CIVILIAN PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS IN THE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 087508 SENSITIVE SIPDIS ADDIS ABABA AND KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS CG UG SU SUBJECT: CIVILIAN PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS IN THE CAR, DRC, AND SOUTHERN SUDAN ¶1. (U) This is an Action Request for Khartoum/Juba, Kinshasa, and Bangui. Please see para 4. ¶2. (SBU) The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) -- though dispersed by Operation Lightning Thunder/Rudia II -- continues to attack civilian populations in border areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR),leading to widespread civilian displacement and frustrating humanitarian relief efforts. Refugee arrivals in southern Sudan since September 2008 have now reached over 20,000 -- mostly Congolese but including some 600 recent arrivals from the CAR. LRA attacks are reported in the DRC and southern Sudan weekly. Recent attacks near Obo, CAR are troublesome new developments. Some humanitarian organizations are concerned that the LRA may be seeking to regroup inside CAR. The UN estimates that over 1,000 people have been killed, 1,500 abducted, and over 250,000 displaced in an area spanning the DRC, Sudan, and CAR since September 2008. ¶3. (SBU) There is a limited presence of humanitarian organizations in the tri-border area but insecurity and poor infrastructure impede access to the populations most in need. State/PRM and USAID are supporting international organizations and NGOs for emergency interventions for affected populations in the DRC and Sudan and will need to address the CAR also. (Note: Senator Feingold has reintroduced a bill to support humanitarian and development assistance in LRA-affected areas. The bill, in committee, calls for a regional strategy for civilian protection and elimination of the LRA threat. AF has concerns with the bill as drafted including that it would require duplicative efforts to those underway. End Note). ¶4. (SBU) Protection of civilians remains a critical concern. In light of new developments, State and USAID are refining (for an Interagency Policy Committee) recommendations on civilian protection in the tri-country area currently affected by the LRA, and PRM is seeking posts' input on practical recommendations guided by the following questions. Note that we do have some inputs from international and non-governmental organizations, but are looking for posts' best and candid judgments. For Khartoum/Juba: -- What is the current UNMIS, SPLA, UPDF response capacity in LRA-affected areas? (We note that in last week's LRA attack on Ezo town, neither the UPDF nor the SPLA soldiers acted effectively to stop the LRA from entering the center of town, attacking IDPs, and looting the Commissioner's premises. Reasons are unclear.) -- Given recent attacks in areas of refugee/IDP settlement, what is the GOSS and UN strategy to provide civilian protection and ensure that humanitarian assistance is not targeted for looting? -- How would any additional humanitarian resources best be used to provide assistance and protection to refugee/IDP/other civilian populations? -- What are the shortfalls in NGO/IO humanitarian operations (including beyond the usual financial resources) in LRA-Affected areas and what obstacles are creating these? -- What has been the local response to the security threats? Have militias been formed to ward off LRA attacks? For Kinshasa: STATE 00087508 002 OF 002 -- What are the current MONUC and FARDC response capacities in LRA-affected areas? -- What is the impact of real or perceived MONUC mandate limitations with regard to civilian protection in the areas affected by the LRA? -- Post has provided considerable information to date on shortfalls in NGO/IO humanitarian operations in LRA-affected areas. We would appreciate any further information on shortfalls, and particularly what obstacles are creating these? -- How would any additional humanitarian resources best be used to provide assistance and protection to civilian populations? For Bangui: -- What is the current FACA and UPDF response capacity in LRA-affected areas? -- What is the current capacity for humanitarian response in LRA-affected areas? (Comment. We know of course that it is quite limited but would appreciate some specific level of effort that post judges might be achieved with additional international support.) What additional resources might be required/effectively used? -- Is there any scope for MINURCAT or other international (e.g., MICOPAX) military role in civilian protection? -- If the LRA were to re-group in the CAR, does the UN country team, government, military, humanitarian actors, etc have contingency plans in place? (We note the affected areas are far from Bangui but Embassy's assessment of this would be helpful.) -- What are other international players' response to LRA-affected areas and what are they reporting on the situation? (SBU response if available). ¶5. (U) At least a preliminary answer would be appreciated by Tuesday, August 25 if possible. CLINTON