detection equipment provided for in Section II of Annex 8 to this Protocol may be used, at the discretion of the inspected Party, to demonstrate to the inspectors that an object contained in the front section and declared by the in-country escort to be a non-nuclear object, is, in fact, non-nuclear. The use of radiation detection equipment shall be conducted in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 15 to this Protocol. ¶14. If the preparation of the front section for viewing has been carried out outside the field of view of inspectors, the inspectors, upon completion of viewing of the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, may view the vehicle or specially allocated site where the front section was viewed, including the space under the shroud, to ascertain the absence of reentry vehicles outside the front section. ¶15. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location designated by the inspected Party for carrying out post inspection procedures. ANNEX 4 PROCEDURES FOR EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS, NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS FOR HEAVY BOMBERS, LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCMs, AND THEIR FACILITIES ¶I. For distinguishability exhibitions of heavy bombers, nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol: ¶1. For exhibitions of heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to view a heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories of the same type. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol, to confirm that the technical data and distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, as well as to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding, to the extent that such data is required to confirm the distinguishing features of such heavy bomber. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber that are not related to specified technical data or distinguishing features. ¶2. For exhibitions of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to view nuclear armaments for heavy bombers and to make linear measurements to confirm that the technical data correspond to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding for such nuclear armaments, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. ¶3. For exhibitions of non-nuclear ALCMs, inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the ALCM is non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, which have been specified in the notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. For long-range non-nuclear ALCMs stored in containers, prior to the commencement of such procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements of the dimensions of the container, and the in-country escort shall open the container and remove the missile. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the missile from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the missile and container are the same ones originally exhibited. The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation. ¶4. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. Photographs may be taken to document features of the exhibited items subject to procedures provided for in paragraph 9 of Section XI of this Protocol. ¶5. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol. ¶6. During distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers: (a) For an exhibition conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Section XIII of this Protocol: (i) The inspected Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each category and, if applicable, variant of that type in close proximity to one another. Different types of heavy bombers may be exhibited at separate sites. (ii) The inspected Party shall exhibit all nuclear armaments for heavy bombers of each type. Different types of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers may be exhibited at separate sites. (b) For exhibitions of heavy bombers and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section XIII of this Protocol: (i) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one heavy bomber of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type. (ii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one nuclear armament for heavy bombers of the new type specified in such notification. ¶7. During pre-inspection procedures for distinguishability exhibitions: (a) A member of the in-country escort shall identify for inspectors each type, category, and, if applicable, variant of heavy bomber that is to be exhibited, and each type of nuclear armament for heavy bombers that is to be exhibited. (b) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of heavy bomber to be exhibited, the differences that make heavy bombers of each category and, if applicable, variant distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories and variants of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. ¶8. For exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the differences that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of the type exhibited distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs of each type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. II. For inspections of deployed heavy bombers during nuclear warhead inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(a) of Section IX of this Protocol: ¶1. Inspectors shall have the right to view a deployed heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from other heavy bombers of the same type. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a deployed heavy bomber that are not related to confirming: (a) Specified distinguishing features, and (b) The number of, or absence of, nuclear armaments loaded on such a heavy bomber. ¶2. The inspection team leader shall designate prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures which of the deployed heavy bombers subject to inspection located at the facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect are to be inspected. For a deployed heavy bomber that arrives at the facility during the period of inspection and that is subject to inspection, the inspection team leader shall, immediately upon the arrival of the heavy bomber, inform the in-country escort whether it is designated to be inspected. During the period of inspection, no deployed heavy bomber designated for inspection shall depart the facility until inspected. ¶3. Inspections of objects loaded on deployed heavy bombers which are not declared by the inspected Party to be nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, but that are large enough to be the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers, shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, except that inspections of covered or environmentally protected objects and non-nuclear ALCMs loaded on such heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Section. ¶4. During the inspection of deployed heavy bombers, the inspectors may designate for further inspection no more than three covered or environmentally protected objects loaded on such heavy bombers which are not declared by the inspected Party to be nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, but that are large enough to be the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers declared by the inspected Party; or no more than three non-nuclear ALCMs loaded on such heavy bombers; or any combination of no more than three such items. (a) For a designated covered or environmentally protected object, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such a covered or environmentally protected object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to use radiation detection equipment on the exterior of such a covered or environmentally covered object. Objects subjected to the use of radiation detection equipment shall be removed from the heavy bomber. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe the removal of the object from the heavy bomber, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the object is the same object chosen by inspectors. If no source of radiation is detected from the object by using radiation detection equipment, then the object shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) For covered or environmentally protected objects inside which is a source of radiation that is detected by using radiation detection equipment, the in-country escort shall uncover the covered or environmentally protected object sufficiently so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing that the object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers. (iii) If, by viewing the object, inspectors confirm that the object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, then the object shall not be subject to further inspection. (iv) If, by viewing the object, inspectors are unable to confirm that it is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements to confirm that such measurements do not correspond to the linear dimensions specified for any nuclear armament for heavy bombers exhibited by the inspected Party. (v) If, by such viewing and making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, they shall record their finding in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the object subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. (b) For a designated non-nuclear ALCM, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such a designated ALCM loaded on a heavy bomber is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to view such an ALCM to confirm the presence of the features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. (ii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the ALCM shall not be subject to further inspection. (iii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, a member of the in-country escort may allow the inspectors to carry out additional actions, which may include making linear measurements and using radiation detection equipment, to confirm the presence of features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. (iv) If a member of the in-country escort does not allow such additional actions, or if, by carrying out such additional actions, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the ALCM subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. ¶5. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing and functional features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. ¶6. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol. III. For inspections of deployed heavy bombers loaded with nuclear armaments during nuclear warhead inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 8(b) of Section IX of this Protocol: ¶1. In addition to the procedures provided for in Section II of this Annex, the procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to deployed heavy bombers loaded with nuclear armaments during nuclear warhead inspections of air bases for deployed heavy bombers. ¶2. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the number of nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers is equal to the number of such nuclear armaments specified by the in-country escort and annotated on the site diagram in subparagraph 6(b) of Section IX of this Protocol. ¶3. The in-country escort shall have the right to prepare such heavy bombers for inspection at a location chosen by the inspected Party and to cover the nuclear armaments loaded on the heavy bomber provided that such covering allows the inspectors to confirm the data provided for in subparagraph 6(b) of Section IX of this Protocol. The areas where such heavy bombers are located shall not be subject to inspection except as provided for in this Section. ¶4. No more than a total of four inspectors shall inspect a deployed heavy bomber declared to be loaded with nuclear armaments for a total period of no more than 30 minutes. If nuclear armaments are loaded in a weapons bay, inspectors may view the contents of the bay from a position external to the bay, designated by a member of the in-country escort, from which inspectors can confirm the data on the numbers of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 6(b) of Section IX of this Protocol. IV. For inspections of nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with deployed heavy bombers at the airbase conducted pursuant to subparagraph 8(c) of Section IX of this Protocol: ¶1. The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with deployed heavy bombers at the airbase. ¶2. Prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures a member of the in-country escort shall: (a) Inform the inspection team leader of the location of nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with deployed heavy bombers at the air base, and (b) Provide a site diagram of each such area depicting the structures that are large enough to contain the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers and annotated to indicate the location and number of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers and the structures or vehicles in which they are located. ¶3. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the number of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers within the boundaries of nuclear armaments weapons storages areas associated with the air base is equal to the number of nuclear warheads specified by the in-country escort in subparagraph 6(c) of Section IX of this Protocol. ¶4. Inspections of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of nuclear armament weapons storage areas shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, except that inspections of containers that are large enough to contain the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers declared by the inspected Party, shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of this Section. Additionally, except as provided for in paragraph 6 or 7 of this Section, the inspectors may, in carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, make linear measurements only of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures. ¶5. No more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed in a structure. ¶6. During the inspection of the nuclear armaments weapons storage areas, the inspectors may designate for further inspection no more than three covered or environmentally protected objects which are not declared by the inspected Party to be nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, but that are large enough to be the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers declared by the inspected Party; or no more than three covered or environmentally protected objects which are not declared by the inspected Party to be nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, but that are large enough to be the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers declared by the inspected Party; or no more than three containers that are large enough to contain the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers; or no more than three non-nuclear ALCMs stored outside containers; or any combination of no more than three such items: (a) For a designated covered or environmentally protected object, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such an object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to use radiation detection equipment on the exterior of such a covered or environmentally protected object. If no source of radiation is detected from the covered or environmentally protected object by using radiation detection equipment, then the object shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) For covered or environmentally protected objects inside which is a source of radiation that is detected by using radiation detection equipment, the in-country escort shall uncover the object sufficiently so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing that the object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers. (iii) If, by viewing the object, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, then the object shall not be subject to further inspection. (iv) If, by viewing the object, inspectors are unable to confirm that the object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features that make the object distinguishable from nuclear armament for heavy bombers. (v) If, by such viewing and making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the object is not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the object subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. (b) For a designated container, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such a container does not contain a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to use radiation detection equipment on the exterior of such a container. (ii) For containers inside which is a source of radiation that is detected by using radiation detection equipment, the in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a nuclear armament for heavy bombers. (iii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection. (iv) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe the removal of the contents of the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the contents and the container are the items chosen by the inspectors. The inspectors shall have the right to view the contents of the container and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features that make the contents of the container distinguishable from nuclear armament for heavy bombers. (v) If, by such viewing and making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a nuclear armament for heavy bombers, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. (c) For a designated non-nuclear ALCM stored outside a container, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such an ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to view such an ALCM to confirm the presence of the features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. (ii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the ALCM shall not be subject to further inspection. (iii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, a member of the in-country escort may allow the inspectors to carry out additional actions, which may include making linear measurements and using radiation detection equipment, to confirm the presence of features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. (iv) If a member of the in-country escort does not allow such additional actions, or if, by carrying out such additional actions, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the ALCM subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. End text. CLINTON