START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATI0NS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM MARR PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATI0NS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-IV): U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, SEPTEMBER 1,2009 AND
INITIAL MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUP CHAIRS, SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START
Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-004.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 1, 2009
Event: U.S.-hosted Reception
Time: 7:30 to 9:00 P.M.
Place: 41 Quai Wilson, Geneva

(U) Meeting Date: September 2, 2009
Event: Initial Meetings of WG Chairs
Time: 5:20 to 5:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. Chairs Russian Chairs

Amb Ries Mr. Koshelev
- Treaties and Definitions WG

Dr. Warner Col Ilin
- Inspecion Protocol (IP) WG

Mr. Elliott Mr. Smirnov
- Conversion or Elimination (CorE) WG

Mr, Siemon Mr, Smirnov
- Notifications WG

Mr. Trout MGen Orlov

- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) WG

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On September 1, 2009, the U.S. Delegation hosted a
reception for the Russian Delegation. U.S. Delegation
members engaged their counterparts regarding specific
substantive issues and the structure, timing, and nature of
the work to be conducted when the START Follow-on
Negotiations continue in late September. Specific topics
discussed at the reception were the difficulty of resolving
the issue of counting rules for the new treaty, possible
compromises on the warhead limits for the treaty, the
treaty preamble--specifically the Russian position on
"equal security" as expressed in meetings during this
session and the difference between "defensive" and
"strategic defensive" systems, and other key Russian
concerns.


4. (S) After the final meeting on September 2, the U.S.
working group chairs met with their Russian counterparts to
discuss plans for organizing the delegations' work when the
next round begins in late September. For the most part,
these informal meetings continued or repeated conversations
from the previous evening's reception. Notable topics
included which areas of disagreement would be tackled in
the working groups versus by the heads of delegation at
plenary meetings, homework to prepare for starting on
September 21, and papers that would be exchanged before the
next round.

--------------
PREAMBLE--EQUAL SECURITY
--------------


5. (S) On the margins of the working group meeting, and
continuing the points that Gottemoeller had made during the
earlier meeting, Brown noted to Kotkova that one of the
concerns that the U.S. side had with the formulation "equal
security" was that it was used by Russian officials and
non-governmental experts as a shorthand way to incorporate
a number of Russian positions, including some related to
the subject of these negotiations, such as uploading and
the ban on conventional warheads, and some not related,
such as deployment of weapons in space and missile defense.


6. (S) Kotkova asked whether the Russian Delegation could
make it clear that the phrase was used only in the context
of this treaty, and the U.S. Delegation could go on the
record that this was its understanding as well. Brown
discouraged such an approach, noting that the phrase had
also been used in SALT II, and its repetition in this
treaty would lead only to unnecessary explanations and
clarifications during the U.S. ratification process. He
encouraged her to find other ways to express this thought,
noting that "equal rights" or "mutual security" might be a
way out of this situation. She responded that there were
perhaps some principles of international law having to do
with sovereignty that might be useful in this regard and
she said that she would research it as homework.

--------------
PREAMBLE--STRATEGIC DEFENSE
--------------


7. (S) Venevtsev expressed surprise to Elliott that the
Russian-proposed language on the interrelationship between
strategic offense and defense for the preamble and closing
provisions was interpreted by the United States as a
limitation on ballistic missile defense (BMD). Elliott
confirmed the U.S. Delegation's view of the
Russian-proposed language.


8. (S) Hartford discussed with Luchaninov (in the presence
of Vorontsov) the difference in the U.S. Joint Draft Text
(JDT) preamble language on strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms and the Russian concerns over the
United States "changing" the language from the Presidential
Joint Understanding. Luchaninov relayed that when the
United States removed the word "strategic" from the term
"defensive arms," the Russian side thought the United
States changed the intent to include tactical defensive
weapons. Hartford explained that the U.S. proposal was
meant to accurately reflect the Joint Understanding while
removing the repeating word "strategic." In the U.S. text,
Hartford explained, the term "strategic" modified both the
words "offensive" and "defensive" arms. It appeared to
Hartford that both the interpreter and Luchaninov gained an
appreciation of the U.S. proposal and had previously not
understood the apparent change in the U.S. language.

--------------
WARHEADS
--------------


9. (S) Venevtsev inquired as to Elliott's view on "the
numbers." Elliott reminded him again of the July 5, 2009
offer by the United States to lower the U.S. proposal on
strategic delivery vehicles by 200 if the Russians would
raise their position by two hundred, i.e., 700-900.
Venevtsev indicated that the U.S. offer was not low enough,
to which Elliott responded, "There is only one significant
number in between" (meaning 800). At this statement,
Venevtsev raised his glass and said, "Yes." Elliott took
this to mean that 800 would be an acceptable number for
strategic delivery vehicles.


10. (S) General Orlov told Trout there was no warhead data
in the Russian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) because it
had not been decided whether warheads would be the item
of accountability. He said what Russia provided was a
preliminary MOU. When a decision was made about whether
warheads would be the item of accountability, that data
would be added. He also said the MOU would have site
diagram information and other items included in Annex J to
the current START MOU.

--------------
KEY RUSSIAN CONCERNS
--------------


11. (S) Koshelev told Ries that the matter of counting
rules was going to be the biggest issue. We needed to
think about how to handle it and other sensitive political
issues. Some would have to go to the chief negotiators but
he anticipated some going "to the top."


12. (S) Buzhinskiy told Ries that he saw the biggest
issues for the negotiation as conventional missiles and
missile defense.


13. (S) Koshelev told Trout that the concern about U.S.
up-load capability was, in his view, a false issue because
the United States and Russia would never go to nuclear
war. For the same reason, there was no need to have a
large number of transparency provisions in the new treaty.
Koshelev said that, given that the United States was the
major power, transparency helped the United States more
than it helped Russia. Koshelev also told Trout the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not been a major
player in developing the Russian positions on the START
Follow-on treaty. He said the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
has been the driving force behind their current positions.


14. (S) Venevtsev volunteered to Elliott that the United
States was not listening to Russian concerns about
ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. Elliott
reminded him that the United States had tabled a proposal
to permit non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, but to
count them as if they were nuclear warheads. Elliott
restated the U.S. position that we could not agree to a
prohibition.

--------------
COLD WAR THINKING
--------------


15. (S) Kuznetsov asked Brown why the U.S. draft treaty
appears to have been drafted based on Cold War thinking and
wondered what the United States was concerned about: did
we trust each other or not? He said that START had been
drafted at a very different time in U.S.-Russian relations
and, even though he saw the necessity, given the short
amount of time left to negotiate the new treaty, to use
large portions of the START text, that did not mean that
all of the basic concepts behind START had to be included,
particularly those having to do with intrusive
verification. He said that having such provisions in a
treaty at this time would suggest that both sides were
concerned that the other would cheat. He claimed this
could be the only reason for the inclusion of telemetry
provisions in the new treaty; that the U.S. side thought
that the Russian side would cheat. However, U.S. national
technical means (NTM) could already verify that and, if
there was a need for clarification of an ambiguity, the
United States could always raise the issue in the Bilateral
Consultation Commission (BCC).


16. (S) Kuznetsov allowed that the exchange of telemetry
tapes might be acceptable as a confidence-building measure,
but on a voluntary basis. Malyugin offered that perhaps
there could be some criteria established for when telemetry
tapes needed to be handed over, but Kuznetsov interrupted
him, saying that it would take years of negotiating to get
the criteria right. Brown asked what would happen if the
sides were unable to agree in the BCC on the need for the
telemetry tape exchange. Kuznetsov returned to the idea
that times have changed, and he again asked about the
purpose of telemetry tape exchange anyway. Brown noted
that telemetry tape exchange provided transparency on the
development of new types; Kuznetsov responded that there
was already sufficient information provided in
notifications concerning new types.


17. (S) Kuznetsov, who had been on the Soviet START
delegation, noted to Brown that perhaps all those Americans
and Russians who had been involved in this field during the
Cold War, such as the two of them, should be replaced by
the new generation--pointing to Malyugin and Vorontsov--who
did not approach the United States and the whole issue of
nuclear weapons with the same degree of apprehension and
distrust, saying that perhaps they could come up with a
simplified treaty more easily. Kuznetsov said that another
reason that it was so unfortunate that the U.S. draft had
retained so much of the Cold War thinking was that there is
not sufficient time to engage in such discussions if the
intent was to conclude the negotiations before the
expiration of START, recalling that, during the endgame of
START in 1991, it took almost three months just to conform
the text and prepare it for signature, after most of the
fundamental issues had been resolved.

--------------
BULLS-EYE ON THE
TELEMETRY GROUP CHAIR
--------------


18. (S) Gathered with Venevtsev and Luchaninov, Kuznetsov
told Siemon that Russia will never again agree to provide
unencrypted telemetry. He said telemetry was forced on the
Soviet Union at the end of the START negotiations and that
the United States needs to back away from old proposals in
the new treaty. Venevtsev added that providing telemetry
data is too complicated, resulting in too much discussion
in the JCIC, and was not supported by the MOD and other
agencies concerned with the protection of information.
When Siemon asked about the impact of telemetry on
transparency, predictability and stability, Venevtsev
responded that the United States simply wants to collect
information more easily. Luchaninov stated that telemetry
provides information that can easily be collected by NTM,
and providing it separately is unnecessary.


19. (S) In a separate conversation in front of Luchaninov,
Smirnov told Siemon that telemetry data can be collected by
NTM, it is costly to prepare for transmission, and results
in difficult, lengthy discussions in the JCIC that are
totally unnecessary. He indicated that all of the reasons
for the provision of telemetry had been removed from the
U.S. draft text. When Siemon asked about new types,
Smirnov confirmed that NTM could provide any necessary
information and that the military would definitely not
agree to allow the transfer of telemetric information.


20. (C) Luchaninov reemphasized that NTM can easily
collect telemetry. More pointedly, he commented that the
United States sought telemetry as a transparency measure,
but that it was a guise to more easily collect
information. When Siemon asked about the Russian
confidence-building proposal, Luchaninov commented that the
Russian-proposed draft would be short, contain voluntary
measures and that telemetry would not be one of the listed
measures. He also doubted that the provision of telemetry
was useful for transparency, predictability and strategic
stability.


21. (C) In yet another conversation, Leontiev confirmed to
Siemon that the Russian confidence-building treaty article
would be short and only contain voluntary measures. He
indicated he and Kuznetsov would attend the United Kingdom
P-5 Conference in London on September 4-5 as part of the
Russian Delegation.

--------------
RUSSIAN APPROACH AND DELEGATION:
HOW WILL WE GET IT DONE?
--------------


22. (S) Koshelev agreed with Ries that the working groups
needed to get going. He said Antonov had succeeded in
getting more people from MOD to serve as chairmen, so it
would be possible to have four groups, instead of the three
Russia had proposed earlier in the week. Koshelev noted
that the atmosphere in the JCIC was great and that he hoped
this delegation could work the same way. He admitted to
being nervous about getting things done in time for the
deadline.


23. (S) Zdravecky and Dunn spoke to Leontiev, who
commented that the Russian Delegation for the Fall
negotiations would be essentially the same size and
composition of the delegation that attended the current
negotiating session, with potentially one or two additional
advisors. Russia did not have other experts it could send
to support negotiations. Russia had not engaged in this
type of negotiation for 20 years, and there were few
experts left who understood the substance and approach
taken previously.


24. (S) Regarding text, Leontiev told Dunn and Zdravecky
that the Russian approach was to develop a much shorter
document compared to START. When asked if details
concerning logistical arrangements for inspections would be
included, Leontiev said they would not. However, in
response to a follow-up question concerning, as an example,
parking, security, and refueling for military aircraft that
entered Russia through its eastern point of entry, Leontiev
replied that such information would be needed in the new
treaty. The impression was that Russia had not fully
thought through its approach to delete significant portions
of treaty text.

--------------
WORKING GROUP ON TREATY TEXT
--------------


25. (S) In the initial chairperson's meeting, Koshelev
told Ries that he was concerned about how the work of the
Treaty Group would relate to that of the other working
groups--whether the group would aim to resolve issues or
record the conclusion of discussions related to the text in
other groups. He noted that there were certain issues he
expected would have to be discussed by the heads of
delegation and even higher, up to the Presidential level.


26. (S) Ries and Koshelev agreed that some key
concerns--such as the counting rules--probably would have
to be resolved by others, but that the Treaty Group could
take the initiative to work on other sections of the main
treaty text in the meantime. Koshelev stated the Russian
view was that the preamble should contain new text so that
it appeared "fresher," rather than a repetition of language
from older treaties. They also agreed that the Treaty
Group would begin meeting early in the next round, although
Koshelev noted that he would not be present for the first
week; he had to stay in Moscow to serve as Acting Director
while Antonov was in Geneva and the other deputies were out
of town (UNGA, First Committee).


27. (S) Ries and Koshelev began a paragraph-by-paragraph
review of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of the
Preamble, dated August 31, 2009.

- In the second preambular paragraph ("Committed to the
fulfillment...."),both Ries and Koshelev noted that some
of the differences appeared to be stylistic and should be
able to be resolved in a drafting session. Koshelev also
noted that perhaps the working group could think of
something a bit stronger than just mentioning Article VI of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),something that would
send a different signal, commenting that it had been a huge
accomplishment by the MFA to have President Medvedev come
out in favor of eliminating all nuclear weapons eventually,
and that he would try to find something that would reflect
that goal for the preamble and present it to the U.S.
side. The two chairs also discussed the possibility of
using something from President Obama's speech concerning a
world free of nuclear weapons.

- In the third preambular paragraph ("Conscious that
nuclear war would have devastating consequences...") and
the seventh preambular paragraph ("Convinced that the
measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms...."),Koshelev stated that it was a bit odd
that the possibility of nuclear war would be mentioned in
this treaty, given that there was no ideological
confrontation between the United States and Russia any
more, and there was no fear of nuclear war between the two
countries. He added that such language would frighten some
delegations to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and
encourage them to continue to insist on a plan of work
concerning the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, a plan
that he claimed neither the U.S. nor Russian CD Delegations
supported.

- In the fourth preambular paragraph ("Endeavoring to
reduce the role...."),the two chairs acknowledged that
some of the differences appeared to be stylistic and should
be easily resolvable. In response to a question as to why
the word "nuclear" would not be acceptable to the Russian
side in front of the word "non-proliferation," Koshelev
claimed that the more general concept of non-proliferation
meant all weapons of mass destruction (WMD),which would
include such situations as the development of chemical
weapons by countries like Egypt and Syria to counter the
nuclear forces of Israel.

- In the eleventh preambular paragraph ('Recognizing the
interrelationship....'),Koshelev noted that this would be
for resolution at a higher level, and that the most the
working group could do would be to discuss it, while
admitting that, as a general matter, the sides should stick
as closely as they could to the formulations from the July
6 Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents.

- Concerning the Russian-proposed preambular paragraph that
contained a reference to the principle of "equal security,"
Ries recalled Gottemoeller's comments in the plenary about
that phrase. The sides discussed the possibility of
drawing from Presidents Obama and Medvedev's April 1, 2009
Joint Understanding to find a more suitable formulation
("mutually enhance the security of the Parties and
predictability and stability in strategic offensive
forces....").

--------------
WORKING GROUP ON
INSPECTION PROTOCOL
--------------


28. (S) Ilin told Warner that Russia would provide its
draft Inspection Protocol by the end of the following
week. Like others, Ilin noted that resolution of the
issues of counting rules, strategic delivery vehicles, and
deployed strategic nuclear warheads would affect what could
be discussed in the Inspection Group. Notably, Ilin stated
that, if the concept of deployed warheads were adopted, the
treaty would have to include limits and inspections of
non-deployed warheads.


29. (S) Regarding Russia's draft Inspection Protocol, Ilin
said it would be only 20-25 pages, much shorter than the
U.S. version and that it would cut back substantially on
the number of all types of inspections. A greater number
was not necessary given the current state of relations
between Russia and the United States, and Russia wanted to
save money. Warner rebutted that, for the U.S. Senate to
give advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, it
would have to contain sufficient verification.


30. (S) On the early work of the Inspection Group, Ilin
and Warner agreed the "administrative" or "logistical"
portions of the Inspection Protocol could be discussed
first, while awaiting decisions on bigger issues that would
affect the sections on conducting each type of inspection.
Warner and Ilin committed to consider before the next round
which other portions of the Protocol could be taken up
early in the next round. Warner also said the United
States would send its draft of the Inspection Protocol
annexes shortly.

--------------
WORKING GROUPS ON
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION
AND NOTIFICATIONS
--------------


31. (S) Elliott reiterated that the United States would
transmit its draft Conversion or Elimination (C or E)
Protocol, which is approximately 13 pages long, on
September 14. Smirnov agreed in general with U.S.
principles on C or E as contained in the U.S.-proposed
treaty text and hoped that around September 14 Russia could
provide its own draft C or E Protocol. He highlighted that
the Russian approach might be different: the Russian basis
is that each Party will determine its elimination
procedures. Russia did not want to include specific
procedures in the Protocol.


32. (S) Smirnov said that only scientific and technical
means of verification were needed to confirm that
elimination was completed. He claimed that the key would
be notifications and that Russia would propose retaining
three types of C or E= related notifications: on intent to
eliminate; initiation of the elimination process; and
completion of the elimination process. If there were
ambiguities, each Party would reserve the right to
inspect. Smirnov introduced a new concept for visits
rather than inspections to confirm eliminations; Russia
believed this would be a much milder aspect than
inspections and less costly. (Begin comment: This is
reminiscent of the concept proposed by the United States in
post-START text provided on October 23, 2008. End
comment.)


33. (S) Smirnov further elaborated that he expects a lot
more differences with conversions. For instance he did not
understand a technical way to convert a mobile missile; the
only way to convert would be to take the missile off a
launcher and put on a new missile.


34. (S) On notifications, Siemon mentioned that the
Russians should also receive the U.S.-proposed text around
September 14. Siemon and Smirnov discussed when to hold
Notification Working Group meetings and ultimately agreed
that the skeleton of the Protocol could be done in advance
while the specific notifications would be built in along
the way.

--------------
WORKING GROUP ON MOU
--------------


35. (S) Orlov and Trout discussed how the MOU Working
Group would schedule its meetings and how completing the
MOU text would be dependent on decisions made in other
groups. They agreed to plan for one meeting of the MOU
Working Group in each of the first 2 weeks of the next
round. They shared the hope that those two meetings would
clarify the areas of agreement and disagreement.
Thereafter, they would decide whether to have additional
meetings or, if the resolution of the remaining differences
awaited decisions in other working groups, the MOU Working
Group would stop meeting until those differences were
resolved. Orlov told Trout that Russia would transmit its
draft MOU during the week of September 14.


36. (S) On the margins of the working group meetings,
Kotkova asked Brown whether there was a reason why the
database for the treaty had to be contained in an MOU as
opposed to a protocol, noting that she had been asked this
by members of her Delegation who were uneasy with calling
it an MOU, as though it somehow had a different legal
status. Brown responded that the MOU format had come
directly from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
and he thought that it had been used in other arms control
instruments, stating that he would try to provide more
information to her at the next session.

--------------
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
--------------


37. (C) General Buzhinskiy was not sure whether he would
be participating in further work on START Follow-on as he
was retiring at the end of the month. He was considering
working at the MOD, the MFA (said he was getting a lot of
pressure to work for the latter) or in the private sector.
He told Ries what he claimed was a secret, that he does not
get along with the MOD.


38. (C) Mr. Leontiev was serving at NATO Headquarters as
part of the first Soviet Liaison Office in 1991 and was on
vacation in Moscow during the August 1991 coup attempt. He
was in Brussels for a total of five years. He is
comfortable in English.


39. (C) Maria (Masha) Ivanova (Executive Secretary) has
been to Geneva for three prior rounds of arms control
talks. She speaks English, German, and French, with
proficiency in that order. She is engaged to be married,
and only wants one child. She thinks this is a great
experience, and hopes to tell her grandchildren she was
part of this historic event.


40. (C) Mrs. Irina Kotkova (Legal Advisor) became a lawyer
because her older brother was a lawyer. Her father is
retired from the military, and he and Kotkova's mother are
pensioners. She has been married for around four years.
She has no children, but has a cat of which she is quite
fond. She said her husband is unhappy that she is gone so
much and she thinks Geneva is not very interesting because
she has been here so much.


41. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
CLINTON