U.S.- RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS

S E C R E T STATE 082572

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2034
TAGS: MTCRE PARM ETTC TSPA IR KN RS
SUBJECT: U.S.- RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS

Classified By: ISN Acting A/S Vann H. Van Diepen.
Reason: 1.5 (D).

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(U) Summary
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1. (S) A U.S. interagency team -- led by ISN Acting
Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen -- met with a Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs-only team, led by Ambassador
Anatoly Antonov, Director for Security and Disarmament
Affairs (participants list at para 11),on July 29, 2009 to
discuss what the U.S. side considered to be the first round
of a Joint Threat Assessment (JTA),as agreed by Presidents
Obama and Medvedev in the 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit Joint
Statement on Missile Defense Issues. Russia made clear that
it viewed the meeting as a preliminary discussion only, and
frequently noted that there would be no cooperation on the
JTA until the U.S. addressed Russian concerns regarding the
3rd Missile Defense site in Europe. The U.S. side
nevertheless presented its analysis of the Iranian and North
Korean missile programs and attempted to elicit a Russian
response. The Russian side remained largely unresponsive,
and the meeting concluded in two hours. End summary.


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(U) Opening remarks
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2. (S) After introductions of the U.S. and Russian
delegations, Antonov explained that Russia viewed this
discussion as a preliminary meeting only and said the two
sides should just discuss their respective plans on how to
conduct this joint missile assessment. He noted his surprise
in learning that a special team of missile experts had been
dispatched from the U.S. at this time, especially given that
this is the dead season (vacation time) in Russia. He also
stressed that he wanted to be crystal clear that there would
be no future cooperation from Moscow until the U.S. addressed
Russian concerns on the 3rd Missile Defense site in Europe
(Antonov returned to this theme over and over during the
two-hour talks). Russia had not changed its position on the
3rd site in East Europe close to its borders.


3. (S) Van Diepen countered that the U.S. was making
presentations on the missile threat pursuant to the JTA as
agreed to by our two Presidents in the July 6, 2009 Summit
Joint Statement, and not on Missile Defense. He stated that
the U.S. delegation had come to Moscow to present U.S.
perspectives on the Iranian and North Korean missile
programs, listen to Russia's reactions to the presentations,
and answer any questions. Van Diepen further noted that the
U.S. would also like to use the meeting to develop a concrete
plan on next steps.


4. (S) Stating that he was not rejecting the U.S.
presentations, Antonov again went on at length about Russian
concerns on the 3rd site, inquiring about the state of play
of U.S. consultations with Allies and intentions toward the
3rd site. Antonov said that his reading of the Summit Joint
Statement (which he took credit for authoring) made clear the
3rd site issue was paramount. Antonov highlighted the
sentence in the first paragraph of the statement regarding
"mutual respect and interests" (which he equated with Russian
3rd site concerns),and noted that we needed to deal with
this issue before any movement on the bilateral measures in
the 2nd paragraph or the multilateral issues in the 3rd
paragraph could happen. Antonov also expressed
disappointment that the U.S. had not responded to the Russian
positions explained in the March 2009 Aide Memoire,
theatrically asking how Russia is supposed to understand the
silence and the lack of U.S. reaction to Russian concerns.
He then reiterated the view that the
re will be no cooperation until Russia receives clear answers
on the 3rd site. It was up to the U.S. to decide if it
wanted a partner. He added that the U.S. attempting to
"impose cooperation" on Russia is a mistake. Finally, he
said that it was impossible to accept an increase in the
security of the U.S. with a consequent decrease in Russian
security.


5. (S) Van Diepen responded that the JTA exercise has a
straightforward purpose -- to analyze the ballistic missile
challenges as noted in the Summit Joint Statement. He
explained that the U.S. does not share the sentiment that the
U.S. is somehow "imposing cooperation" on Russia, and noted
that success in this assessment will be dependent on the
cooperation of both sides. The discussion of the missile
threat plays a part in a larger picture, and the U.S. is
prepared to discuss its perceptions of that threat.


6. (S) Antonov repeated his earlier statements about the 3rd
site, noting that the "3rd site is the threat, not Iran." He
stated that it was not acceptable to pull one sentence from
the Joint Statement and work on that basis. He also could
not agree with the U.S. perception of the JTA, and reiterated
his request for a response to Russia's 3rd site concerns.
Antonov stated that his message was clear and asked that it
be relayed to the leadership in Washington.


7. (S) After both sides again reiterated their respective
positions, Antonov again made clear his disagreement with the
U.S. approach, asked for the U.S. position on the 3rd site,
and questioned the meaning of "missile threat." "For us
there is no threat," he exclaimed. He opined that "threat"
equals "risk of proliferation plus intention," and disagreed
that Iran's missile program posed a threat to Russia, Europe,
or the U.S. He stated that there was no missile threat from
Iran. Rather, Iran was trying to solve a regional issue and
would surely face strong retaliation from others if it
launched its missiles. Antonov said the Summit Joint
Statement on Missile Defense Issues is "very rich" and simply
references "ballistic missile challenges." Russia views this
initial meeting as preparatory to a future dialogue and an
understanding of each other's positions.

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(U) U.S. presentations
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8. (S) The U.S. side then delivered detailed presentations
on the Iranian and North Korean missile programs. The
Russian side asked a few questions related to the degree of
Chinese missile-related assistance to Iran, Iran's ability to
series-produce the BM-25, the number of missiles in Iran's
and North Korea's inventory (Antonov Deputy and Russian
Missile Technology Control Regime head of delegation Grigory
Mashkov noted the Russian belief that Israel has the
strongest missile potential in the Middle East),Iran's
industrial base for missile production, the satellite-launch
aspects of the DPRK April 2009 TD-2 launch (as well as the
reasons for its failure),and what was new in the U.S.
presentations compared to previous ones. The Russian side
offered no equivalent program description or presentations,
clearly avoiding any detailed discussion relating to JTA in
the absence of resolution of the 3rd site issue and
underscoring its view of the preliminary nature of the
meeting.

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(U) Next steps
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9. (S) Van Diepen then addressed next steps, suggesting that
the Russian side study the U.S. presentations and come
prepared at the next meeting to offer its own views of the
Iranian and North Korean missile programs. The U.S. side can
then react to Russia's presentations in order to develop a
sense of where we agree and disagree, as well as the reasons
for any disagreements. Van Diepen also stated that the U.S.
would come prepared to provide more fulsome responses to the
issues Russia had raised regarding the U.S. presentations.


10. (S) Antonov repeated his earlier 3rd site concerns and
view that cooperation on this assessment will not be
forthcoming until the U.S. addresses those concerns. The JTA
will not matter without consideration for Russia's principal
issues; the Summit Joint Statement is a package and requires
reciprocity. He also stated that President Medvedev had made
a huge concession to the U.S. in the Joint Statement by
deleting any specific reference to the 3rd site. Van Diepen
noted that the U.S. had come to Moscow in good faith and had
done its part in implementing this first step. He also
proposed meeting again in September to continue the Joint
Threat Assessment. Antonov concluded by stating that he
would inform ministers and do the necessary reports, but he
could not commit to another meeting given that most of the
leadership was on vacation.

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11. (U) Participants
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A. (SBU) Russian

Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, Director for Security and
Disarmament Affairs, MFA

Grigory Mashkov, Deputy Director for Security and Disarmament
Affairs, MFA

Vladimir Leontiev, Senior Counselor for Security and
Disarmament Affairs, MFA

Alexander Shilin, Counselor for North America, MFA

Andrey Grebenshchikov, Third Secretary for Security and
Disarmament Affairs, MFA

Andrey Malyugin, Third Secretary for Security and Disarmament
Affairs, MFA


B. (SBU) U.S.:

Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Assistant Secretary, State/ISN

Ralph Palmiero, Deputy Director for Missile Threat Reduction,
State/ISN/MTR

Matt Hardiman, Foreign Affairs Officer, European and Eurasian
Affairs, State/EUR/PRA

Michael Kerley, Foreign Affairs Officer, Missile Threat
Reduction, State/ISN/MTR

Phil Jamison, OSD Missile Defense Policy

COL Timothy Shea, OSD Regional Policy

Daniel Menzel, Intelligence Analyst

Nickolas Katsakis, Control Officer, US Embassy Moscow

LTC Michael Nerstheimer, Assistant Army Attache, US Embassy
Moscow

Yuri Shkeyrov, Interpreter
CLINTON