START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATI0NS, GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 094672 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC DEPT FOR T/ VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS/OP-OSA AND DIFRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: KACT PARM MARR PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATI0NS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, SEPTEMBER 1,2009 AND INITIAL MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUP CHAIRS, SEPTEMBER 2, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-004. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 1, 2009 Event: U.S.-hosted Reception Time: 7:30 to 9:00 P.M. Place: 41 Quai Wilson, Geneva (U) Meeting Date: September 2, 2009 Event: Initial Meetings of WG Chairs Time: 5:20 to 5:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. Chairs Russian Chairs Amb Ries Mr. Koshelev - Treaties and Definitions WG Dr. Warner Col Ilin - Inspecion Protocol (IP) WG Mr. Elliott Mr. Smirnov - Conversion or Elimination (CorE) WG Mr, Siemon Mr, Smirnov - Notifications WG Mr. Trout MGen Orlov - Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) WG -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On September 1, 2009, the U.S. Delegation hosted a reception for the Russian Delegation. U.S. Delegation members engaged their counterparts regarding specific substantive issues and the structure, timing, and nature of the work to be conducted when the START Follow-on Negotiations continue in late September. Specific topics discussed at the reception were the difficulty of resolving the issue of counting rules for the new treaty, possible compromises on the warhead limits for the treaty, the treaty preamble--specifically the Russian position on "equal security" as expressed in meetings during this session and the difference between "defensive" and "strategic defensive" systems, and other key Russian concerns. ¶4. (S) After the final meeting on September 2, the U.S. working group chairs met with their Russian counterparts to discuss plans for organizing the delegations' work when the next round begins in late September. For the most part, these informal meetings continued or repeated conversations from the previous evening's reception. Notable topics included which areas of disagreement would be tackled in the working groups versus by the heads of delegation at plenary meetings, homework to prepare for starting on September 21, and papers that would be exchanged before the next round. -------------- PREAMBLE--EQUAL SECURITY -------------- ¶5. (S) On the margins of the working group meeting, and continuing the points that Gottemoeller had made during the earlier meeting, Brown noted to Kotkova that one of the concerns that the U.S. side had with the formulation "equal security" was that it was used by Russian officials and non-governmental experts as a shorthand way to incorporate a number of Russian positions, including some related to the subject of these negotiations, such as uploading and the ban on conventional warheads, and some not related, such as deployment of weapons in space and missile defense. ¶6. (S) Kotkova asked whether the Russian Delegation could make it clear that the phrase was used only in the context of this treaty, and the U.S. Delegation could go on the record that this was its understanding as well. Brown discouraged such an approach, noting that the phrase had also been used in SALT II, and its repetition in this treaty would lead only to unnecessary explanations and clarifications during the U.S. ratification process. He encouraged her to find other ways to express this thought, noting that "equal rights" or "mutual security" might be a way out of this situation. She responded that there were perhaps some principles of international law having to do with sovereignty that might be useful in this regard and she said that she would research it as homework. -------------- PREAMBLE--STRATEGIC DEFENSE -------------- ¶7. (S) Venevtsev expressed surprise to Elliott that the Russian-proposed language on the interrelationship between strategic offense and defense for the preamble and closing provisions was interpreted by the United States as a limitation on ballistic missile defense (BMD). Elliott confirmed the U.S. Delegation's view of the Russian-proposed language. ¶8. (S) Hartford discussed with Luchaninov (in the presence of Vorontsov) the difference in the U.S. Joint Draft Text (JDT) preamble language on strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms and the Russian concerns over the United States "changing" the language from the Presidential Joint Understanding. Luchaninov relayed that when the United States removed the word "strategic" from the term "defensive arms," the Russian side thought the United States changed the intent to include tactical defensive weapons. Hartford explained that the U.S. proposal was meant to accurately reflect the Joint Understanding while removing the repeating word "strategic." In the U.S. text, Hartford explained, the term "strategic" modified both the words "offensive" and "defensive" arms. It appeared to Hartford that both the interpreter and Luchaninov gained an appreciation of the U.S. proposal and had previously not understood the apparent change in the U.S. language. -------------- WARHEADS -------------- ¶9. (S) Venevtsev inquired as to Elliott's view on "the numbers." Elliott reminded him again of the July 5, 2009 offer by the United States to lower the U.S. proposal on strategic delivery vehicles by 200 if the Russians would raise their position by two hundred, i.e., 700-900. Venevtsev indicated that the U.S. offer was not low enough, to which Elliott responded, "There is only one significant number in between" (meaning 800). At this statement, Venevtsev raised his glass and said, "Yes." Elliott took this to mean that 800 would be an acceptable number for strategic delivery vehicles. ¶10. (S) General Orlov told Trout there was no warhead data in the Russian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) because it had not been decided whether warheads would be the item of accountability. He said what Russia provided was a preliminary MOU. When a decision was made about whether warheads would be the item of accountability, that data would be added. He also said the MOU would have site diagram information and other items included in Annex J to the current START MOU. -------------- KEY RUSSIAN CONCERNS -------------- ¶11. (S) Koshelev told Ries that the matter of counting rules was going to be the biggest issue. We needed to think about how to handle it and other sensitive political issues. Some would have to go to the chief negotiators but he anticipated some going "to the top." ¶12. (S) Buzhinskiy told Ries that he saw the biggest issues for the negotiation as conventional missiles and missile defense. ¶13. (S) Koshelev told Trout that the concern about U.S. up-load capability was, in his view, a false issue because the United States and Russia would never go to nuclear war. For the same reason, there was no need to have a large number of transparency provisions in the new treaty. Koshelev said that, given that the United States was the major power, transparency helped the United States more than it helped Russia. Koshelev also told Trout the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not been a major player in developing the Russian positions on the START Follow-on treaty. He said the Ministry of Defense (MOD) has been the driving force behind their current positions. ¶14. (S) Venevtsev volunteered to Elliott that the United States was not listening to Russian concerns about ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. Elliott reminded him that the United States had tabled a proposal to permit non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, but to count them as if they were nuclear warheads. Elliott restated the U.S. position that we could not agree to a prohibition. -------------- COLD WAR THINKING -------------- ¶15. (S) Kuznetsov asked Brown why the U.S. draft treaty appears to have been drafted based on Cold War thinking and wondered what the United States was concerned about: did we trust each other or not? He said that START had been drafted at a very different time in U.S.-Russian relations and, even though he saw the necessity, given the short amount of time left to negotiate the new treaty, to use large portions of the START text, that did not mean that all of the basic concepts behind START had to be included, particularly those having to do with intrusive verification. He said that having such provisions in a treaty at this time would suggest that both sides were concerned that the other would cheat. He claimed this could be the only reason for the inclusion of telemetry provisions in the new treaty; that the U.S. side thought that the Russian side would cheat. However, U.S. national technical means (NTM) could already verify that and, if there was a need for clarification of an ambiguity, the United States could always raise the issue in the Bilateral Consultation Commission (BCC). ¶16. (S) Kuznetsov allowed that the exchange of telemetry tapes might be acceptable as a confidence-building measure, but on a voluntary basis. Malyugin offered that perhaps there could be some criteria established for when telemetry tapes needed to be handed over, but Kuznetsov interrupted him, saying that it would take years of negotiating to get the criteria right. Brown asked what would happen if the sides were unable to agree in the BCC on the need for the telemetry tape exchange. Kuznetsov returned to the idea that times have changed, and he again asked about the purpose of telemetry tape exchange anyway. Brown noted that telemetry tape exchange provided transparency on the development of new types; Kuznetsov responded that there was already sufficient information provided in notifications concerning new types. ¶17. (S) Kuznetsov, who had been on the Soviet START delegation, noted to Brown that perhaps all those Americans and Russians who had been involved in this field during the Cold War, such as the two of them, should be replaced by the new generation--pointing to Malyugin and Vorontsov--who did not approach the United States and the whole issue of nuclear weapons with the same degree of apprehension and distrust, saying that perhaps they could come up with a simplified treaty more easily. Kuznetsov said that another reason that it was so unfortunate that the U.S. draft had retained so much of the Cold War thinking was that there is not sufficient time to engage in such discussions if the intent was to conclude the negotiations before the expiration of START, recalling that, during the endgame of START in 1991, it took almost three months just to conform the text and prepare it for signature, after most of the fundamental issues had been resolved. -------------- BULLS-EYE ON THE TELEMETRY GROUP CHAIR -------------- ¶18. (S) Gathered with Venevtsev and Luchaninov, Kuznetsov told Siemon that Russia will never again agree to provide unencrypted telemetry. He said telemetry was forced on the Soviet Union at the end of the START negotiations and that the United States needs to back away from old proposals in the new treaty. Venevtsev added that providing telemetry data is too complicated, resulting in too much discussion in the JCIC, and was not supported by the MOD and other agencies concerned with the protection of information. When Siemon asked about the impact of telemetry on transparency, predictability and stability, Venevtsev responded that the United States simply wants to collect information more easily. Luchaninov stated that telemetry provides information that can easily be collected by NTM, and providing it separately is unnecessary. ¶19. (S) In a separate conversation in front of Luchaninov, Smirnov told Siemon that telemetry data can be collected by NTM, it is costly to prepare for transmission, and results in difficult, lengthy discussions in the JCIC that are totally unnecessary. He indicated that all of the reasons for the provision of telemetry had been removed from the U.S. draft text. When Siemon asked about new types, Smirnov confirmed that NTM could provide any necessary information and that the military would definitely not agree to allow the transfer of telemetric information. ¶20. (C) Luchaninov reemphasized that NTM can easily collect telemetry. More pointedly, he commented that the United States sought telemetry as a transparency measure, but that it was a guise to more easily collect information. When Siemon asked about the Russian confidence-building proposal, Luchaninov commented that the Russian-proposed draft would be short, contain voluntary measures and that telemetry would not be one of the listed measures. He also doubted that the provision of telemetry was useful for transparency, predictability and strategic stability. ¶21. (C) In yet another conversation, Leontiev confirmed to Siemon that the Russian confidence-building treaty article would be short and only contain voluntary measures. He indicated he and Kuznetsov would attend the United Kingdom P-5 Conference in London on September 4-5 as part of the Russian Delegation. -------------- RUSSIAN APPROACH AND DELEGATION: HOW WILL WE GET IT DONE? -------------- ¶22. (S) Koshelev agreed with Ries that the working groups needed to get going. He said Antonov had succeeded in getting more people from MOD to serve as chairmen, so it would be possible to have four groups, instead of the three Russia had proposed earlier in the week. Koshelev noted that the atmosphere in the JCIC was great and that he hoped this delegation could work the same way. He admitted to being nervous about getting things done in time for the deadline. ¶23. (S) Zdravecky and Dunn spoke to Leontiev, who commented that the Russian Delegation for the Fall negotiations would be essentially the same size and composition of the delegation that attended the current negotiating session, with potentially one or two additional advisors. Russia did not have other experts it could send to support negotiations. Russia had not engaged in this type of negotiation for 20 years, and there were few experts left who understood the substance and approach taken previously. ¶24. (S) Regarding text, Leontiev told Dunn and Zdravecky that the Russian approach was to develop a much shorter document compared to START. When asked if details concerning logistical arrangements for inspections would be included, Leontiev said they would not. However, in response to a follow-up question concerning, as an example, parking, security, and refueling for military aircraft that entered Russia through its eastern point of entry, Leontiev replied that such information would be needed in the new treaty. The impression was that Russia had not fully thought through its approach to delete significant portions of treaty text. -------------- WORKING GROUP ON TREATY TEXT -------------- ¶25. (S) In the initial chairperson's meeting, Koshelev told Ries that he was concerned about how the work of the Treaty Group would relate to that of the other working groups--whether the group would aim to resolve issues or record the conclusion of discussions related to the text in other groups. He noted that there were certain issues he expected would have to be discussed by the heads of delegation and even higher, up to the Presidential level. ¶26. (S) Ries and Koshelev agreed that some key concerns--such as the counting rules--probably would have to be resolved by others, but that the Treaty Group could take the initiative to work on other sections of the main treaty text in the meantime. Koshelev stated the Russian view was that the preamble should contain new text so that it appeared "fresher," rather than a repetition of language from older treaties. They also agreed that the Treaty Group would begin meeting early in the next round, although Koshelev noted that he would not be present for the first week; he had to stay in Moscow to serve as Acting Director while Antonov was in Geneva and the other deputies were out of town (UNGA, First Committee). ¶27. (S) Ries and Koshelev began a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, dated August 31, 2009. - In the second preambular paragraph ("Committed to the fulfillment...."),both Ries and Koshelev noted that some of the differences appeared to be stylistic and should be able to be resolved in a drafting session. Koshelev also noted that perhaps the working group could think of something a bit stronger than just mentioning Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),something that would send a different signal, commenting that it had been a huge accomplishment by the MFA to have President Medvedev come out in favor of eliminating all nuclear weapons eventually, and that he would try to find something that would reflect that goal for the preamble and present it to the U.S. side. The two chairs also discussed the possibility of using something from President Obama's speech concerning a world free of nuclear weapons. - In the third preambular paragraph ("Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences...") and the seventh preambular paragraph ("Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms...."),Koshelev stated that it was a bit odd that the possibility of nuclear war would be mentioned in this treaty, given that there was no ideological confrontation between the United States and Russia any more, and there was no fear of nuclear war between the two countries. He added that such language would frighten some delegations to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and encourage them to continue to insist on a plan of work concerning the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, a plan that he claimed neither the U.S. nor Russian CD Delegations supported. - In the fourth preambular paragraph ("Endeavoring to reduce the role...."),the two chairs acknowledged that some of the differences appeared to be stylistic and should be easily resolvable. In response to a question as to why the word "nuclear" would not be acceptable to the Russian side in front of the word "non-proliferation," Koshelev claimed that the more general concept of non-proliferation meant all weapons of mass destruction (WMD),which would include such situations as the development of chemical weapons by countries like Egypt and Syria to counter the nuclear forces of Israel. - In the eleventh preambular paragraph ('Recognizing the interrelationship....'),Koshelev noted that this would be for resolution at a higher level, and that the most the working group could do would be to discuss it, while admitting that, as a general matter, the sides should stick as closely as they could to the formulations from the July 6 Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents. - Concerning the Russian-proposed preambular paragraph that contained a reference to the principle of "equal security," Ries recalled Gottemoeller's comments in the plenary about that phrase. The sides discussed the possibility of drawing from Presidents Obama and Medvedev's April 1, 2009 Joint Understanding to find a more suitable formulation ("mutually enhance the security of the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces...."). -------------- WORKING GROUP ON INSPECTION PROTOCOL -------------- ¶28. (S) Ilin told Warner that Russia would provide its draft Inspection Protocol by the end of the following week. Like others, Ilin noted that resolution of the issues of counting rules, strategic delivery vehicles, and deployed strategic nuclear warheads would affect what could be discussed in the Inspection Group. Notably, Ilin stated that, if the concept of deployed warheads were adopted, the treaty would have to include limits and inspections of non-deployed warheads. ¶29. (S) Regarding Russia's draft Inspection Protocol, Ilin said it would be only 20-25 pages, much shorter than the U.S. version and that it would cut back substantially on the number of all types of inspections. A greater number was not necessary given the current state of relations between Russia and the United States, and Russia wanted to save money. Warner rebutted that, for the U.S. Senate to give advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, it would have to contain sufficient verification. ¶30. (S) On the early work of the Inspection Group, Ilin and Warner agreed the "administrative" or "logistical" portions of the Inspection Protocol could be discussed first, while awaiting decisions on bigger issues that would affect the sections on conducting each type of inspection. Warner and Ilin committed to consider before the next round which other portions of the Protocol could be taken up early in the next round. Warner also said the United States would send its draft of the Inspection Protocol annexes shortly. -------------- WORKING GROUPS ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND NOTIFICATIONS -------------- ¶31. (S) Elliott reiterated that the United States would transmit its draft Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol, which is approximately 13 pages long, on September 14. Smirnov agreed in general with U.S. principles on C or E as contained in the U.S.-proposed treaty text and hoped that around September 14 Russia could provide its own draft C or E Protocol. He highlighted that the Russian approach might be different: the Russian basis is that each Party will determine its elimination procedures. Russia did not want to include specific procedures in the Protocol. ¶32. (S) Smirnov said that only scientific and technical means of verification were needed to confirm that elimination was completed. He claimed that the key would be notifications and that Russia would propose retaining three types of C or E= related notifications: on intent to eliminate; initiation of the elimination process; and completion of the elimination process. If there were ambiguities, each Party would reserve the right to inspect. Smirnov introduced a new concept for visits rather than inspections to confirm eliminations; Russia believed this would be a much milder aspect than inspections and less costly. (Begin comment: This is reminiscent of the concept proposed by the United States in post-START text provided on October 23, 2008. End comment.) ¶33. (S) Smirnov further elaborated that he expects a lot more differences with conversions. For instance he did not understand a technical way to convert a mobile missile; the only way to convert would be to take the missile off a launcher and put on a new missile. ¶34. (S) On notifications, Siemon mentioned that the Russians should also receive the U.S.-proposed text around September 14. Siemon and Smirnov discussed when to hold Notification Working Group meetings and ultimately agreed that the skeleton of the Protocol could be done in advance while the specific notifications would be built in along the way. -------------- WORKING GROUP ON MOU -------------- ¶35. (S) Orlov and Trout discussed how the MOU Working Group would schedule its meetings and how completing the MOU text would be dependent on decisions made in other groups. They agreed to plan for one meeting of the MOU Working Group in each of the first 2 weeks of the next round. They shared the hope that those two meetings would clarify the areas of agreement and disagreement. Thereafter, they would decide whether to have additional meetings or, if the resolution of the remaining differences awaited decisions in other working groups, the MOU Working Group would stop meeting until those differences were resolved. Orlov told Trout that Russia would transmit its draft MOU during the week of September 14. ¶36. (S) On the margins of the working group meetings, Kotkova asked Brown whether there was a reason why the database for the treaty had to be contained in an MOU as opposed to a protocol, noting that she had been asked this by members of her Delegation who were uneasy with calling it an MOU, as though it somehow had a different legal status. Brown responded that the MOU format had come directly from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and he thought that it had been used in other arms control instruments, stating that he would try to provide more information to her at the next session. -------------- BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION -------------- ¶37. (C) General Buzhinskiy was not sure whether he would be participating in further work on START Follow-on as he was retiring at the end of the month. He was considering working at the MOD, the MFA (said he was getting a lot of pressure to work for the latter) or in the private sector. He told Ries what he claimed was a secret, that he does not get along with the MOD. ¶38. (C) Mr. Leontiev was serving at NATO Headquarters as part of the first Soviet Liaison Office in 1991 and was on vacation in Moscow during the August 1991 coup attempt. He was in Brussels for a total of five years. He is comfortable in English. ¶39. (C) Maria (Masha) Ivanova (Executive Secretary) has been to Geneva for three prior rounds of arms control talks. She speaks English, German, and French, with proficiency in that order. She is engaged to be married, and only wants one child. She thinks this is a great experience, and hopes to tell her grandchildren she was part of this historic event. ¶40. (C) Mrs. Irina Kotkova (Legal Advisor) became a lawyer because her older brother was a lawyer. Her father is retired from the military, and he and Kotkova's mother are pensioners. She has been married for around four years. She has no children, but has a cat of which she is quite fond. She said her husband is unhappy that she is gone so much and she thinks Geneva is not very interesting because she has been here so much. ¶41. (U) Gottemoeller sends. CLINTON