GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA

S E C R E T STATE 075614 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2029 TAGS: PARM PREL KACT KTIA START JCIC US RS SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, JULY 22-24, 2009 REF: A. STATE 041125 ¶B. STATE 050911 ¶C. STATE 050910 ¶D. STATE 060343 ¶E. STATE 060487 ¶F. STATE 061832 ¶G. MOSCOW 01347 ¶H. GENEVA 00419 (SFO-GVA-I-007) ¶I. STATE 064643 ¶J. GENEVA 000521 (SFO-GVA-II-004) ¶K. GENEVA 000514 (SFO-GVA-II-003) ¶L. 04 GENEVA 1026 (BIC-I-001) Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, VCI. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, will head the U.S. delegation in continuing negotiations regarding a START Follow-on treaty with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, in Geneva, Switzerland on July 22-24, 2009. ¶2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw from previous guidance and U.S. nonpapers (reftels) to discuss U.S. views relating to a START Follow-on treaty. During discussions on the margins of the Moscow Summit, Antonov suggested that the next round of negotiations focus on (1)the offense-defense relationship; (2) conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs; (3) what will be counted under the treaty limits; and (4) the interest of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in participating in the negotiations. Delegation is authorized to reach agreement on these issues as detailed in paragraphs 3 ? 7, below. Delegation should report on all meetings as expeditiously as possible. -------------- Relationship Between Offense and Defense -------------- ¶3. (S) Delegation may draw from the discussion contained in Ref K to clarify Russia's concerns on the relationship between strategic offense and defense. Delegation should reiterate that the U.S. position remains clear, as was explained during the drafting of the Joint Understanding (text in paragraph 8, below) that there would only be a single mention of defensive arms in the treaty and that would be in the preamble. -------------- Conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs -------------- ¶4. (S) As directed by the White House, on the margins of the July Moscow Summit, Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed the earlier U.S. proposal regarding the counting of non-nuclear warheads. If the Russian Delegation raises the question of the U.S. proposal on non-nuclear warheads and treaty limits made in conjunction with the Moscow Summit Joint Understanding, Delegation should reaffirm that the United States is willing to resolve the issue of non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs by counting such warheads toward the treaty limit on strategic warheads in exchange for Russian agreement: (a) to a strategic warhead limit of 1500 and a strategic delivery vehicle limit of 700-900 (with the specific number within this range to be agreed through further negotiation); and (b) to exclude from the treaty strategic delivery vehicles that are currently counted in START but that are not now part of the strategic nuclear forces of the parties. As required, Delegation should draw on previous guidance to explain which U.S. strategic delivery vehicles currently counted in START should be excluded from the new treaty. If Russia proposes alternate numbers for warhead or delivery vehicle limits, proposes additional limitations on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs or asks questions about which non-nuclear warheads are to be counted, delegation should probe the Russian delegation for its views and report the Russian position and questions back to Washington. -------------- What Will Be Counted Under Treaty Limits -------------- ¶5. (S) Delegation may draw from discussions contained in Refs J and K to explain the U.S. views on what should be counted in the START Follow-on treaty, explaining that the U.S. was drawing from a Russian proposal tabled at the first meeting of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission (Ref L). Depending on the results of discussion on conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs (see paragraph 4, above),the delegation may delete the word "nuclear" as appropriate in the U.S. position on what should be counted in the START Follow-on treaty. -------------- -------------- Participation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Delegation should draw from points in the U.S. paper contained in paragraph 7 of Ref I as well as previous guidance to reiterate the U.S. view that the START Follow-on treaty will be a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. Delegation should also seek to draw out Russian views regarding the ideas presented earlier by the United States with respect to possible additional steps that could be taken to inform and reassure Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on developments relating to further cuts in strategic offensive arms. -------------- Organization for Future Work -------------- ¶7. (S) Delegation should present a notional plan for organization of further work on the START Follow-on treaty, drawing on the experience gained during START negotiations. In particular, working groups would be modeled on those that were in place during the negotiation of START. Such work would begin in earnest at the end of August and continue until the work was completed. -------------- Text of the Joint Understanding -------------- ¶8. (U) On July 6, 2009 during the Moscow Summit, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the following Joint Understanding: The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty, and directed that the new treaty contain, inter alia, the following elements: ¶1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100 for strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their associated warheads. ¶2. Provisions for calculating these limits. ¶3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections, and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. ¶4. A provision to the effect that each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. ¶5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. ¶6. A provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability. ¶7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national territory of each Party. ¶8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve questions related to treaty implementation. ¶9. A provision to the effect that the treaty will not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state. ¶10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The two Presidents direct their negotiators to finish work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries. Signed at Moscow, this sixth day of July, 2009, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: End text. CLINTON