AUSTRALIA GROUP: CHEMICAL MICRO-REACTOR SYSTEMS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 087595 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM ETTC SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: CHEMICAL MICRO-REACTOR SYSTEMS EXPERTS GROUP (#1 OF 4) REF: A. BERLIN 1003 ¶B. STATE 82614 ¶C. COATES-HARTELL E-MAIL 8/6/2009 ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Drawing on the background below, Department requests Australia Group (AG) country Embassies provide the non-paper in paragraph 6 to appropriate host government officials and elicit a response. (Note: This is the first of four cables conveying U.S. proposals. End Note) In delivering this non-paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this non-paper as part of preparations for the September 21-25 AG plenary and that we would appreciate hearing their views or any suggestions they may have on the non-paper. Request Embassy Canberra provide the non-paper to the AG chair for circulation as an official AG document. -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Embassies should report results of this demarche by cable before September 7. Please contact ISN/CB Andrew Souza at 202-647-4838 or via e-mail for further information. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The manufacturing process for many chemical warfare agents can be extremely caustic, requiring equipment that is made of specialized corrosion and heat-resistant materials. To help limit the proliferation of chemical weapons, the 40-country AG has agreed to require government permission for exports of this specialized chemical production equipment. The chemical micro-reactor, a pejorative term used to describe very millimeter-sized high-throughput reactors, is an emerging technology that has the potential to eventually supplant the traditional chemical production equipment listed on the AG's control list. For further background on chemical micro-reactor technology, see REF B. ¶5. (SBU) To prepare for such an event, we are proposing that AG participants assemble a group of experts to consider advances in micro-reactor technology as they relate to chemical weapons proliferation and potential steps the AG could take to address the issue. The U.S. has already shared this proposal with the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands, as they currently represent the vast majority of global micro-reactor production countries. The UK and Germany have voiced preliminary support for the proposal (REFs A and C),but France and the Netherlands have yet to provide their views. -------------- NON-PAPER -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Begin Text of non-paper: AG-In-Confidence AUSTRALIA GROUP Australia Group Doc AG/Jul09/ExC/USA/xx Chemical Micro-reactor Systems Experts Group Issue Should the Australia Group establish an experts group to consider awareness-raising guidelines or controls for multi-unit (numbered up) commercially-manufactured micro-reactor and/or meso-reactor systems with process STATE 00087595 002 OF 003 throughput (yield capabilities of a metric ton or greater per annum)? Background Commercial manufacturers of industrial micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems produce units capable of yielding metric ton (and greater) per annum product yields. These systems can rival in yield, and especially in product purity, chemicals produced with standard 100 L - 20,000 L (AG-controlled) reactor technologies. The concern from the standpoint of the AG is that even though these reactor systems are as capable as traditional reactor systems, they do not meet the parameters of current controls. The small size of these reactor systems would also make it easier to conceal a production process within a chemical plant. This would present a tempting opportunity for chemical weapons proliferators with sufficient financial resources and a high level of technical sophistication. Since this problem will only become more significant over time, contemplating action now, while the technology has not widely diffused, would be prudent. There is also a possibility that micro-reactors/meso-reactors will eventually supplant some traditional chemical production technology. Assembling a group of experts would be a prudent first step towards understanding what, if any, aspects of this reactor technology can be controlled to prevent proliferation without imposing an undue burden on commercial industry. Discussion Multiple publications have voiced concerns about micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems as pathways for avoiding AG export controls and Chemical Weapons Convention inspections, but none have offered solutions for minimizing this risk. These systems are highly sophisticated and rather specialized, so at this point they might not readily lend themselves to use for chemical weapons proliferator, although this may change in the future. At this time, they are also significantly more expensive than standard glass production equipment and designed for continuous production processes. Some are only capable of generating a limited variety of chemical products. However, micro-reactors and meso-reactors do have a number of advantages over traditional chemical production equipment. For example, many chemical reactions have shown improved reactivity, product yield, and selectivity when executed on this scale. They also simplify the problems associated with scaling-up a process by combining multiple reactors in arrays, a process also known as numbering-up., The high throughput of these reactor systems when numbered-up could allow for the production of hazardous chemicals on demand, minimizing handling and storage needs. Processing highly toxic or corrosive materials in these reactors produces a smaller waste stream and higher reaction yield (i.e., purity). Their small size also makes them more difficult to detect. All of these characteristics would make them very advantageous to chemical warfare agent production. Though numbering-up, avoids some scale-up difficulties of conventional chemical production, it is not without hurdles, as it requires real-time computer control to coordinate and monitor all of the individual modules and the total system. Micro-reactors and meso-reactors are also not well-suited for processing solid chemicals, requiring would-be proliferators to address technological challenges, such as filtering, preventing fouling, heat management, catalyst implementation, ensuring absolutely uniform flow equi-partitioning, and control of the subunits in a reliable and robust manner. Recommendations -- The United States recommends that AG participants establish an experts group on micro-reactor/meso-reactor technologies (analogous to the group established for synthetic biology) to evaluate current commercial industrial systems for their dual-use proliferation potential during the 2009-2010 intersessional period. -- The United States suggests that this experts group consider whether to provide awareness-raising guidelines for producers of commercial micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems. STATE 00087595 003 OF 003 -- The experts group should also consider whether current trends in the adoption of micro-reactor/meso-reactor technology warrant the AG to consider appropriate controls for multi-unit (numbered-up) automated micro/meso chemical factory systems. -- In addition to evaluating these reactor systems, the experts group should also look at enabling technologies,, which specifically enable micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems to evolve and overcome current limitations. -- It probably would be useful to have the experts group meet informally with appropriate representatives of AG country industry on the margins of its meetings, to ensure a thorough understanding of the technology and its commercial implications. -- If it appears that controls will eventually be necessary, AG members could then ask the group to identify micro-reactor/meso-reactor equipment specifications that could be used as the basis for future controls. End non-paper. ¶7. (U) Please begin all responses with AUSTRALIA GROUP and slug for ISN. ¶8. (U) Department thanks posts for their support. CLINTON