Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE8319
2009-01-30 02:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:
ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP TO IRANIAN FLIGHTS
ORIGIN ISN-00 INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 DS-00 EAP-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 CAC-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 NEA-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 NIMA-00 CAEX-00 PM-00 GIWI-00 P-00 ISNE-00 FMPC-00 SSO-00 SS-00 T-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 SCRS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 SCA-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 /000R O P 300238Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 008319
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MASS AE MU SA YM IR SU
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP TO IRANIAN FLIGHTS
INFORMATION
REF: A. STATE 5567
B. STATE 4162
C. STATE 3948
D. STATE 3521
E. STATE 2617 (NOTAL)
F. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: William Malzahn, Acting Director ISN/CATR,
Reasons: 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).
S E C R E T STATE 008319
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MASS AE MU SA YM IR SU
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP TO IRANIAN FLIGHTS
INFORMATION
REF: A. STATE 5567
B. STATE 4162
C. STATE 3948
D. STATE 3521
E. STATE 2617 (NOTAL)
F. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: William Malzahn, Acting Director ISN/CATR,
Reasons: 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).
1. (U) This is an urgent action request to Embassies Abu
Dhabi, Khartoum, Muscat, Riyadh, and Sanaa. Please deliver
as soon as feasible. Please see paragraphs 4 and 5.
--------------
Background
--------------
2. (S/NF) Ref A expanded the action in Ref B to include Saudi
Arabia, UAE, Oman, Yemen, Chad, and Sudan. Ref B asked Sudan
to stop Badr Airlines flights from Tehran, Iran to Khartoum,
Sudan which we believed are carrying lethal military
equipment. Earlier Washington advised Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Oman, and Yemen in Ref C with updated information that
additional flights may be planned for 23 and 24 January,
which we are concerned could also be used to transfer arms
from Iran to Sudan. Ref D advised that Washington had
received information that the UAE firm Ramjet Aviation
Support requested overflight permission from the Civil
Aviation Authority in Yemen for Sudan's Badr Airlines to
conduct chartered flights on 16 and 17 January 2009 between
Iran and Sudan. Ref E advised Egyptian authorities that
Sudanese airlines may be involved in the transfer of arms to
Hamas. Ref F informed that Iran intended to conduct arms
shipments to Hamas via Sudan and that the arms were expected
to be transferred via aerial routes using cargo planes.
--------------
Objectives
--------------
3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:
-- Inform host governments that Iran intends to continue
delivering lethal military equipment to Sudan in the near
future using arlines not necessarily of Iranian origin.
-- Inform the host government that additional flights are
expected to depart this weekend or early next week.
-- Ask host nation to stop the flights.
-- Ask to be provided information that is regularly required
for overflight requests.
-- Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or
transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel,
whether or not originating in Iran.
-- Continue to stress to Sudan the United States considers
this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our
two countries are working together towards critical issues of
UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment,
resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
--------------
Action Request
--------------
4. (S) Posts are requested as soon as feasible, bearing in
mind the timeframe of the information, to use the points in
para 5 to approach host governments to inform them of the
flights and request their assistance to stop the flights, in
Sudan's case, or to deny overflight or require the planes to
land for inspection.
5. (SECRET/REL UAE, YEMEN, OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SUDAN)
Begin Talking Points:
-- Iran intends to continue delivering arms to Sudan in the
near future using cargo flights of various airlines (not
necessarily of Iranian companies),most likely in order to
transfer them to Hamas.
-- These flights are expected to depart from Iran to Sudan
this weekend or in the beginning of next week.
-- The Iranians may attempt to dissimulate the type of cargo
loaded on the flights, their destination, and route.
-- As we noted in our previous demarche on these flights, we
appreciate any assistance you can provide regarding the
military-related flights between Iran and Sudan and request
that you remain vigilant on denying additional flights.
-- As you are aware, there is information that is regularly
required for overflight requests. We would like to know what
information was provided to you. The regularly required info
is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration,
nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination,
date/time, entry/departure points.
-- Additionally, all overflights require fees to be paid.
Countries can deny overflight permissions because overflight-
or other flight-related fees by the parties involved with
operating the flights are in arrears. We request that you
look into this avenue as an additional means to refuse future
overflights.
-- UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5
states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly
or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not
originating in Iran.
-- Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related
materiel violates Iran's obligations under UNSCR 1747.
-- In view of the above, we request that planes flying from
Iran to Sudan be denied overflight or be inspected and any
arms found on the planes be confiscated.
End Talking Points
6. (U) Department appreciates Posts' assistance in this
matter. ISN/CATR POCs are Ann Ganzer
(ganzerak@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-2718) , Margaret T.
Mitchell (mitchellmt2@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-2433; and Mike
Rolleri (rollerimj@state.gov.gov); 202-647-0255.
CLINTON
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MASS AE MU SA YM IR SU
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP TO IRANIAN FLIGHTS
INFORMATION
REF: A. STATE 5567
B. STATE 4162
C. STATE 3948
D. STATE 3521
E. STATE 2617 (NOTAL)
F. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: William Malzahn, Acting Director ISN/CATR,
Reasons: 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).
1. (U) This is an urgent action request to Embassies Abu
Dhabi, Khartoum, Muscat, Riyadh, and Sanaa. Please deliver
as soon as feasible. Please see paragraphs 4 and 5.
--------------
Background
--------------
2. (S/NF) Ref A expanded the action in Ref B to include Saudi
Arabia, UAE, Oman, Yemen, Chad, and Sudan. Ref B asked Sudan
to stop Badr Airlines flights from Tehran, Iran to Khartoum,
Sudan which we believed are carrying lethal military
equipment. Earlier Washington advised Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Oman, and Yemen in Ref C with updated information that
additional flights may be planned for 23 and 24 January,
which we are concerned could also be used to transfer arms
from Iran to Sudan. Ref D advised that Washington had
received information that the UAE firm Ramjet Aviation
Support requested overflight permission from the Civil
Aviation Authority in Yemen for Sudan's Badr Airlines to
conduct chartered flights on 16 and 17 January 2009 between
Iran and Sudan. Ref E advised Egyptian authorities that
Sudanese airlines may be involved in the transfer of arms to
Hamas. Ref F informed that Iran intended to conduct arms
shipments to Hamas via Sudan and that the arms were expected
to be transferred via aerial routes using cargo planes.
--------------
Objectives
--------------
3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:
-- Inform host governments that Iran intends to continue
delivering lethal military equipment to Sudan in the near
future using arlines not necessarily of Iranian origin.
-- Inform the host government that additional flights are
expected to depart this weekend or early next week.
-- Ask host nation to stop the flights.
-- Ask to be provided information that is regularly required
for overflight requests.
-- Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or
transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel,
whether or not originating in Iran.
-- Continue to stress to Sudan the United States considers
this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our
two countries are working together towards critical issues of
UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment,
resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
--------------
Action Request
--------------
4. (S) Posts are requested as soon as feasible, bearing in
mind the timeframe of the information, to use the points in
para 5 to approach host governments to inform them of the
flights and request their assistance to stop the flights, in
Sudan's case, or to deny overflight or require the planes to
land for inspection.
5. (SECRET/REL UAE, YEMEN, OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SUDAN)
Begin Talking Points:
-- Iran intends to continue delivering arms to Sudan in the
near future using cargo flights of various airlines (not
necessarily of Iranian companies),most likely in order to
transfer them to Hamas.
-- These flights are expected to depart from Iran to Sudan
this weekend or in the beginning of next week.
-- The Iranians may attempt to dissimulate the type of cargo
loaded on the flights, their destination, and route.
-- As we noted in our previous demarche on these flights, we
appreciate any assistance you can provide regarding the
military-related flights between Iran and Sudan and request
that you remain vigilant on denying additional flights.
-- As you are aware, there is information that is regularly
required for overflight requests. We would like to know what
information was provided to you. The regularly required info
is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration,
nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination,
date/time, entry/departure points.
-- Additionally, all overflights require fees to be paid.
Countries can deny overflight permissions because overflight-
or other flight-related fees by the parties involved with
operating the flights are in arrears. We request that you
look into this avenue as an additional means to refuse future
overflights.
-- UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5
states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly
or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not
originating in Iran.
-- Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related
materiel violates Iran's obligations under UNSCR 1747.
-- In view of the above, we request that planes flying from
Iran to Sudan be denied overflight or be inspected and any
arms found on the planes be confiscated.
End Talking Points
6. (U) Department appreciates Posts' assistance in this
matter. ISN/CATR POCs are Ann Ganzer
(ganzerak@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-2718) , Margaret T.
Mitchell (mitchellmt2@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-2433; and Mike
Rolleri (rollerimj@state.gov.gov); 202-647-0255.
CLINTON