GUIDANCE FOR SEPTEMBER 15 CORFU PROCESS MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 095507 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019 TAGS: PREL OSCE RU SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR SEPTEMBER 15 CORFU PROCESS MEETING REF: A. STATE 57920 ¶B. STATE 59226 ¶C. USOSCE 181 Classified By: EUR PDAS NANCY MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (SBU) Post is authorized to draw from the points below (see paragraph 5) during the September 15 "Corfu process" discussion of "cooperative security versus unilateralism" and "different levels of security in the OSCE area." ¶2. (C) Background: In a speech in Berlin on June 5, 2008, and again in an April 20, 2009 speech in Helsinki, Russian President Medvedev called for a new set of treaty-based European "hard" security arrangements covering conflict resolution, arms control, and alliances. Medvedev provided few details, and Russia has not elaborated by tabling any specific proposals. A central theme underlying Russia's rationale for developing a "new" European Security architecture is the idea -- based on the principle of the "indivisibility of security" contained in any number of NATO, NATO-Russia, and OSCE documents -- that no state should be allowed to provide for its security at the expense of any other (see reftels). Russian leaders have made clear that they do not believe this principle of the indivisibility of security is currently being observed as a result of NATO and EU enlargements. Foreign Minister Lavrov opined recently that the process of NATO enlargement demonstrates how security enhancements for some states come at the expense of others. ¶3. (U) Background (cont'd): The U.S. and our NATO Allies are committed to upholding Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's foundational document, which states that "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty." As the President has made clear, we also stand by the principles that all states have a right to choose their own alliances, and that no country should have a "sphere of privileged interests." ¶4. (U) We seek practical cooperation with Russia across all three OSCE dimensions. This also means engaging with Russia in a broader security dialogue -- based on the "Corfu process" launched by the Greek Chairmanship -- in which we seek to transcend zero-sum thinking about security in Europe and Eurasia. We believe all OSCE states have an interest in cooperative security and we will continue to pursue practical cooperation with Russia while maintaining our principled position rejecting spheres of influence and affirming the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of OSCE participating States. We should continue to work to convince Russia that NATO and EU enlargement are not threats to its security -- indeed, relations among European countries have become more stable and predictable as a result, and military equipment levels have reached historical lows -- and that a vital, active OSCE can build security in Europe by engaging effectively on some of the toughest issues that shape our global security environment today, even as OSCE continues to pursue core missions in its three dimensions. ¶5. (U) Begin Points: -- The U.S. welcomes the opportunity to engage in a comprehensive discussion of European security here at the OSCE as part of the so-called "Corfu process" to discuss ways to improve the existing security architecture in Europe and Eurasia. Today's topic of discussion, "cooperative security," is important, relevant, and timely. -- The indivisibility of security is an important concept, and one which the United States fully supports. It is important to be clear what we mean by this term, which is found in such important foundational documents as the Helsinki Final Act (1975),the Charter of Paris (1990),and the Rome Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation (2002). It is also important not to treat the principle of indivisibility of security in isolation, as these documents show repeatedly that it is one principle to be considered in the context of STATE 00095507 002 OF 003 other principles. -- One important element of the indivisibility of security is the comprehensive nature of security as embodied in the three dimensions of the OSCE: human, economic, and political-military. Any reduction of the notion of security to just one or two of these dimensions to the exclusion of any of the other dimensions fails to do justice to the complex and integrated nature of security in the 21st century. Economic collapse, armed conflict, and the systematic violation of human rights all imperil our collective security and deserve to be on our agenda in collective fora such as this one. All of these threats are also most effectively dealt with through a cooperative approach to security, rather than through unilateral action. -- A second important element is the indivisibility of security among states. We recognize that building a lasting and inclusive peace in the OSCE arena requires that all states share in the benefits of cooperative security arrangements. In this context, we also believe that all states have a sovereign right to freely choose their own alliances, and no state should claim or be allowed a "sphere of privileged interests." These principles were explicitly outlined and agreed by all OSCE participating States in the Charter for European Security, which states in paragraph 8 that &each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each state also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any preeminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.8 We remain convinced that the transparent enlargement of the Alliance that has taken place to date has benefited both NATO and non-NATO members alike by ensuring stability that benefits all. NATO enlargement is not focused on obtaining military advantage on the ground in Europe. Interestingly -- and this is also relevant in ongoing discussions about the future of the CFE Treaty -- the 28 NATO Allies together hold less heavy equipment on the ground in Europe today than the 16 NATO Allies held in 1990. -- A third and related element is the recognition, particularly in the security environment we face today, that the security of Europe and Eurasia is inextricably linked to global security. It is not only the physically immense reach of the OSCE space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, but also the interdependent nature of our world, that makes our security challenges indivisible and underscores the need to deal with them cooperatively. -- Finally, a fourth principle of the indivisibility of security is the appreciation that security within states impacts security among states. We have seen repeatedly how instability within a state can easily spill across borders. This fact in no way implies, however, any diminution of our support for the core international principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the contrary, the OSCE and other regional institutions such as the Council of Europe provide an array of tools that can and should be used to bolster the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of participating states for the benefit of the entire organization. -- One of our challenges looking ahead is to think creatively about new ways to bolster our collective security. The United States highly values existing European security institutions and we do not wish to see these institutions diminished. At the same time, we are open to looking for ways to structure these institutions to improve our common security, such as an OSCE crisis management mechanism, which could be deployed to monitor and defuse a tense situation in a conflict zone. We should explore this fall how we can spark progress in resolving protracted conflicts, and more generally, whether there are ways we can more effectively deal with crises when unrecognized, breakaway regions or other non-state actors are involved. Similarly, a review of the OSCE,s role in addressing 21st century threats, to include the OSCE's contribution to the political-military dimension of security, STATE 00095507 003 OF 003 could be productive. We also support the development of mechanisms to address energy security and climate change. We should also look at the possibility of creating new mechanisms to investigate human rights violations and ensure freedom of the press and to establish norms for the protection of journalists. Finally, we should consider whether the OSCE might strengthen its efforts to address human trafficking and tolerance issues. These are just a few of the ideas we look forward to discussing in the coming weeks. End points. CLINTON