IAEA: GUIDANCE FOR USDEL TO BOARD OF GOVERNORS

UNCLAS STATE 093930 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IAEA KNNP TRGY AORC PTER IR SUBJECT: IAEA: GUIDANCE FOR USDEL TO BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG) MEETING ON IRAN ¶1. PER SEPTEL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USDEL FOR AGENDA ITEM 6(D) ON IRAN ARE INCLUDED IN PARAS 2-3. DEL IS INSTRUCTED TO USE THE STATEMENT IN PARA 4. ¶2. U.S. POSITION PAPER BEGIN ISSUE PAPER ISSUE: THE BOARD WILL DISCUSS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL?S LATEST REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA?S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN; IRAN?S COMPLIANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1737, 1747, 1803, AND 1835; AND THE SECRETARIAT'S INVESTIGATION INTO IRAN?S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. BACKGROUND: IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL (DG) ELBARADEI'S 26TH REPORT ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA'S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN IRAN MAKES CLEAR THAT IRAN HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ITS ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ARAK REACTOR, AND THAT IRAN?S COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA?S INVESTIGATION REMAINS INSUFFICIENT. CONSEQUENTLY, IRAN HAS, ONCE AGAIN, FAILED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATIONS AND IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG) REQUIREMENTS TO SUSPEND ITS PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE IAEA. THIS LATEST REPORT MARKS THE ELEVENTH TIME SINCE THE ADOPTION OF UNSCR 1737 IN DECEMBER 2006 THAT THE IAEA HAS REPORTED IRAN?S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE OBLIGATIONS. NUCLEAR PROGRAM STATUS ACCORDING TO THE IAEA'S AUGUST REPORT, IRAN CONTINUES TO ENRICH URANIUM USING APPROXIMATELY 4,600 IR-1 CENTRIFUGES AT ITS FUEL ENRICHMENT PLAN (FEP) AT NATANZ AND, MOST TROUBLING OF ALL, NOW POSSESSES 1,430 KG OF LOW ENRICHED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE (LEUF6). CONSEQUENTLY, IRAN NOW HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT LEUF6 TO PRODUCE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPON, IF FURTHER ENRICHED TO WEAPONS-GRADE. THIS INCREASE IN PRODUCTION SUGGESTS IRAN HAS SUSTAINED GENERALLY GOOD CENTRIFUGE PERFORMANCE SINCE NOVEMBER 2008. IN ADDITION, IRAN ALSO CONTINUES TO INSTALL AND TEST NEW CASCADES AT THE UNDERGROUND FEP (FOR A TOTAL OF 8,308 CENTRIFUGES INSTALLED OR UNDERGOING TESTING AS OF 12 AUGUST 2009),AND TO TEST CENTRIFUGES OF VARIOUS DESIGNS (IR1, IR2, IR2 MODIFIED, IR3, AND IR4),INCLUDING WITH UF6 GAS, AT THE PILOT FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT AT NATANZ. THE REPORT NOTES THAT IRAN HAS ACCEPTED AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS MEASURES AT NATANZ, BUT ONLY THOSE THAT THE IAEA REQUESTED IN ORDER TO MEET THE MINIMUM NECESSARY STANDARD TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE AS TO THE NONDIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THIS STEP DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE REPORT ALSO NOTES ONGOING CONSTRUCTION OF THE HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR AT ARAK (IR-40),A VIOLATION OF UNSCR 1737. WHILE IRAN PROVIDED THE IAEA WITH ACCESS TO THE IR-40 ON 17 AUGUST TO CARRY OUT A DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER SUCH ACCESS WAS ONE-TIME OR WILL BECOME ROUTINE. THE IAEA WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THAT NO REACTOR VESSEL WAS YET PRESENT; HOWEVER, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL NOTED THAT IRAN STILL NEEDS TO PROVIDE UPDATED AND MORE DETAILED DESIGN INFORMATION, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHARACTERISTICS, FUEL HANDLING AND TRANSFER EQUIPMENT, AND THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL SYSTEM. FURTHER, IRAN MUST PROVIDE ROUTINE, REGULAR ACCESS TO THE ARAK REACTOR IN ORDER FOR SAFEGUARDS TO BE SUSTAINED AND EFFECTIVE. ONE-TIME ACCESS AT IRAN?S WHIM DEFEATS THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDS. TO DATE, IRAN HAS NOT MADE SUCH ACCESS ROUTINE, AND IT CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT THE MODIFIED CODE 3.1 OF THE SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENT TO ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, AS NOTED BY THE IAEA DG IN THIS LATEST REPORT. THIS PRESENTS THE RISK THAT IRAN COULD BUILD A NEW NUCLEAR FACILITY AND FAIL TO DECLARE IT UNTIL 180 DAYS PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL INTO THE FACILITY. IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE IAEA WITH PRELIMINARY DESIGN INFORMATION FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IT IS PLANNING TO BUILD AT DARKHOVIN IS A CASE IN POINT. THE IAEA (AND THE UNITED STATES) REJECTS IRAN?S UNILATERAL ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO IMPLEMENT MODIFIED CODE 3.1. THE DG FURTHER NOTED THAT, IN ORDER FOR THE AGENCY TO BE IN A POSITION TO PROGRESS IN ITS VERIFICATION OF THE ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND ACTIVITIES IN IRAN, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IRAN TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENABLE THE IAEA TO CLARIFY AND BRING TO A CLOSURE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND IMPLEMENT ITS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL. POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL USED A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS LATEST REPORT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS (PMD) TO IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES THAT GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT NEED TO BE CLARIFIED BY IRAN. SPECIFICALLY, HE NOTED QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ALLEGED STUDIES, THE ACQUISITION OF THE URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT, AND THE PROCUREMENT AND REASEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY- RELATED INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES THAT COULD BE NUCLEAR- RELATED, AS WELL AS THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. THE REPORT FURTHER HIGHLIGHTED THAT THE INFORMATION ON THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES OVER DIFFERENT PERIODS OF TIME, AND APPEARS TO BE GENERALLY CONSISTENT. IT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED THAT IT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED BY IRAN WITH A VIEW TO REMOVING THE DOUBTS THAT NATURALLY ARISE ABOUT THE EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE REPORT OFFERED AN EXTENDED RENDITION OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND THE LENGTHS TO WHICH THE IAEA HAS GONE TO ENGAGE IRAN TO NO AVAIL. END POSTION PAPER ¶3. U.S. POSITION: THE U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD DELIVER A STRONG NATIONAL STATEMENT AND ALSO WORK TO ENSURE THAT NON-P5+1 MEMBER STATE NATIONAL STATEMENTS ARE FIRM AND DIRECT IN THEIR INSISTENCE THAT IRAN COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. TO THAT END, THE U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD WORK TO ENSURE THAT AS MANY NON- P5+1 MEMBER STATES AS POSSIBLE REFLECT THE FOLLOWING MAIN THEMES IN THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS: --CALL ON IRAN TO COMPLY WITH ITS UNSC, NPT, AND IAEA SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS, AND ENCOURAGE IRAN TO ENGAGE THE P5+1 IN GOOD FAITH TO RESOLVE ALL THE OUTSTANDING CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. --CONCERN WITH IRAN?S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE FULLY AND TRANSPARENTLY WITH THE IAEA'S INVESTIGATION, AS WELL AS IRAN?S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS UNSC OBLIGATIONS. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS IRAN?S FAILURE TO SUSPEND ITS PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, ITS REFUSAL TO RATIFY ITS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL, AND ITS REJECTION OF ITS CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE EARLY DECLARATION OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES. --AFFIRMATION THAT, WHILE IRAN MAY HAVE ALLOWED THE IAEA ONE-TIME ACCESS TO THE ARAK REACTOR FOR A DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION, THIS ACCESS MUST BE PROVIDED ON A REGULAR AND ROUTINE BASIS IN ORDER TO FULFILL IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS AND ENSURE THE REACTOR IS NOT USED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES. SIMILARLY, STATEMENTS SHOULD AFFIRM THAT WHILE IRAN AGREED TO AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS MEASURES AT NATANZ, THESE MEASURES ARE THE BARE MINIMUM NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE NONDIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THESE STEPS DO NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF IRANIAN NONCOMPLIANCE AND NONCOOPERATION. --NEED FOR IRAN TO ADDRESS FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY ALL OF THE IAEA'S OUTSTANDING AND SERIOUS CONCERNS REGARDING: THE EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION MADE AVAILABLE TO THE AGENCY ON IRANIAN WORK ON NUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN; THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT; PROCUREMENT AND R&D ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY-RELATED INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES THAT COULD BE NUCLEAR-RELATED; AND THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS. --NOTE THAT UNLESS IRAN COOPERATES WITH THE IAEA AND FULLY COMPLIES WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, THE BOARD CANNOT HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OR IN ANY ASSURANCES REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. THUS, IRAN WILL REMAIN OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. ¶4. STATEMENT. THE USDEL IS INSTRUCTED TO USE THIS STATEMENT ON IRAN. BEGIN STATEMENT. MADAME CHAIR, THE UNITED STATES APPRECIATES THIS LATEST REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND COMPLIANCE WITH ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATIONS. WE THANK THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AND THE SECRETARIAT FOR THEIR CONTINUED SERIOUS AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORTS IN CONDUCTING THEIR VERIFICATION MISSION IN IRAN. THIS IS MY FIRST INTERVENTION ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAN AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS. IRAN REMAINS A CRITICAL CHALLENGE FOR THE AGENCY AND CONTINUES TO BE A KEY ISSUE DEMANDING THE ATTENTION OF THIS BOARD. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SECRETARIAT IS NOT GETTING THE FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION THAT IT NEEDS FROM IRAN TO RESOLVE THESE LONG-OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE IAEA?S INVESTIGATION IS NOW ENTERING ITS SIXTH YEAR, AND STILL MANY OF THE ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED AS A RESULT OF IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION AND ACCESS NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE IAEA'S SERIOUS QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY REGARDING IRAN'S PAST NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. IN FACT, THE LATEST DIRECTOR GENERAL?S REPORT DESCRIBES THAT, ONCE AGAIN, IRAN HAS MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE REGRET THAT NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE IAEA?S INVESTIGATION FOR OVER A YEAR, AND NO PROGRESS AT ALL HAS BEEN MADE WITH RESPECT TO IRAN?S FULFILLMENT OF ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NPT, AND IAEA OBLIGATIONS. THIS INCLUDES IRAN?S OBLIGATION TO SUSPEND URANIUM ENRICHMENT AT NATANZ PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE MEDIA HAS NOTED IRAN?S ACCEPTANCE OF AN AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS APPROACH AT NATANZ. HOWEVER, THAT ONLY RE-ESTABLISHES THE MINIMUM NECESSARY IAEA MONITORING AT NATANZ WITHOUT ADDRESSING IRAN?S BASIC OBLIGATIONS. IN ADDITION, THE PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED AT THIS FACILITY SHOULD BE SUSPENDED PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF IRAN?S PROVISION OF ACCESS TO ARAK. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT INDICATED THAT IRAN PERMITTED THE IAEA TO CONDUCT A DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION AT THE ARAK REACTOR. THIS DEVELOPMENT IS, OF COURSE, WELCOME. HOWEVER, ACCESS GRANTED AFTER A YEAR OF DEFIANCE IS NOT SOMETHING TO BE CONGRATULATED. MOREOVER, IRAN?S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT CODE 3.1 MODIFIED OF ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE EARLY NOTIFICATION OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES DISCONCERTINGLY SUGGESTS THAT THIS ACCESS WILL NOT BE ROUTINE OR REGULARIZED, AS REQUIRED BY IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT RATHER AD HOC AND LAST-MINUTE WHEN POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT. AS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL NOTED IN HIS REPORT, IRAN IS THE ONLY STATE WITH SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES THAT HAS A COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN FORCE BUT IS NOT IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED CODE 3.1. SIMILARLY, OVER A YEAR AGO, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL REQUESTED DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION INFORMATION FOR THE NEW POWER REACTOR IRAN PLANS TO CONSTRUCT AT DARKHOVIN. AND ONCE AGAIN, IRAN HAS REFUSED TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION TO THE IAEA. THE FAILURE TO APPLY CODE 3.1 MODIFIED IS A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO THE IAEA?S ABILITY TO PROPERLY SAFEGUARD AND VERIFY NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. THE LIMITS PLACED BY IRAN EVEN ON THIS ONE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT SAFEGUARDS AT THE ARAK REACTOR REVEALED FURTHER THE LACK OF IRANIAN COOPERATION. THE REPORT CLEARLY INDICATES THAT, WHILE IRAN CONTINUES TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT ARAK, IRAN HAS YET TO PROVIDE CRITICAL, DETAILED DESIGN INFORMATION, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHARACTERISTICS, FUEL HANDLING AND TRANSFER EQUIPMENT, AND THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL SYSTEM. THIS INFORMATION IS FUNDAMENTAL TO SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION AND SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITHOUT DELAY. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP OF LIMITED COOPERATION, THE REPORT DESCRIBES BOTH TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN IRANIAN URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND A TOTAL STALEMATE IN ADDRESSING THE IAEA'S SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN?S PAST WARHEAD- RELATED WORK. INDEED, THIS LATEST REPORT DESCRIBES THAT IRAN NOW HAS, AT A MINIMUM, 1,430 KILOGRAMS OF LOW ENRICHED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE. IRAN IS NOW EITHER VERY NEAR OR IN POSSESSION OF SUFFICIENT LOW ENRICHED URANIUM TO PRODUCE ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON, IF THE DECISION WERE MADE TO FURTHER ENRICH IT TO WEAPONS-GRADE. THIS ONGOING ENRICHMENT ACTIVITY, PROHIBITED BY THREE CHAPTER VII UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, MOVES IRAN CLOSER TO A DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING POSSIBLE BREAKOUT CAPACITY. TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN?S REFUSAL TO ENGAGE WITH THE IAEA REGARDING ITS PAST NUCLEAR WARHEAD-RELATED WORK, WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT IRAN IS DELIBERATELY ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION - AT A MINIMUM. WHILE THE AGENCY CONTINUES TO REQUEST CLARIFICATION ON THE ALLEGED STUDIES, THE URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT, AND THE PROCUREMENT AND NUCLEAR-RELATED R&D ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES, AS WELL AS THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, IRAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE. THIS IS REGRETTABLY UNPRODUCTIVE. IT IS ALSO DISAPPOINTING THAT OVER TEN MONTHS HAVE GONE BY AND IRAN HAS FAILED TO TAKE WHAT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL CALLS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN ADDRESSING THESE LONG-OUTSTANDING ISSUES BY PROVIDING SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS TO THE IAEA?S QUESTIONS. WHAT CONCLUSION SHOULD THE BOARD DRAW FROM IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS TO THE IAEA?S QUESTIONS? MADAME CHAIR, IT HAS BEEN NEARLY SIX MONTHS SINCE THE UNITED STATES JOINED ITS P5+1 PARTNERS IN OFFERING TO NEGOTIATE WITH IRAN BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS AND MUTUAL RESPECT, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THE UNITED STATES AND OUR P5+1 PARTNERS HAVE MADE A GOOD-FAITH EFFORT TO REACH OUT TO IRAN AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE. AND WHILE WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT IRAN HAS A NEW PROPOSAL, WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL, SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE FROM OUR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS. NONETHELESS, WE WOULD REVIEW ANY PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY IN THE SPIRIT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND WOULD WELCOME THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE P5+1'S APRIL 2009 INVITATION TO MEET FACE-TO-FACE. MOVING FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN TO BRING IRAN INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND CREATE CONFIDENCE IN THE EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THIS IS A FRESH, NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR IRAN TO TURN THE PAGE, COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND PROVE THAT IT IS A RESPONSIBLE, TRUSTWORTHY MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PATHWAY TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR IRAN AND WE CONTINUE TO CALL ON IRAN'S LEADERS TO DEMONSTRATE GENUINE COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT DISPUTE IRAN?S RIGHT TO A CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, BUT WITH THAT RIGHT COMES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN'S ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAM. WE WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE, HONEST ENGAGEMENT WITH OUR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE ONCE AND FOR ALL. MADAME CHAIR, IRAN CLAIMS THAT ALL OF THE IAEA'S CONCERNS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS IS FAR FROM THE CASE, AS THE LATEST REPORT AND ITS MANY PREDECESSORS DEMONSTRATE. WE, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD, HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DEMAND THAT THE SECRETARIAT'S QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED, AND TO ENSURE THAT WE CAN OBTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WHEN A STATE SUCH AS IRAN HAS VIOLATED ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR DECADES AND IS KNOWN TO HAVE ENGAGED IN WEAPONS-RELATED WORK, IT MAKES THIS TASK ALL THE MORE VITAL. WHEN A STATE SUCH AS IRAN CONTINUES TO VIOLATE ITS OBLIGATIONS, WE MUST RESPOND. MADAME CHAIR, MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE P5+1 DUAL-TRACK APPROACH. WE CONTINUE TO CALL ON IRAN TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY AND TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE P5+1 OFFER ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM MADE IN APRIL 2009. WE ARE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT DIPLOMACY BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND INTERESTS AND SEEK A WILLING PARTNER. HOWEVER, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, WITH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES. WE URGE IRAN TO FULFILL ITS INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR OBLIGATIONS AND ACCEPT THE PROMISE OF A NEGOTIATED AND COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT THAT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL IRANIANS. WE HOPE THAT IRAN WILL NOT MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY, AND WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO A TIME IN WHICH IRAN IS GREETED BY THIS BOARD AS AN IAEA MEMBER STATE IN GOOD STANDING AND URGE IRAN TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THAT A REALITY. THANK YOU, MADAME CHAIR. END STATEMENT. CLINTON