JCIC-DIP-09-008: RUSSIAN FAILURE TO PROVIDE

S E C R E T STATE 078777 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2029 TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS SUBJECT: JCIC-DIP-09-008: RUSSIAN FAILURE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED START NOTIFICATION FOR THE FLIGHT TEST OF AN SLBM ON JULY 13, 2009 REFS: A. STATE 072155 (RNC/STR 09-191/78) ¶B. STATE 072206 (RNC/STR 09-192/78) ¶C. STATE 072526 (RNC/STR 09-194/78) Classified by: Jerry Taylor, Director VCI/SI - Reason 1.4B and D. ¶1. (S) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 6 below. ¶2. (S) BACKGROUND: From July 11 to 13, 2009, as provided by the START Treaty, the Russian Federation sent the United States, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) a total of three "Notifications of a Flight Test of an ICBM or SLBM" (Refs A-C). The first notified a flight test to take place from the Arctic Ocean to the Kanin Peninsula during a four day window beginning July 12 (Ref A). The second notified a flight test to take place from the Barents Sea to Kamchatka also during a four day window beginning July 12 (Ref B). The third notified a flight test to take place from the White Sea to Kamchatka during a four day window beginning July 14 (Ref C). On July 13, 2009, Russia launched two SS-N-23 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from two separate Delta IV ballistic missile submarines, the first one operating in the Barents Sea and the second one operating in the Arctic Ocean. There were irregularities, however, associated with the timing of the notification provided for one of these launches. Specifically, the second notification (Ref B) corresponds to the first launch in terms of launch location and impact area, but was provided approximately six hours after the launch took place. This notification also included the following text: "Notification was not transmitted in time to the United States due to operator error who incorrectly identified the launch date (instead of 13 Jul 2009, 15 Jul 2009 was annotated). The Russian Federation regrets any inconvenience." The first notification (Ref A) corresponds to the second launch in terms of launch location and impact area and was given, as required, more than 24 hours in advance of the launch. The irregularity of the notification for the first launch and the sequencing caused concern at the Pentagon and at U.S. Strategic Command and affected the ability of the intelligence community to collect technical data on the flight tests. ¶3. (S) For information purposes, the third flight test notification (Ref C),referenced in paragraph 2, above, was for the launch of an SS-NX-32 Bulava SLBM from the White Sea. The Bulava SLBM is Russia's newest ballistic missile and is still in development. The Bulava launched on July 15, but failed within 30 seconds of the launch. There have been 10 previous Bulava flight tests, nine of which were either total or partial failures. We believe it is possible that the relatively close sequencing of this SLBM launch and the other two SLBM launches may have contributed to difficulties regarding START notifications on the Russian side. ¶4. (U) Paragraph 1 of Section VI of the START Notification Protocol states that ballistic missile launch notifications shall be provided in accordance with the 1988 U.S.-Soviet Agreement "On Notifications of Launches of Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles." The latter agreement specifies that no less than 24 hours in advance, either side shall inform the other of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for a strategic ballistic missile. In the case of SLBMs, the notification shall include a general area of the launch, i.e., the quadrant within the ocean or the body of water from which the planned launch will take place. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the START Treaty specifies that time and dates shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The START Treaty also requires Russia to provide telemetry data from both launches to the United States within 65 days. ¶5. (S) Launch details for the two SS-N-23 launches include the following information: - First launch -- Time: 03:16 GMT, July 13, 2009 -- Launch location: 79-45N, 064-59E, which matches the second notification launch area of the Barents Sea -- Impact area: 58-21N, 160-26E, which corresponds with the Kamchatka peninsula - Second launch -- Time: 23:49 GMT, July 13, 2009 -- Launch location: 88-16N, 46-45W, which corresponds with the launch area of the Arctic Ocean in the first notification -- Impact area: 67-20N, 45-48E, which is on the Kanin peninsula ¶6. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Moscow is requested to provide the text contained in paragraph 7 below to appropriate host government officials in the form of a non-paper. Washington will provide embassy a courtesy Russian-language translation of the paper. Washington requests that embassy confirm delivery of this paper, the name and office of the official to whom it was delivered, the date of delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that time. ¶7. (S) Begin text of paper: July 28, 2009 U.S. Concerns Regarding the Notification of Russian SLBM Flight Tests - From July 11 to 13, 2009, the United States received a total of three "Notifications of a Flight Test of an ICBM or SLBM" from the Russian Federation. - On July 13, 2009, Russia launched two SS-N-23 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from two separate Delta IV ballistic missile submarines operating in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. - The United States received two notifications for the SS-N-23 SLBM launches (RNC/STR 09-191/78 and RNC/STR 09-192/78). The first notification (RNC/STR 09-191/78) corresponded to the launch that occurred late on July 13, 2009, in terms of launch location and impact area and was given more than 24 hours in advance of the launch. The second notification (RNC/STR 09-192/78),however, corresponded to the launch that occurred early on July 13, 2009, in terms of launch location and impact area, and was given approximately six hours after the launch took place. - The United States recognizes that the Russian Federation acknowledged in its second notification that an error had occurred with respect to its late submission. - The United States notes that with multiple launches of ballistic missiles, the potential for error is increased given the greater complexity of the events. - The United States trusts that in the future, the Russian Federation will seek to ensure due vigilance on the part of those who are responsible for Treaty compliance during such major missile launch exercises. End text. CLINTON