START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATI0NS, GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 094665 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC DEPT FOR T/ VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS/OP-OSA AND DIFRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: KACT PARM MARR PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATI0NS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 2, 2009 SESSION REF: A. GENEVA 617 (SFO-GVA-III-02) ¶B. STATE 91093 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/1) ¶C. STATE 91284 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/2) ¶D. STATE 91291 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/3) ¶E. STATE 91106 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/4) ¶F. STATE 91134 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/5) ¶G. STATE 91143 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/6) ¶H. STATE 91151 (SUPP GUIDANCE/US-PROPOSED IP/7) ¶I. GENEVA 743 (SFO-GVA-IV-014) (READER'S GUIDE TO IP) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-005. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 2, 2009 Time: 11:00 a.m. - 1:05 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Russian Delegation presented two papers for consideration by the United States: the first, a Joint Declaration ON the Expiration of the START Treaty and, the second, a draft United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution ON Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New Framework for Strategic Relations. The Russians explained that the draft UN resolution was based on the paper the Russian Delegation had provided in the previous session in July. (Reporting of the draft UNGA resolution is reported septel.) Regarding the Joint Declaration, the Russian Delegation explained that, since Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had all expressed concerns with the expiration of START, Russia felt it was a good idea to use such a document to provide confirmation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum ON Security Assurances, but not to revise those assurances. The Russian Delegation was seeking U.S. views ON how to organize the Joint Declaration and questioned how it should be presented to the other countries; whether it should be a surprise or should it be a joint declaration coordinated among all of the original five START Parties. ¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation gave a presentation ON the U.S.-proposed Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring. The U.S. Delegation explained that the United States had been guided by the general rule that we should strive to maintain as much of the information contained in the Inspection Protocol from the START Treaty as appropriate, since the Parties had been able to work together very effectively in conducting inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring for the last 15 years. The United States had made a series of changes to its draft version that reflected lessons learned during START implementation, the deletion of certain types of inspections, and the addition of new procedures for nuclear warhead inspections for START Follow-on specific inspections. ¶5. (S) The Russian Delegation identified the four working groups and their chairs: Treaty Text and Definitions, chaired by Mr. Koshelev; Inspections, chaired by Colonel Ilin; Conversion or Elimination and Notifications chaired by Colonel Ryzhkov; and, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) chaired by General Orlov. -------------- AGENDA -------------- ¶6. (S) Gottemoeller opened the morning session by stating that there were some leftover issues from the previous meeting that needed to be discussed. The first was the issue of the Joint Declaration ON the expiration of START and the second issue was the Russian proposal for a draft resolution to the UNGA. Finally, the U.S. Delegation was prepared to present the U.S.-proposed draft of the Inspection Protocol. ¶7. (S) Antonov agreed, and also asked whether it was correct that the discussion related to the issues of equal security and telemetry would be delayed until the September 21 session. Gottemoeller responded that she was pleased to see that Antonov was willing to discuss telemetry in our negotiations. She believed it was important to discuss the three issues she had mentioned for the morning meeting, and perhaps there would be time to discuss the issues of equal security and telemetry in the afternoon meeting. Antonov agreed. -------------- RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE START TREATY -------------- ¶8. (S) Antonov asked that the United States consider adopting a Joint Declaration ON the expiration of the START Treaty that would reaffirm security assurances from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum ON Security Assurances to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. These three states have concerns regarding the expiration of START, and have indicated a desire to participate at the negotiating table for the START Follow-on treaty. One even mentioned their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); any hint of withdrawal from the NPT should be dismissed. Ukraine, in particular, has continued to raise questions about the Budapest Memorandum. While Belarus and Kazakhstan do not oppose a document which would relate only to Ukraine, Russia was against the idea of revising the assurances that were provided in 1994. Regarding what could be said about Treaty implementation, Russia believes that these states have implemented their obligations under START sufficiently. The content of the declaration could include: - Welcome successful implementation of START, including the participation in START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; - Appreciation for full implementation of obligations under the Lisbon Protocol to START; and - Highlight steps taken under START to remove all nuclear weapons from their territories and their accession to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. ON the eve of the NPT Review Conference, it would be important to stress their accession to the NPT and the positive effect that this has on international peace and strategic stability: the voluntary nature of their status as non-nuclear weapon states strengthens the security of these states. ¶9. (S) Finally, Antonov stated Russia has proposed clear, simple language that would reaffirm the security assurances from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum; the Russian proposal is only one page and four paragraphs in length. While handing over the proposed Joint Declaration, Antonov encouraged the United States to study it before the next session, and to think about how it should be adopted. Should it be signed at the Foreign Minister level? Should it be signed ON December 4/5, the date of START's expiration, or perhaps before or after that date? He said that it was also important to consider how Russia and the United States should engage these countries ON this issue, and whether they should be allowed to comment ON the draft. In conclusion, Antonov said he was open to any of the options and he looked forward to the U.S response. ¶10. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the Russian Delegation for drafting the proposed Joint Declaration and said she would study it in Washington. She believed it was a good idea, and had begun initial discussions of this approach in Washington. She said Antonov had raised very important questions regarding how the document should be organized and that she would consider them. Her initial personal reaction was that it might be a good idea to sign the declaration as part of the celebratory activities associated with the signing of the START Follow-on treaty. It was important to consider how Russia and the United States could involve Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in a positive endgame of the START treaty. ¶11. (S) Finally, Gottemoeller recalled Ukraine's strong interest in the Conference ON Disarmament in pursuing legally-binding security assurances. She said the United States was conducting, as part of the Nuclear Posture Review, a review of major doctrinal issues including security assurances. She said that she would keep Antonov apprised of the progress of the Posture Review and would provide the U.S. reaction to the proposed Joint Declaration at the next session. -------------- PRESENTATION OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS, EXHIBITIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING -------------- ¶12. (S) Warner introduced the U.S.-proposed draft of the Inspection Protocol (REFS B-H) to the Russian Delegation by presenting the following points. Begin text of Points: Changes in the START Follow-on Treaty Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities -- In drafting the Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities for the START Follow-on Treaty, the United States has been guided by the general rule that the Parties should strive to maintain as much of the information contained in the Inspection Protocol (IP) of the original START Treaty as seems appropriate. This reflects the fact that the U.S. and Russian Parties have been able to work very effectively in conducting inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring activities within the framework of the IP over the 15-year life of the START Treaty. -- The right to conduct short-notice on-site inspections ON each of our most sensitive strategic systems was one of the most revolutionary ideas that were negotiated during START. These inspections are very important for confirming the data provided by each Party in the Memorandum of Understanding. We believe it is necessary to retain these inspection provisions as central elements of the START Follow-on Treaty. -- The United States has, however, made a series of changes to our draft version of the IP to the START Follow-on Treaty that reflect: 1) lessons learned during START implementation; 2) our judgment regarding certain types of inspections we believe can be deleted under START Follow-on; and 3) the formulation of new procedures for START Follow-on necessitated by additions in the content of the START Follow-on Treaty. -- The United States recommends the following types of inspections be deleted from the START Follow-on Treaty for the reasons cited with each: - Baseline Data Inspection - This type, in our view, will not be required in light of the carry-over of much of the relevant data from START. New types of data can be confirmed at the initial data update inspections, which we propose will continue to be conducted under the START Follow-on Treaty. - New Facility Inspection. These inspections were very infrequently implemented under START and their purpose can be accomplished using the initial data update inspections at a newly-notified facility. - Suspect-Site Inspection. These inspections as well were infrequently used under START and, in our view, can be deleted. - Post-Exercise Dispersal Inspection. This type of inspection was never implemented during START and we believe that it can be deleted. - Close-Out Inspection. The United States believes this type of inspection can be deleted. However, if either Party has concern about the possible conduct of activities for purposes believed inconsistent with the new Treaty at a facility which has been formally closed-out, that Party can exercise its right to check ON these activities by conducting a Formerly Declared Facility Inspection, which has been retained. - The Reentry Vehicle Inspection has been retained for ICBMs and SLBMs, but renamed the "Nuclear Warhead Inspection" to reflect its wider scope. Under the U.S. approach to the START Follow-on Treaty, it will also be necessary to include confirming the number of nuclear armaments associated with deployed heavy bombers. In addition, in our draft Treaty and the IP, we propose to combine the Nuclear Warhead Inspection and the Data Update Inspection for air bases of deployed heavy bombers into a single inspection which is entitled a "Nuclear Warhead Inspection." -- In light of these recommended deletions, we propose to retain, and in one case rename and combine, the following types of inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring activities: - Data Update Inspection; - Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection renamed Nuclear Warhead Inspection; - Conversion or Elimination Inspection; - Formerly Declared Facility Inspection; - Technical Characteristics Exhibition; - Distinguishing Exhibition; and - Continuous Monitoring Activities. -- Sections II-V of the U.S.-proposed Inspection Protocol retain the administrative matters, the legal status, notifications, transportation arrangements, meals and lodging, equipment and supplies, and cost accounting procedures that were set forth in the START Treaty. There were small edits made in these sections to reflect actual practices based ON our START Treaty implementation experience, as well as to reflect tracking changes in the U.S.-proposed roster of inspections under START Follow-on. -- The most extensive changes to the Inspection Protocol were based ON the changes that are necessary to confirm the actual number of deployed warheads ON ICBMs and SLBMs through the conduct of nuclear warhead inspections. There are two important new aspects to this inspection. - First, the inspecting Party will be fully informed during the pre-inspection briefing of the full load-out of nuclear-armed reentry vehicles for each launcher at the ICBM or SLBM base. - Second, the inspecting Party will be permitted to select up to two ICBMs or SLBMs during each nuclear warhead inspection to confirm the actual number of reentry vehicles loaded ON each. However, in order to lessen the operational impact of the inspection ON the base, the inspection of two missiles/launchers will take place within the same silo launch group, same restricted area, or same ballistic missile submarine. -- Finally, Nuclear Warhead Inspections of deployed heavy bombers and nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with air bases for deployed heavy bombers will be conducted in order to confirm the number of nuclear armaments declared in the Memorandum of Understanding for that air base. End text. ¶13. (S) Warner stated that he had worked closely with the officers who actually conduct START inspections, as well as with the operational weapons systems experts at the bases, in developing the U.S.-proposed Inspection Protocol. He said that it was his view that these experts ON both sides should be available to support the work of the Inspection Protocol Working Group when it begins to meet. He looked forward to working with the members of the Russian Delegation and looked forward to receiving the Russian-proposed draft of the Inspection Protocol. ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller handed over the U.S.-proposed draft of the Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions, and Continuous Monitoring Activities in English. She stated that the Russian translation would be provided the next day. Additionally, Gottemoeller offered the Russian Delegation the Reader's Guide to Changes in the U.S.-proposed Draft of the START Follow-on Treaty Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities that would also be provided the next day (REF I). -------------- DRAMATIC RUSSIAN REACTION TO U.S.-PROPOSED INSPECTION PROTOCOL -------------- ¶15. (S) Buzhinskiy thanked Warner for his presentation. He noted that the Russian side wanted to make the new treaty less expensive and easier to implement, stressing that it was not just the number of types of inspections that should be decreased but the overall number of inspections themselves. He said it was important that all costs associated with inspection activities should be minimized as much as possible. Warner responded that the United States was mindful of the need to reduce costs involved in implementing the protocol, but noted that the inspections that remain in the U.S.-proposed text were critical to the implementation of the treaty. Data update inspections were crucial, and the U.S. side attempted to minimize the time requirements, etc. Nuclear warhead inspections were also very important, not only for the continued focus ON ICBMs and SLBMs, but for heavy bombers as well. Conversion or elimination inspections would be less frequent, but it was important to remove items from accountability or to convert them to conventional roles. Formerly-declared facility inspections, to ensure that closed-out facilities did not contain items subject to the treaty, were important. ¶16. (S) Buzhinskiy asked whether the overall number of inspections had been reduced. Warner responded that the number of data update inspections had been reduced from 15 to 12, explaining that some types of inspections, such as conversion or elimination inspections, would be conducted on an as-needed basis. Buzhinskiy asserted that the U.S. side was insisting ON special limitations and verification measures for mobile ICBMs while removing limitations and restrictions ON reentry vehicles loaded ON submarines. ¶17. (S) Antonov asked whether any other members of his Delegation had any comments ON the U.S.-proposed text. Kuznetsov, who had been sitting in the back of the room, stood and introduced himself as a consultant to the Russian Delegation from Rosatom. He stated it was his belief that the document the U.S. side had provided to the Russian side was created by "crazy people' who 'obviously had no experience in the START Treaty' and had not taken into account the Joint Understanding reached by the two Presidents ON July 6. He further asserted that it was impossible to agree ON a document like the one proposed by the United States by December 4, further claiming that its provisions undermined the taskings that the two Delegations had received from the Presidents. (Begin comment: Kuznetsov was a member of the Soviet Delegation to the START negotiations. The interpreter and several members of the Russian Delegation, including Antonov, were struggling with how to accurately translate Kuznetsov's comment about "crazy people" for the U.S. side. Several members of the U.S. Delegation, including Warner, understood the phrase without translation. Later, several members of the U.S. Delegation were approached by Russian counterparts to apologize for Kuznetsov's comment. During their one-on-one lunch later that day, Antonov asked Gottemoeller to explicitly convey apologies to Warner ON behalf of the entire Russian Delegation. End Comment.) After a stunned silence, Warner observed that he had been called many things before, and probably a "crazy person" was among them. Returning to the business at hand, Warner stated that it was true that the U.S. text uses START formulations, but it was important to note that these formulations had been implemented successfully in the post-Cold War period. Concerning Kuznetsov's comment about the impossibility of reviewing all this text by December 4, he stressed that this was language that had been followed during START's implementation period and, thus, it should be easier to reach agreement because much of it reflected existing practice. However, this did not mean that the U.S. side was not open to suggestions ON how to accomplish the tasks in a different way. After all, this was an initial proposal, and these are negotiations. ¶18. (S) Gottemoeller noted that both Delegations had been working ON Inspection Protocol issues and the U.S. side thought that there was no need to recreate the normal procedures that had been used for the past 15 years, and it was the successful implementation of these routine procedures that was a sign of the post-Cold War period. ¶19. (S) Ilin stated that the Russian approach to the elaboration of the Inspection Protocol was different. It was the Russian view that it should be substantially simpler. In the period after the Cold War it is true that START was successfully implemented, but this was because the procedures were in a legally-binding treaty. Now, in the post-Cold war period, it was the Russian view that the two sides should proceed in a completely different way in principle: the numerical limits are different and there will not be any sub-limits ON our forces. Thus, many types of inspections lose their meaning. In addition, the principle of equal security underlies the Russian position on the inspection of mobile launchers of ICBMs, and it will be a problem if the sides cannot agree that one type of mobile system should not be treated differently than any other type of strategic offensive arms. Buzhinskiy clarified that ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers should all be treated the same way under this treaty. Under this approach, the number of inspections could then be decreased threefold from START inspections, while still retaining some of the START formulations. ¶20. (S) Antonov, clearly trying to make amends for Kuznetsov's outburst, stated pointedly that the Russian side valued the work done by the U.S. Department of Defense and the representative of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and would read every line in order to understand it, as this was the purpose of negotiations, that is, try to find mutually-acceptable formulations. He further noted that he had no doubt that the two Delegations would be able to elaborate the new treaty. ¶21. (S) Gottemoeller asked for clarification of whether the Russian side believed that arrangements dealing with such activities occurring within its territory had to be codified in legally-binding instruments or whether an approach to inspection should be pursued that was not based on legally-binding provisions. Antonov responded that this was not the Russian view. He said that whatever is agreed to will be legally-binding and that there had been no change in Russian law pertaining to this. In order to bring U.S. inspectors onto a sensitive military site, there needed to be international agreements ON this, and that based ON these agreements each of the relevant Russian agencies would be instructed to take the appropriate measures. He observed that he himself could not enter a sensitive military base without governmental permission and clearance by the appropriate agencies and approval by the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Concerning confidence-building measures, these would be contained in a legally-binding instrument as well, but the confidence-building measures themselves would be voluntary. Antonov concluded his remarks by commenting that procedures would be discussed in the working group. -------------- RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL FOR WORKING GROUPS -------------- ¶22. (S) Regarding Russia's proposal for working groups, Gottemoeller reminded the Russian Delegation that the United States had proposed six working groups: - Treaty and Definitions; Chair: Ambassador Marcie Ries - Inspection Protocol; Chair: Dr. Ted Warner - Conversion or Elimination Protocol; Chair: Mr. Mike Elliot - Notifications Protocol; Chair: Mr. Kurt Siemon - Telemetry Protocol; Chair: Mr. Kurt Siemon - Memorandum of Understanding; Chair: Mr. Richard Trout Gottemoeller asked if Antonov was prepared to provide Russia's vision for working groups. Antonov said that the U.S. proposal was interesting and fit with the U.S. vision for the START Follow-on treaty but Russia had a somewhat different vision. He proposed the following four working groups: - Treaty and Definitions; Chair: Mr. Koshelev - Inspection Protocol; Chair: Colonel Ilin - Conversion or Elimination/Notifications; Chair: Colonel Ryzhkov - Memorandum of Understanding; Chair: General Orlov Antonov said that, under the Russian approach, telemetry would not require a special working group, but it did not mean that the Russian Delegation might not listen. ¶23. (S) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed Draft of the START Follow-on Treaty Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation ON Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, dated September 2, 2009; and -- Reader's Guide to Changes in the U.S.-proposed Draft of the START Follow-on Treaty Protocol ON Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities, dated September 2, 2009. - Russia: -- Draft Joint Statement in Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty ON the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; and -- Draft UN Resolution ON the Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New Framework for Strategic Relations. ¶24. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick LtCol Comeau Mr. Dunn Ms. Eccles Mr. Elliott Ms. Friedt Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Gen (Ret) Buzhinskiy Col Ilin Ms. Ivanova Col. Izrazov Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Neshin Gen Orlov Mr. Pischulov Mr. Rudenko Mr. Semin Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Tarasov Mr. Vasiliev Gen Venevtsev Mr. Vorontsov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. CLINTON