RESPONSE TO UK REQUEST FOR OPTIONS TO RESUME

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 091299

SIPDIS

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED NOFORN CAPTION AND PARA 3.
MARKING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ UK
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO UK REQUEST FOR OPTIONS TO RESUME
NAVAL TRAINING IN IRAQ

Classified By: NEA DAS Michael Corbin for reasons 1. 4(b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a response to an action request.


2. (C/NF) Summary and Guidance: Reftel requested guidance on
what message to deliver to the UK Embassy regarding
resumption of their Naval training mission in Iraq. The
Department suggests the following (keyed to Reftel request):

1. The UK should actively pursue a vote on its bi-lateral
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) when the Iraqi Council of
Representatives (COR) reconvenes. 2. UK forces should not be
placed under the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) at
this time. 3. If, however, the UK has not secured its
agreement by October, options for moving UK forces under
NTM-I should be considered at that time.


3. (C/NF) The UK's naval trainers have been stationed in Kuwait
since July when the COR failed to pass an extension of the
MOU allowing the UK,s forces to remain in Iraq. We
encourage the UK to engage the Iraqis to seek passage of the
agreement when the COR reconvenes in September. However,
current USG efforts should prioritize the NATO Long Term
Agreement (LTA),which is also likely to come before the COR
in the next session. UK forces should not be moved under the
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) at this time because of
the potential this move has of interfering with passage of
the NATO LTA. However, the UK trainers may be able to
operate under NTM-I sometime in the future, should attempts
to achieve support for its own agreement ultimately fail and
if the Iraqis recognize the importance of the Naval training
mission at Umm Qassr. We should revisit this option in
October.

Encourage the UK Embassy to Seek COR Approval of its MOU
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4. (C/NF) The Iraqi COR is set to reconvene after Ramadan,
sometime in mid-September. Although the prospect of a
successful COR vote is small, we believe that it is
worthwhile to encourage the UK to engage the Iraqis to try to
pass the UK-Iraq MOU in the upcoming session. However, based
on events in July (staunch Sadrist resistance to the
agreement),we realize that this may be difficult. The UK
Ambassadors have stated that they would need a new
arrangement by the first week of September or will have to
redeploy their forces from the region, a decision that should
be made by their Embassy.
UK Forces Should Not be Moved Under NTM-I at this Time
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5. (C/NF) Post should make clear that the NTM-I option is not
a sound one. Folding the UK mission into the NTM-I will
appear like a bait and switch maneuver to the Iraqis, which
could undermine Iraqi support for the NTM-I mission.


6. (C/NF) Furthermore, adding the UK Naval trainers to NTM-I
might violate the current personnel cap of 300 and seeking to
raise the cap at this time would certainly undermine Iraqi
support for the NTM-I LTA. Support for the 300 person cap
vice 200 required the direct intervention of the PM,
suggesting that there would be strong opposition to raising
the cap at this time.


7. (C/NF) Staffing decisions for NTM-I should be driven by
GOI and Allied priorities. The Spanish have recently offered
30-40 Guardia Civile to assist on border training in line
with Iraqi requests for such training; UK officer training at
Ar Rustamiyah is comprised of a dozen personnel unrelated to
the Naval training request. Both missions should fit within
the current personnel limits of the NTM-I agreement. At a
future date we could seek an increased cap as a long-term
goal to accommodate new training efforts by NATO members,
including the UK.

U.S. Forces Provision of Force Protection at Umm Qasr
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8. (C/NF) Even if the UK only sought to place a small number
of Navy trainers (30-40) under NTM-I without violating the
cap, it would probably still be seen by the Iraqis as an
underhanded move. However, Post may wish to remind the GOI
that after August 2010, USF-I will change mission and
therefore transfer authority for this training mission to the
GOI. If the GOI does not wish to have a UK presence in Iraq,
they must be prepared to cover force protection at Umm Qassr,
as well as training requirements, allow another third country
to perform the training mission, or continue the mission
through NTM-I under another country configuration.

9. (C/NF) If, however, the Iraqis come to see the return of
UK Navy trainers as a legitimate effort, we could encourage
it at a later date. Post should inform the UK ambassadors
that their trainers may be able to operate under NTM-I in the
future, should attempts to secure Iraqi support for its own
agreement ultimately fail.
CLINTON