IRANIAN PROCUREMENT AGENT SEEKS GERMAN TEST

S E C R E T STATE 081281 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2034 TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL ETTC MNUC TSPA IR GM TH SUBJECT: IRANIAN PROCUREMENT AGENT SEEKS GERMAN TEST CHAMBER, FALSELY NAMES THAI FIRM AS END-USER (S) REF: A. 08 STATE 90515 ¶B. 08 BERLIN 1210 ¶C. BERLIN 805 Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO. REASONS: 1.4(B),(C),AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Berlin please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (S) Background: In August 2008, we informed Berlin that the German firm Voetsch Industrietechnik was negotiating a deal to sell two model VT7004 environmental test chambers to the Malaysian intermediary Toshi Electronics on behalf of Iranian procurement agent Amin Ravan (Ref A). We noted that Toshi had falsely indicated that the equipment would be used in Malaysia, when in fact it was destined for Iran. As we explained to German officials, Ravan is associated with the Singapore-based entity CoreZing, an entity that has procured materials on behalf of Iranian end-users of concern, including the Iran Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO - the umbrella organization for all Iranian industries responsible for developing and manufacturing missiles). In response to the information we provided, German authorities sensitized representatives of Voetsch, who in turn canceled the contract to sell the chambers to Toshi (Ref C). ¶3. (S) Background (cont.) and objective: We now understand that as of early July 2009, Ravan and Shahin Forouzan - another Iranian procurement agent - had ordered the same Voetsch VT7004 test chamber from the German firm Quasar GmbH, but identified a different end-user -- the Thailand-based firm Evrex Company Pte Ltd. We believe that the true end-user is located in Iran, and that Ravan and Forouzan are using the Thailand address of Evrex as a means of circumventing German export restrictions. We want to share this information with German officials and urge them to take measures to ensure that this transaction does not occur. ¶4. (U) Action Request: Request Embassy Berlin approach appropriate German government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET//REL GERMANY) --We would like to alert you to information of proliferation concern and request your assistance in investigating this activity. --In August 2008, we shared with your government information indicating that Iranian procurement agent Amin Ravan was working to obtain two VT7004 test chambers manufactured by Voetsch Industrietechnik GmbH. --Ravan was seeking these test chambers from the Malaysian firm Toshi Electronic, which falsely indicated that the equipment would be used in Malaysia as opposed to Iran. --As we noted to you, Ravan is associated with the Singapore-based entity CoreZing, which has sought materials on behalf of Iranian end-users of proliferation concern, including the Iran Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which has overall responsibility for Iran's ballistic missile programs. --We were pleased to learn that as a result of the information we supplied to your government, German officials had sensitized representatives of Voetsch to their concerns about this transaction, and Voetsch subsequently cancelled the contract to sell the chambers to Toshi. --We now have new information related to this case that we would like to share with you. --We understand that Amin Ravan is continuing his efforts to procure Voetsch test chambers. --Specifically, we have information indicating that as of early July 2009, Ravan and Shahin Forouzan - another Iranian procurement agent - had ordered a Voetsch VT7004 test chamber from the German company Quasar GmbH. --Quasar is located at Mannheimer Str. 115, 60327 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; phone: 496966123924. --Ravan and Forouzan indicated to Quasar that the end-user contact was J. Ahmad in the Commercial Department of the Thai firm Evrex Company Pte Ltd, located at Sukhumvit Road, Klongton, Klongtoey, Bangkok, Thailand. --However, we believe that the true end-user is located in Iran, and that Ravan and Forouzan are falsely using the Thailand address in order to circumvent German export restrictions. --We understand that Quasar accepted the order from Forouzon, and that plans have been made to ship the test chamber five to six weeks after Quasar's receipt of a down payment. --We therefore urge you to investigate this information and to take all appropriate measures to prevent this transaction. --We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation on nonproliferation matters and to hearing of any updates on the progress of your investigation of this case. End talking points/nonpaper. ¶6. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/PRA and EUR/CE. ¶7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON