|09STATE9154||2009-02-02 16:28:00||SECRET||Secretary of State|
1. (U) This is an action request; see paragraph three.
2. (S) Summary: On or about February 4, 2009, the USG intends
to designate domestically under E.O. 13224 the Iraq-based
entity the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) for its support
to the Kongra-Gel (KGK, aka the Kurdistan Workers Party or
PKK). The KGK was previously designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) on October 8, 1997 and domestically under E.O.
13224 on September 23, 2001 for acting and providing support to
terrorists or acts of terrorism. Post is requested to pre-notify
host government of this action. End summary.
3. (S) Action request: Embassies Baghdad and Ankara are asked
to share with host government, on a close hold basis, the
identifiers and background paper provided in para six. Action
should be taken as soon as possible and no later than February 4.
Posts may draw from the key objectives in paragraph four in
preparing demarches. Points may be adapted to local circumstances.
End action request.
4. (S) (Releasable only to Iraqi and Turkish governments)
-- Inform host government that on/about February 4, 2009, the
United States intends to designate domestically under E.O.
13224 the Iraq-based entity the Free Life Party of Kurdistan
(PJAK) for its allied relationship and support to the Kongra-Gel
(KGK, aka the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK). The U.S.
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on October 8,
1997 and domestically under E.O. 13224 on September 23, 2001 for
acting and providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.
-- Explain to host government that we will not/not forward
this name to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee for
inclusion on its consolidated asset freeze list, as it
does not appear that the Free Life Party of Kurdistan is
linked to Usama bin Laden, al-Qaida, or the Taliban.
-- Remind host government that under UNSCR 1373, all
states are required to suppress and prevent the financing
of terrorist acts and freeze without delay financial
assets of terrorists and their supporters.
-- Express to host government that even though this is a
U.S. domestic designation, we hope host government
undertakes similar measures by freezing the assets of the
Free Life Party of Kurdistan under its own domestic authority.
-- Request that host government share with us information
concerning any actions that it undertakes, including the
blocking of assets, to enforce sanctions against the Free
Life Party of Kurdistan. In addition, we welcome any information
that host government would like to share with us regarding the
activities of PJAK in its country.
-- To avoid the flight of assets that might otherwise
become subject to freezing, strongly urge host government
not to disclose publicly or privately the proposed U.S.
designation until action has been taken.
-- Share the identifiers and background information in
paragraph six as a non-paper.
End key objectives.
5. (SBU) Posts should report on any host government
response no later than February 3.
Identifiers and background
6. (SBU) Begin text:
Name: Free Life Party of Kurdistan
AKAs: Kurdistan Free Life Party
Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane
Location: Qandil Mountain, Irbil Governorate, Iraq
Alt, Location: Razgah, Iran
The Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK)-based in Iran
and Iraq-is a Kurdish opposition group that is controlled
by FTO and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Kongra-Gel
(KGK). The KGK leadership authorized certain Iranian-Kurdish
KGK members to create a KGK splinter group that would portray
itself as independent from but allied with KGK.
KGK determined that the name of the KGK splinter group would
be PJAK and created PJAK to appeal to Iranian Kurds. KGK
formally institutionalized PJAK in 2004 and selected five
KGK members to serve as PJAK leaders-to include KGK-affiliate
Hajji Ahmadi, who became PJAK's General Secretary.
KGK leaders also selected the members of PJAK's 40-person
central committee. While certain PJAK members objected to
the KGK selection of their leaders, KGK advised that PJAK
had no choice.
As of April 2008, KGK leadership controlled PJAK and
allocated personnel to the group. Separately, PJAK members
carried out their activities in accordance with orders received
from KGK senior leaders. In one instance, PJAK's armed wing,
the East Kurdistan Defense Forces, had been acting independently
in Iran. KGK senior leaders immediately intervened, however, and
recalled the responsible PJAK officials to northern Iraq.
Points of contact
7. (SBU) Points of contact: Post should deliver this request
as soon as possible and send a response cable slugged for
EEB/ESC/TFS Caitlin Ertel, EUR/PGI Lonni Reasor, NEA/I Jason Kondos,
and Treasury OIA Mark Yen.
8. (U) Web resources: Web resources: English versions and
translations of the background paper into Arabic, French,
Russian and Spanish are available on EEB Terrorism Finance's
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/e/eb/index.cfm?fuse action=public.display&id=fa28bb2b-94e2-446e-9 99d-50547bb5be13)
Alternatively, access the State Department's classified site,
click Bureaus and Offices, click E, then EEB, then Terrorist