(C) TURKEY'S EU PROSPECTS: U.S.-SWEDEN COORDINATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 077689 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TU EUN SUBJECT: (C) TURKEY'S EU PROSPECTS: U.S.-SWEDEN COORDINATE VIEWS Classified By: EUR Deputy Assistat Secretary Matt Bryza, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a joint EUR-Embassy Stockholm cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: On July 15, EUR DAS Bryza and Swedish MFA European Director Lars Wahlund discussed coordinating strategies to advance Turkey's EU accession and Cyprus negotiations during Sweden's EU Presidency. Both agreed that there is an immediate need for more high-level U.S., EU, and Turkish attention to keep Turkey's EU accession on track past key deadlines this year, with the EU in the lead, given its leverage deriving from Turkey's EU aspirations. Turkey has stalled reforms, failed to enact critical legislation, and is unlikely to open its ports to Cypriot vessels by the December deadline to implement the Additional Ankara Protocol. As a result, the prospect for opening those EU "acquis" chapters not blocked by Cyprus is bleak, with the Swedes limited to opening at most one or two chapters by their Presidency's conclusion. Furthermore, Sweden will face emboldened Turkey-critics in the EU who could seize on Turkey's disappointing progress. Bryza and Wahlund agreed that a Cyprus settlement is essential to keeping Turkey's EU accession on track; Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt characterized Cyprus as "the most important foreign policy problem Sweden will face during its Presidency." Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan must understand the importance of jumpstarting EU reform efforts, and the EU must understand that blocking Turkey's accession or failing to support Cyprus talks could change the strategic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean for years to come. Sweden requested U.S. help to de-escalate Greece-Turkey disputes in the Aegean and encouraged progress on Turkey-Armenia rapprochement and the re-opening of Halki Seminary in Istanbul -- Turkish actions that would improve its EU accession prospects. The sides agreed upon a list of actions (see para 12). End summary. The EU Continues to be Problematic...As Does Turkey -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Wahlund described several challenges facing Turkey's EU prospects. The first set is within the EU itself: EU states' failure to adopt the Lisbon Treaty and the effects of the financial crisis have stalled enlargement; EU states co-opt the enlargement debate to further domestic interests; and certain EU states' refusal to rethink their position on Turkey despite positive Turkish steps, such as new legislation that diminishes the role of the military and improvements on minority rights. ¶4. (C) Wahlund commented that the Swedish EU Presidency's message to Turkey is basic: "help us to help you." Decrying the recess of the Turkish Parliament from July 1 to possibly as late as October as very bad form, Wahlund stressed the urgent need for the Turks to enact reform legislation now to open new chapters. The GOT should also press forward now on issues that do not require new legislation, such as re-opening Halki Seminary in Istanbul. Movement on Halki will certainly be a strong gesture and help in other areas, Wahlund said. Sweden privately is disappointed with Turkey, Wahlund stated, as Turkey's recent efforts do not include specific technical reforms required to advance within chapters as well as open new ones. DAS Bryza noted Turkey's belief that the EU will ultimately recognize that Turkey is too important to fail. This attitude wastes Turkey's opportunity under a supportive Swedish EU Presidency to make headway on EU accession. Characterizing PM Erdogan as the "Turkish Sarkozy" and ultimate decision-maker, Wahlund emphasized that Erdogan must be convinced to re-energize Turkey's reform efforts; otherwise, the EU will run out of chapters to open soon after the Spanish EU Presidency in early 2010. Sweden believes Erdogan's wife can be helpful in this effort and has arranged for a meeting with the Swedish Crown Princess. Sweden has also reached out to Turkish opposition party CHP leader Deniz Baykal to persuade the opposition to support EU reform efforts. Wahlund noted the EU Presidency is considering a process review on EU enlargement policies to "blame and shame EU members" by showing how far Turkey (and other candidate countries) have STATE 00077689 002 OF 004 advanced on the acquis criteria -- a tact that appeals to the Turks. DAS Bryza welcomed active Swedish efforts and stated that U.S. high-level public support for Turkey's EU accession and private urging to further reforms will continue, although the U.S. is not an EU member and has more limited influence on this issue. Prospects for Opening New Chapters "Rather Grim" -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Swedes acknowledged that their EU Presidency might be limited to opening only one or two chapters, likely Education and/or Environment. Other possible chapters - Foreign Policy and Energy - are too problematic. The Environment Chapter requires changes to the constitution as well as serious reductions of sulphur emissions, which would mean substantial financial cost to Turkey. Sweden is working to convince the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) to stop blocking the Education chapter, which will require the ROC to overcome three areas of dispute: 1) "illegal" universities in the northern part of the island; 2) cultural heritage; and 3) remove Turkey's block on ROC membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Foreign Policy chapter has the potential to further complicate NATO-EU cooperation. The Energy Chapter requires progress on Cyprus and is complicated by recent tensions following offshore oil exploration by Houston-based Noble Energy in areas claimed by the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) as its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). (Note: If the ROC proceeds to explore in its claimed EEZ, Turkish warships will resume their harassment, Wahlund predicted. DAS Bryza agreed on the need to avoid more flare-ups during this sensitive period of Cyprus settlement talks, but noted that the USG cannot instruct Noble Energy to halt its activities. DAS Bryza will raise our concerns with Noble Energy on the margins of other discussions and outline how these activities could precipitate a breakdown in ongoing Cyprus negotiations. End note.) Cyprus is Fundamental to Continuing Turkey's EU Accession -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Sweden views a Cyprus settlement as the most important foreign policy agenda item during its EU Presidency and fundamental to a positive outcome in Turkey's fall enlargement review and the December deadline for Turkey to implement the Additional Ankara Protocol (AAP). "If the Cyprus talks fail, Turkey will say goodbye to the EU and NATO-EU cooperation will be dead," Wahlund stressed. He again feared that Erdogan fails to understand the centrality of Cyprus to Turkey's accession prospects. Both Wahlund and Bryza believed the planned summer departure of Turkish MFA U/S Apakan will remove an obstacle to progress. ¶7. (C) Bryza briefed on his mid-July Cyprus visit, describing a more positive atmosphere following the June 26 agreement to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak checkpoint. He said both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiators said they now had more points of agreement than disagreement. Still, Bryza expressed "cautious optimism," which Wahlund echoed. To bolster momentum and instill a sense of urgency, the U.S. is privately clear with the Greek Cypriots that they need to take this opportunity, which could be the last chance to reach a settlement for a generation. Greek Cypriots simply do not understand that Turkey favors a settlement, Wahlund added, and suggested opening up a back channel of communication between them as well as using the future of UNFICYP as a potential stick with the Greek Cypriots. Although the Greek Cypriots recoil at any mention of deadlines, the calendar is a reality they must face: the December deadline for Turkey's implementation of the Additional Ankara Protocol and the April Turkish-Cypriot "presidential" election, wherein the lack of an agreement could result in the election of a Turkish Cypriot hard-liner opposed to any settlement. Greek Cypriots are exhibiting a renewed sense of urgency in the face of Turkish Cypriot "president" Talat's difficult April reelection bid, Wahlund claimed. As part of an effort to bolster Talat, both parties noted it would be helpful for Talat to attend UNGA. Wahlund emphasized the need for the European Commission to be more active and viewed European Commission President Barosso's recent visit to Cyprus as a good first step. ¶8. (C) The EU must also do more, Wahlund stressed. The Commission must apply as much pressure as possible to ensure STATE 00077689 003 OF 004 the Turkish Cypriots receive the benefits of EU membership immediately following a settlement. He agreed the EU must start "preparing for success," and suggested holding a donor's conference, perhaps in Washington, to which Bryza responded that Brussels would likely prefer to host. Bryza raised the idea of resurrecting the 2006 Finnish proposal to open Famagusta seaport and Ercan Airport in exchange for Varosha and a moratorium on development on disputed Greek Cypriot properties. Wahlund said this was a non-starter-the Turks are adamantly opposed to any "piecemeal" step, preferring a comprehensive settlement. While Sweden supports discussing options privately, Wahlund stressed the focus must be on getting a Cyprus settlement by the end of this year and not allowing the parties to think a "Plan B" exists if talks fail. Weathering the Additional Ankara Protocol Deadline -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) In the near-term, Sweden is also working to avoid a Turkey-EU "train wreck" over the EU's fall Enlargement Review and December deadline for Turkey's implementation of the Additional Ankara Protocol (AAP),which requires Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot vessels. Wahlund reported Sweden has reached a "ceasefire" with France and both have agreed not to be "provocative." He felt confident the French would be satisfied with an outcome akin to "no breakthrough, but no breakdown" with Turkey's EU accession. Sweden was looking toward a low-key review of Turkey's AAP implementation, so long as Cyprus talks are making progress. Furthermore, it is not in the interest of Greece or the RoC to end Turkey's EU accession on account of the AAP, Wahlund commented. Sweden supports more Greek involvement, but is not hopeful Athens will be forthcoming given current political strife in Greece and possible elections in spring 2010. Wahlund stressed, though, that Sweden cannot promise that other EU members opposed to Turkey's membership will avoid taking advantage of the review and AAP deadline. Aegean Tensions Still Problematic -------------- ¶10. (C) Wahlund urged the USG to help in de-escalating tensions in the Aegean. Turkey opposes Greece's inclusion of islands whose militarized status is in dispute in NATO exercises over the past three years and has responded with Turkish overflights of inhabited and clearly Greek islands. Bryza stated that U.S. efforts to encourage both sides to work together to reduce tensions and comprehensively address the full range of Aegean disputes are ongoing. We have proposed reinvigorating confidence building measures, including a code of conduct in the Aegean, and encouraged meetings between Greek and Turkish Air Force commanders. Specifically, we are quietly but firmly pressing Turkey to cease overflights of two Greek islands, while also urging the Greeks to avoid provocative air and naval exercises of their own. Nabucco Project Shot in the Arm for Turkey's EU Accession -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Bryza briefed on the status of the Nabucco Pipeline Project, noting the July 13 signing of the inter-governmental agreement (IGA) was a significant step. The IGA should help resolve in part Turkey-Azerbaijan gas transit and pricing disagreements by providing a legal and regulatory framework. Though optimistic that a reasonable, commercially-viable agreement is possible, Bryza noted that disputes between Turkey and private investors on gas pricing are likely. Wahlund said he would seek EU assistance and will propose discussing the 15 percent lift off with European companies in the Nabucco consortium. Bryza recounted Turkish FM Davutoglu's statement to him that Turkey timed the Nabucco event to occur just days before the July 17 Minsk Group meeting on Nagorno-Karabakh in Moscow between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents as a show of good faith to Baku to elicit a constructive approach. Though both processes are separate, they are moving forward in parallel, and a breakthrough on Nagorno-Karabakh is critical to progress on Turkey-Armenia rapprochement. Wahlund emphasized that progress on Turkey-Armenia, including the opening of the border, before the EU's enlargement review reports are released in October would be very helpful. Strategies to Keep Turkey's EU Accession on Track STATE 00077689 004 OF 004 -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C/REL SWEDEN) Agreed upon courses of action include: On Turkey: EU in particular encourages Erdogan to move Parliament toward real reforms, especially technical reforms aimed at closing specific acquis chapters; encourage the Turkish Parliament to remain in session after their brief August session to elect a new speaker; stress to Erdogan the importance of avoiding a collapse in Cyprus; prepare the Turkish military for a deal on Cyprus; encourage movement on Halki Seminary and Turkey-Armenia rapprochement; and communicate with MFA U/S Apakan's successor and encourage him to be more flexible than his predecessor. On the EU: Disassociate Turkey's strategic cooperation in regional issues (Iran and the Caucasus) from the "privileged partner" image that France wants and Turkey wishes to avoid. Sweden will work with the Commission to possibly stage a public review of Turkey's progress in each of the chapters to further demonstrate Turkey's progress and flush out its opponents in the EU. On Cyprus: Continue to push the "Now or Never" message to all parties involved in the Cyprus peace talks; urge think-thanks such as the German Marshall Fund to spur helpful debate on the Cyprus issue; U.S. to raise the danger to ongoing negotiations of continuing offshore oil exploration with Noble Energy; work to get Talat to UNGA in September; hold a donors conference, probably in Brussels. On the Aegean: U.S. and EU to continue efforts to urge Greece and Turkey to de-escalate tensions. CLINTON